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Inovação na Diplomacia Cultural: O Caso da China

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Thesis presented to the University of Aveiro to fulfill the necessary requirements to obtain the Doctoral Degree in Public Policy, carried out under the scientific guidance of Doctor Carlos José de Oliveira e Silva Rodrigues, Associate Professor in the Department of Social, Political and Territory Sciences at the University of Aveiro

To my supervisor, my beloved family and all my sincere friends

o júri
Presidente

Vogais

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Resumo   Este estudo tem como foco a inovação da Diplomacia Cultural da China (DCC) através do Instituto Confúcio (IC). Os principais conteúdos giram em torno dos seguintes objetivos de investigação: 1) compreender o enquadramento estratégico e o percurso prático da Diplomacia Cultural da China e clarificar o contexto da sua herança e inovação; 2) analisar se o IC, exemplo de inovação crucial da Diplomacia Cultural da China, melhorou a imagem nacional da China nos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP) e aumentou a atração e competitividade internacional da cultura chinesa; e 3) explorar como a China pode formular melhor a sua estratégia de Diplomacia Cultural, de acordo com as exigências da era moderna. O estudo combina os métodos de revisão de literatura, estudo de caso e pesquisa de questionário para explorar os tópicos de diferentes perspetivas com o objetivo de fortalecer a natureza científica dos resultados de investigação.

Além da introdução e da conclusão, a tese está dividida em cinco capítulos. O Capítulo 1 discute a conotação e o valor de Diplomacia Cultural (DC). O Capítulo 2 expõe o desenvolvimento e a inovação da Diplomacia Cultural da China (DCC). O Capítulo 3 resume sistematicamente a interação cultural da China no seu processo diplomático com os Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa (PALOP). O Capítulo 4 discorre sobre o papel do IC em termos do seu modo de operar e dos seus meios diplomáticos. O Capítulo 5 constitui o núcleo da tese e envolve a análise empírica dos dados do estudo de caso e do questionário. Tem como objetivo investigar as funções, a imagem pública, a influência e os meios práticos dos IC no processo de Diplomacia Cultural (DC). As principais descobertas indicam que os IC nos PALOP alcançaram o feedback social ideal e desempenham um papel positivo na formação da imagem da China. No entanto, de acordo com os diferentes continentes onde os IC estão situados, os resultados da pesquisa apresentam caraterísticas distintas que estão intimamente relacionadas com as diferentes políticas externas da China para a América Latina, a Europa e a África e são determinadas pelas experiências históricas e pelas condições nacionais dos vários países. A futura tarefa da Diplomacia Cultural da China (DCC) será a de esclarecer as raízes institucionais da China e os genes culturais por trás do seu desenvolvimento, usando intercâmbios culturais e a cultura fluida da China para transmitir uma mensagem de busca de paz, de desenvolvimento e de cooperação por parte da China.

key words   China, Cultural Diplomacy, Innovation, Confucius Institute

abstract   This study focuses on the innovation of China's cultural diplomacy (CCD) by means of the Confucius Institute (CI). The main contents revolve around the following research goals: 1) to understand the strategic framework and practical path of CCD, and to clarify the context of its inheritance and innovation; 2) to analyze whether the CI, epitomized as a crucial innovation of CCD, has improved China's national image in Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs) and enhanced the attraction and international competitiveness of Chinese culture; and 3) to explore how China can better formulate its CD strategy in line with the exigencies of the modern era. The study combines the methods of literature review, case study, and questionnaire research to explore the topics from different perspectives to strengthen the scientific nature of the research results.

In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the connotation and value of CD. Chapter 2 expounds the development and innovation of CCD. Chapter 3 systematically summarizes China's cultural interaction in its diplomatic process with PSCs. Chapter 4 elaborates on the CI in terms of its operation mode and diplomatic means. Chapter 5 forms the core of the study and involves empirical analysis of case-study and questionnaire data. It aims to investigate the functions, public image, influence, and practical means of CIs in the process of CD. Major findings indicate that CIs in PSCs have achieved ideal social feedback and play a positive role in shaping the image of China. However, according to the different continents where CIs are located, the survey results show distinct characteristics which are closely related to China's different foreign policies towards Latin America, Europe, and Africa and are determined by the historical experiences and national conditions of the various countries. The future task for CCD is to clarify China's institutional roots and the cultural genes behind its development by using cultural exchanges and China's fluid culture to convey a message of China's pursuit of peace, development, and cooperation.

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Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANU-CI	Confucius Institute at Agostinho Neto University
ASEAN	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRI	The Silk and the Road Initiatives
CC	Confucius Classroom
CCD	China's Cultural Diplomacy
CD	Cultural Diplomacy
CI	Confucius Institute
CICRM	Confucius Institute Conference Reference Materials
CIEF	The Chinese International Education Foundation
CPC	The Communist Party of China
CPLP	The Community of Portuguese Language Countries
DUFL	Dalian University of Foreign Languages
FAAP-BCI	Business Confucius Institute at FAAP
Hanban	The National Office for International Promotion of Chinese Language
Macao Forum	The Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and PSCs
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
PCU-Rio-CI	Confucius Institute at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro
PSCs	Portuguese-speaking countries
UA-CI	Confucius Institute at the University of Aveiro
UC-CI	Confucius Institute at University of Coimbra
UCV-CI	Confucius Institute at University of Cape Verde
UEM-CI	Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University
UFC-CI	Confucius Institute at Federal University of Ceará in Fortaleza
UL-CI	Confucius Institute at University of Lisbon
UM-CI	Confucius Institute at University of Minho
UNB-CI	Confucius Institute at the University of Brasilia
UNESP-CI	Confucius Institute at University of Estadual Paulista
UNICAMP-CI	Confucius Institute at Campinas State University
UP-CI	Confucius Institute at University of Porto
USTP-CI	Confucius Institute at São Tomé e Príncipe University
ZJNU	Zhejiang Normal University

Introduction

The intensification of global intercommunication is a distinguishing characteristic of the 21st century. Furthermore, international relations involve more than simply inter-government transactions, but also involve the public of all countries, which will then be subject to cultural factors such as lifestyle and ways of thinking (Moran et al.*,*2006). Under such circumstances cultural diplomacy has become a research focus for academic scholars and policy makers. Meanwhile, cultural diplomacy has been proactively put into practice by many countries to achieve mutual exchange between different cultures. China is no exception, since China has made unprecedented steps towards becoming a major player at the center of the world stage. The Chinese government follows the concept of "harmony" (和 *hé* in Chinese) and adheres to the position of "inclusiveness" (包容 *bāo róng*）and has fully embarked on its road to cultural diplomacy (Wang, 2014). At present, the vital issue confronting China is to boost its international competitiveness while at the same time improving China's national image by means of advancing the image of its attractive mixture of cultures (An, 2014). In this way, China's cultural diplomacy serves as an important starting point to play a unique role for a more global appreciation of its culture. This study aims to outline the inheritance and innovation of China's cultural diplomacy and try to define its strategic framework. Finally, the study will attempt to propose a trajectory that China can follow in the future. In this context, as an important innovation of China's cultural diplomacy, the Confucius Institute (CI) has certain representative features. In this thesis we question whether CI can serve China's national interests and enhance its national image on the world stage. This will be our focus and we will attempt to suggest some answers by dint of a rigorous and detailed study.

i. Origin of Topic Selection

China is softening its diplomatic approach by setting up an unprecedented global network of CIs to project a positive image of itself as a benign country (Gil, 2008). CI is designed to function as a bridge reinforcing friendship and cooperation between China

and the rest of the world while its rapid expansion has provided chances for people across the world to learn the Chinese language and understand its culture (Liu, 2014). In a view to avoid over-generalization, this study will narrow down the scope of CIs on the global map to those in Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs) based on two principal considerations.

i.i. Academic Motivation

Whereas CI as an innovative highlight of China's cultural diplomacy has attracted the interest of academic and political groups, as well as the media, the global coverage about its impact inside and outside China has been at the same time both controversial and impressive. Based on the articles published on this topic from 2004 to 2021, one can conclude that the majority of the articles focused on specific Chinese language teaching details, teacher training issues, comparisons with other cultural diplomatic forms, as well as reactions to CI in terms of public opinion and social values. Regardless of the topic, in the case of PSCs, there continues to be an enormous gap in the knowledge on how CI, in those countries, has contributed to strengthen China's national image and improve its cultural diplomacy. Therefore, given the current literature and the highlighted research gaps, an empirical study providing sound insights on the impact of CI seems a necessary step.

i.ii. Personal Motivation

The author, since 2013, has had the opportunity to closely observe the work of the Confucius Institute at the University of Brasilia (Brazil) and also the one at the University of Aveiro (Portugal). She has also attended a wide range of academic conferences on CIs, as well as the Annual Global Confucius Conference for consecutive seven years. The author has visited many CIs in different countries, which gives her a first-hand understanding about China's ambitious flagship project as well as useful background information. In addition, the author has finished two research projects on CI sponsored by Liaoning Province in China. All the experience and insight gained from previous studies contribute to her future research. Moreover, the research will draw on

persuasive arguments and rich internal materials such as the Confucius Institute Conference Reference Materials(CICRM), official papers, news reports, by-laws and statistics related to CIs, observation results and interviews, and government policy documental sources. These internal materials and ethnographic interviews carried out in CIs operating in PSCs shed vital light on China's promotional politics and how China promotes itself globally to improve its national image.

ii. The Significance of the Research

The study is based on a thorough analysis of 22 CIs operating in PSCs, carefully selected in order to bring into the discussion of the social, political and cultural specificities of four different continents: Latin America, Asia, Europe and Africa. In terms of the amount of CIs further afield in PSCs, it is evident that it should be established how much China values bilateral relations with those countries. Historical and economic relations between China and PSCs have been close and at an all-time high in recent years (China Daily, 2020). According to the official figures published by China's General Administration of Customs, from January to December 2019, the total value of imports and exports between China and PSCs was 149.639 billion US dollars with a year-on-year increase of 1.55%. China imported 105.574 billion US dollars from PSCs, an increase of 0.06% year-on-year while exports to PSCs were 44.065 billion US dollars, an increase of 5.3% year-on-year (PRC Ministry of Commerce, 2020). China values positive bilateral relations and takes advantage of the unique resources of PSCs in developing the Chinese concept of a community of common destiny for all mankind (人类命运共同体 *rénlèi mìngyùn gòngtóngtǐ*). With the political and economic background, it is of great use to evaluate the CI's performance in PSCs as a means of cultural diplomacy. Although Chinese language teaching and cultural exchanges in PSCs take on various characteristics under different circumstances, they share such things in common as the Chinese and foreign host institutions with distinct advantageous academic disciplines which provide a wide range of educational resources for the development of

CIs. Meanwhile, the well-established connection between different PSCs, as well as the vast geographical coverage, cultural diversification and distinctive educational resources can be deemed as providing favorable conditions for the development of the particular characteristics of the CI. Finally, the effect of China's innovation at the level of cultural diplomacy policy will be elaborated, based on representative data and illustration's provided by the study. Accordingly, reasonable suggestions and reflections on the future prospects of CI and China's cultural diplomacy will be proposed.

ii.i. Literature Review

In his famous book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University coined the term "soft power" (Nye, 2004). Later, Nye (2008) suggested that soft power is the ability to affect others to acquire the outcomes one wants through attraction instead of coercion or payment. When dealing with international relations on the world stage, the importance of cultural elements have for a long time been relatively neglected. On the contrary, military and economic powers have been the favorite focus for most professionals and politicians (Stelowska, 2015). International power can be generally induced in three categories including power in fields of military, economy and power over opinion (Carr, 2000). In this context, cultural diplomacy has been endowed with solid foundation to thrive and develop. The first use of the buzzword "culture diplomacy" appears in the thirties of the last century, but only gets its deserving attention after the umbrella term "public diplomacy" steps onto the world stage. cultural diplomacy as part of public policy plays an important role in meeting foreign policy objectives with the underlying goal of increasing its soft power. However, to adequately achieve the objectives of cultural diplomacy, the power and flexibility of culture needs to be put to good use.

Afterwards, the term "cultural diplomacy" explodes into diplomatic use and simultaneously occupies an important position in cultural discourse (Ang, et al., 2015). The growing interest in the innovative facets of diplomacy's theoretical and practical foundations has aroused academic attention with the result that scholars have started to

analyze the nature and implications of the innovation as well. To date, many countries have been undergoing a series of diplomatic strategies to change their national image and improve the present status of their soft power. The toolbox of cultural diplomacy provides many alternatives, which are comprehensively used: among them are interchange of cultural communication, increasing favor among overseas students, building-up language training programs, offering cultural assistance and trade, enhancing academic exchanges (Murray, et al., 2001). Some countries have launched language training programs in target countries and chosen a representative figure in their own culture to name the language institution so as to enlarge the cultural influence, such as China's Confucius, Germany's Goethe, Britain's Shakespeare, Cervantes of Spain, Dante Alighieri of Italy, Camões of Portugal. These language institutions have facilitated the process of strengthening cultural exchanges among the countries (Pan, 2013). In this framework, CI following its Constitution and By-laws, has defined its work scope to satisfy the demands of people from different countries and regions in the world to understand the Chinese language and culture and to promote the development of multi-culturalism, and to construct a harmonious world. These dual functions of language teaching and cultural communication offered by this comprehensive cultural exchange platform strives to make the world get to know the real China and understand the true Chinese culture. Therein, many findings reveal that CI is helping to shape the way China is viewed among a foreign public (Brazys & Dukalskis, 2019; Huang & Xiang, 2019; An, et al., 2014).

Meanwhile, there is an apparent contrast between Chinese scholars and foreign researchers in terms of perspectives and trends in their studies concerning CI. The vast majority of foreign literature tends to agree that the CI is an expression and promotion of Chinese cultural soft power (Nye, 2005; Ferdinand, 2016; Benavides, 2012). Some scholars have developed a neutral evaluation of cultural soft power, while others hold that the Chinese cultural soft power represented by CI is a kind of cultural invasion. In turn, researches in China mainly focus on the practical daily operation of CIs, outlining

recommendations for improving their operation and management, while fulfilling the functions of cultural diplomacy. The attitude of these scholars heralds that CI has improved the international status of the Chinese language and helped China exert a more prominent role in the world of international politics. In contrast, foreign studies mainly look at CI from the perspectives of cultural soft power, China's rise, China's foreign policy, China's outward assistance in educational field and economic globalization. Gil (2008, p.119) mentions that CI embodies soft power in world politics. However, at the state-to-state level, it does not seem to be influencing the policies and actions of other countries, nor leading governments to unhesitatingly comply with China's intentions. At the people-to-people level, however, it has contributed to Chinese language promotion and helped facilitate understandings of China, but not necessarily brought more positive dispositions towards China (Gil, 2017). Falk (2018) argues that CI is a unique institution connecting China's global rise and its national culture, thus assuming the status of a form of cultural diplomacy. Starr (2009) believes that the establishment of the first CI in 2004 marks China's political self-confidence: so, after a century of semi-colonial status and 50 years of third world status China has finally become an important member on the world stage. Lien (2014) points out that along with the establishment of new or more CIs in non-English speaking developing countries, the network of CIs will lead to a greater global impact. However, the potential mutual benefit between China and these under-representing countries should be a prerequisite for attracting these countries to establish CIs. Sahlins (2015) commented that although the establishment of CIs will reduce the number of existing local Chinese schools in recipient countries, which normally are managed by Chinese diaspora, CI successfully encourages more people to learn Chinese. The foreign literature reveals that the attitude of foreign researchers differs from the Chinese researcher's approaches. Nevertheless, scholars have reached a consensus that the rapid leap of CI in the global layout is the reflection of the successful performance of China's economy, education and language globalization (Gil, 2009; Hartig, 2012; Starr, 2009; Chen, 2015).

ii.ii. Research Content

Drawing on a literature review, the project starts by looking at cultural diplomacy and its innovative forms. The outline of a solid conceptualization of cultural diplomacy is essential to frame the role CIs are supposed to play in improving China's national image. The approach focuses on three issues: initially, with the adoption of the cultural diplomacy theory and its practice in several influential countries, especially of China, the thesis aims to explore the reasons and challenges that the countries are facing while interacting with the rest of world. Then, the strategic framework and practical path of China's cultural diplomacy is interpreted and the context of its inheritance and innovation clarified. Secondly, a panoramic review of diplomatic relations between China and PSCs is undertaken to reveal how China is strengthening bilateral relationships and cooperation by means of cultural diplomacy. Armed with the empirical analysis results, the thesis analyzes whether CI, as an important innovation of China's cultural diplomacy, has promoted the national image of China in PSCs and enhanced international competitiveness and attraction of Chinese culture in those countries. Finally, according to the research results, this paper discusses how China can make a cultural diplomacy strategy to meet the requirements of the new era and suggests future innovative paths for cultural diplomacy.

iii. Methodological Approach

Following the emphasis contemporary social sciences place on the use of multiple research methods, the systematic empirical study combines quantitative and qualitative research to explore a specific research topic from different perspectives, thus, strengthening the scientific soundness of research results originated from the first-hand sources. Throughout the whole process the project employs a mixed model to complete the research including the methods of literature review, case study and questionnaire research while practical fieldwork and ethnographic supervision are also used. An analytical framework of the literature review will be followed by this mixed paradigm, as

it thought to be an appropriate model to carry out the investigation by means of both qualitative and quantitative methods.

iii.i. Multiple Case Studies

The case study is recognized and valued by the academic community as a social science research tool which allows one to understand and make an in-depth description of given phenomena. As an innovative form of China's cultural diplomacy, CI aims to play a role in shaping China's national image in PSCs through four means, normally employed in cultural diplomacy: language education, cultural promotion, academic exchange and media promotion. Three typical CIs are deliberately targeted, drawing on multilevel documental sources, media outlets publicized by foreign and Chinese sources, field observations as well as interviews and presentations. The three CIs have been established at different times and developed their operations in different scales, as well as under distinct economic, political, cultural and historical backgrounds. They are the Confucius Institute at the University of Aveiro (UA-CI), in Portugal, which is the main case, the Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM-CI), in Mozambique, and the Confucius Institute at the University of Brasilia (UNB-CI), in Brazil. Using a variety of documental sources, from reports and private notes to official records, in-depth interviews with personnel, direct observation of and participation in activities, the study reveals the developing and changing process of CIs in PSCs in a detailed way and demonstrates how this innovation of cultural diplomacy operates in specific contexts, so as to shape China's national image.

iii.ii. Questionnaire Research

Questionnaires have been distributed to the related targets. With the basis on a Likert scale with seven points, adult students from fifteen CIs in PSCs have provided opinions on the role CI plays in shaping China's national image through cultural promotion and Chinese teaching. Moreover, they were asked about perceptions on the effect of CI with regard to China's growing influence on the host country. The selection of the fifteen CIs has been made on the basis of purposive sampling and the questionnaire has been

validated by the supervisor and representatives of CI including course directors, Chinese teachers and chosen students who enrolled in Chinese courses and participated in CI cultural activities, respectively. This social survey pays more attention to the average social intention or attitude of the investigated group. At the next stage, the study involves a frequency analysis followed by careful analytic induction. Finally, there follows some reflection with regards to this research on all previously collected information including interviews, reports and official documents.

iv. About Originality

With the rapid development of China in the past 40 years, China's educational and cultural cooperation and its relationship with different countries (regions) and international organizations in the world have been continuously consolidated. The international influence of China's soft power competitiveness has been increasing and the number of CIs has also mushroomed. Many researchers focus on CI but fail to engage in empirical research needed to foster in-depth analysis of its role in shaping the national image. Most studies offer overall comments on the subject, but lack the support of solid data. As a significant innovation of cultural diplomacy, CI is an undertaking ranging over distinct cultures or civilizations between distinct nations, social, economic and political systems and races. Therefore, if the research takes all the various interwoven elements into consideration, due to the sheer complexity of the research topics it risks being too general and too superficially analyzed to fall into the track of overgeneralization and emptiness due to the research subject. Armed with the theoretical framework of soft power and national image shaping, this thesis aims to fill the void and the knowledge gap. It proposes to discuss the innovation of cultural diplomacy following both the oriental and occidental academic point of view by choosing to study how China has established its global cultural footprint through its CIs. This thesis draws on the methods of literature review, quantitative study and multiple case studies to focus on those CIs operating in PSCs, which is an unprecedented research with topographical

selection. The impact on shaping China's national image is verified by first-hand information obtained from students. The main case and confirmatory cases are analyzed at multiple levels. After the evaluation, the potential predicaments and obstacles that CIs are encountering are selected and the thesis puts forward some suggestions and future prospects for Chinese policy makers to improve cultural diplomatic policies and better engage in international interactions. The reliability of the study is built on a variety of published materials and the major findings may result in a significant contribution to knowledge expansion on this topic. This kind of panoramic research reveals how the people in PSCs perceive China's efforts in shaping its national image. Moreover, it suggests that CIs, being a non-profit cultural institution, and celebrating China's image and culture plays a very relevant role in promoting cultural exchanges. Ultimately, this will add energy to the development of China's relations with PSCs.

v. Limitation

Although the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is fully-fledged in the study, a number of limitations should be acknowledged. The initial plan of conducting interviews and collecting information from all the CI's foreign directors and presidents of host universities in PSCs ran into an awkward reality: only two foreign directors working in Brazil and three in Portugal have been interviewed. The number of interviews has hampered the carrying out of a full research project, namely with regard to how the administrators of CI view the situation. Nevertheless, the author has selected and analyzed some of the related comments of the administrators voiced in different media channels in order to compensate for these limitation.

Chapter 1: Redefining Cultural Diplomacy for the 21st Century

In the long course of history, having people understand your thought is much greater security than another submarine.

—J. William Fulbright

More than ever before, culture is a central component of international relations and so plays an important role in expanding countries' global influence. Cultural exchange has been well-practiced and intertwined with the pursuit of foreign relations throughout history. From the reciprocal gifts of ancient rulers to modern-day Expos, culture has been employed by leaders and countries to assert their power and build mutual relationships (Casey, 2011; Holden et al., 2007). Cultural diplomacy is increasingly valued by academia and governments.

This chapter begins by redefining cultural diplomacy in terms of soft power and national image. Then theoretical support is provided for the research via a panoramic review that harnesses ideas of eastern and western academic circles. The chapter explores the cultural diplomacy practices of several leading powers in order to set up a systemic framework to analyze, on the one hand, the importance of cultural diplomacy within national diplomatic strategies in a polarized world and, on the other hand, the way innovations in cultural diplomacy help shape national images.

1.1. Key Discursive Terms

Classifying Cultures

The word "culture" in English expresses a complex, hard to define concept. Any argument about culture confronts enduring debates over its definition and vastness. Etymologically, the word comes from Latin, originally referring to the cultivation, processing, and improvement of land in transforming nature to meet the human needs of food and shelter. Marcus Tullius Cicero, a famous Roman orator, uses culture as an

agricultural metaphor for the development of philosophical soul, i.e., the way human beings get rid of barbarism and grow into full citizens. The content of culture has changed to mean a process of transforming and perfecting people's inner world and giving them ideal citizenship (Fishwick, 2013). Since the end of the 18th century, further changes have taken place in the meaning and usage of the term in Western languages. In this period, the term mainly refers to the tendency of natural growth and the process of human cultivation. By the 19th century, culture is first used to describe a certain state or habit of the mind, something closely related to the perfection of human thought and to the general state of knowledge development in society. Culture also now describes the sum of all kinds of arts.

Amidst the changing fortunes of cultural upsurge, researchers increasingly differ on the definition of culture. E. B. Tylor (1871) was the first person to give the term *culture* a scientific definition: Culture or civilization is a complex entirety including knowledge, belief, art, law, ethics, customs, and any other abilities and habits acquired by people as members of society through learning. Under his influence, many scholars have studied culture from different methods and perspectives, leading to the emergence of various cultural schools. Franz Boas (1911) argued that

> "culture embraces all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the product of human activities as determined by these habits." (p. 159)

Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) thought that culture refers to the unique way of life of a certain human group, which includes both explicit and implicit patterns of living:

> "All cultures constitute so many somewhat distinct answers to essentially the same questions posed by human biology and by the generalities of the human situation. ... Every society's patterns for living must provide approved and sanctioned ways for dealing with such universal circumstances as the existence of two sexes; the helplessness of infants; the need for satisfaction of the elementary biological requirements such as food, warmth, and sex." (pp. 317-18)

Political scientists became interested in exploring cultural questions in the late 1950s because they sought to delimit the cultural domain they thought pertained to political culture (Spencer-Oatey, 2012). George Simmel (1997, p. 103) explained that culture

emerges out of human life and its intentions and is created by human beings as objectified contents in language, religion, normative orders, legal systems, traditions, artistic artifacts, and so on. On this view, cultures are strengthened by the social and cultural values which undergird human development and help determine human behavior. Hofstede (2011) simplifies the definition of culture, seeing it as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group of people from another. He also offers a dimensional model for scholars to use in analyzing the differences between cultures and understanding the connotations of culture.

In China, the germination of cultural awareness can be dated back to the Eastern Zhou (东周 dōng zhōu) Dynasty (Wang & Zhu, 2006). Confucius, strongly advocating an etiquette system, said in *The Analects of Confucius* (论语 Lúnyǔ), "The rich and complete etiquette system of the Zhou Dynasty was built on the basis of that of the Xia and Shang dynasties. I abide by the system of the Zhou Dynasty" (周监于二代，郁郁乎文哉！吾从周。Zhōu jiān yú èr dài, yùyù hū wénzāi! Wú cóng zhōu) (Gong, 1984, p. 23). The word "Wén" (文) here has already embodied the connotation of culture. Then the words Wén（文）and Huà （化）were used separately in the book of *I Ching* (易经 Yì jīng) i.e., "the sage observes and grasps the humanities so he should educate all living beings with poems, books, rituals and music and make the society reach a harmonious state" (观乎人文以化成天下 Guān hū rénwén yǐ huàchéng tiānxià) (Lyu, 2010, p. 18).

Etymologically, the first combination of the words Wén （文）and Huà （化）appeared in the book 说苑·指武 (Shuō yuàn·zhǐ wǔ) written by Liu Xiang in the Western Han (西汉) Dynasty. He writes that the sage should govern the world by virtue initially and then conquer the world by force if necessary. Anyone who aims to conquer a country by force will not convince its people. Only when the people cannot be governed and changed by virtue may the conquerors punish the people with force (圣人之治天下也，先文德而后武力 Shèngrén zhī zhì tiānxià yě, xiān wén dé érhòu wǔlì (Gao, 2013, p. 207). Here the connotation of culture is against military force. Subsequently, culture in ancient Chinese meant to educate people with virtues, ethics, and morality so that

people's behaviors are restricted by etiquette. Xun Yue in the Han (汉) Dynasty added that self-promotion and culture should be combined while educating the people (Zhang & Li, 2017). The Prince of the Southern Dynasty Xiao Tong expounded the relationship between culture and force: Only by strengthening domestic cultural cultivation can external achievements be gained (文化内辑，武功外悠 Wénhuà nèi jí, wǔgōng wài yōu). Wang Rong in the Southern Qi (齐) Dynasty emphasized the importance of 文化 (Wénhuà) as the basic means and content of governance (敷文化以柔远 Fū wénhuà yǐ róu) (Liang, 1990, p. 50).

The earliest concept of the term "culture" (文化 Wénhuà) in China emphasizes ruling a country with rules, regulations, etiquette, and customs (Wang, 2009). Japanese scholars first translated the Chinese word 文化 (Wénhuà) into English *culture*. As Qian Mu (2019) said, China's culture lays particular emphasis on spiritual aspects. Such a definition agrees somewhat with western scholars' understanding of culture as cultivation, breeding, and domestication, putting culture above a certain way of life. *A Sea of Words* (词海 Cíhǎi) expresses the word "culture" in Chinese: the sum of material wealth and spiritual wealth created in the process of human social and historical practice; the ideology of society, as well as the corresponding institutions and organizations; general knowledge including the overview of the definition of culture in Chinese knowledge (Dictionary Research Center, 2015, p. 690).

Combining concepts of culture from both western and eastern traditions, this thesis subscribes first to the idea that culture is initially a product of history. Second, I maintain that culture is a complex social, political, and economic entity, produced in part by the ways different cultures interact, impacting and changing one another. Culture is also here an extension of morality, the spiritual attribute beyond life as well as an ideological system. Third, culture is multi-dimensional: it is wealth created in the course of the historical practice of human society; the superstructure of society and its corresponding institutions and organizations; and the general knowledge of ancient politics and culture (Xu, 2017).

Soft Power

The theory of soft power has a long history. Its early prototype can be detected in Gramsci's theory of "cultural hegemony" and Althusser's "ideology and state machine" (Hui, 2001). In the early 1990s, Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington proposed "The end of history" (Fukuyama, 1992) and "The clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996), respectively. In Fukuyama's point of view, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the upheaval of Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War mark the end of communism. According to the author, moving forward the wheels of history would run only on the road of the western market economy and liberal democracy. Huntington (1993), in turn, suggested in *The Conflict of Civilizations* that "the commonness and differences of civilizations affect national interests". He thinks that the present national paradigm cannot meet the needs of the new developing world because after the end of the Cold War countries began to develop new models of confrontation and coordination. Accordingly, the clash of civilizations has become a new framework for understanding the world. In this context, Huntington underlines the vital role of culture in shaping global political structure. As a sign, the research perspective of international politics has shifted from civilization conflict to political conflict (Liu & Guan, 2015). Cultural elements are now increasingly used in the global diplomatic arena.

In the same period, another formative view on the relation between culture and power was offered by Joseph Nye (1990), who coined the term "soft power" and defined it as a nation's cultural resources that can enhance, or even substitute for, military and economic strength. Nye describes soft power as

> …the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. (2004, p. x)

The term can be seen as an extension and development of Carr's (1954) idea of "power over opinion" and Lukes' (1974) "third dimension of power," both of which shed light on how the attractiveness of a nation's cultural resources give it the ability to

persuade other nations to willingly adopt its goals. The essential part of soft power, as Nye (2004) further explains, is the ability to affect others so as to obtain what one wants through co-option and attraction rather than through coercion or payment. Put simply, soft power is used to win hearts and minds. It is generated from the resources of culture, values, and policies. The instrumentalizations may include the attraction of normative values, media, business practices, education, and language (Nye, 2016). Thus, the theories of soft power and clash of civilizations make the function of culture more prominent in international relations (Carbonell, 2018).

Soft power theory has aroused large-scale debate in the United States and looms large on the world stage. Not only the U.S. government but also Beijing has embraced soft power as a prominent part of its comprehensive national power. The term "soft power" has been formally adopted by top PRC leaders such as President Hu Jintao (Glaser, 2009). The prevalent understandings of the concept encompass a narrower sense and a broader one. The former believes that soft power is similar to cultural influence. British historian Niall Ferguson (2004) and German publicist Josef Joffe (Joffe, 2001, 2006) are its firm supporters. In China, the majority of opinion on soft power also conforms to this narrower sense. The "culture" school argues that "the core of soft power is culture" while the "politics" school maintains that not the softness of resources but the soft use of them is the "key to whether a certain power source becomes soft or hard." Soft power in China is constantly referred to as cultural soft power (文化软实力 wén huà ruǎn shí lì) and is the central concept in the Xi Jinping Era (Ichihara, 2006; Klimeš, 2017; Li, 2009). Internationally, in the broader sense, soft power is synonymous with non-military power and includes both cultural power and economic strength (Vuving, 2009). Contrarily, Nye (2006) in "Think Again: Soft Power" suggests that the term has been "stretched and twisted" because he puts military might and economic strength under the same heading of hard power. Additionally, Hurn (2016) points out that soft power plays an important role in attracting inward foreign investment and promoting export sales as well as developing mutual understanding of shared cultural values because soft

power can convince and persuade through trade, diplomacy, foreign aid, and the spread of values, which helps a country develop a stronger national image.

Soft power, then, can build attraction and encompasses nearly everything other than economic and military power (Dev, 2007). Soft power is a kind of non-compulsory dominant influence or control by persuasion. Soft power theory has received positive response as a mainstream concept used in cultural diplomacy. The main reason for that response was that it clarifies the value of soft power which becomes less transferable and more invisible. Current research on soft power has become a large and interdisciplinary field. With the development of research and application of soft power, cultural diplomacy has been fully recognized as a kind of diplomacy which plays a softening and regulating role within public diplomacy.

I agree that soft power is the power of attraction and the ability to change the other's preferences over their choices, such that one's own preferred goal develops into the other's preferred outcome. The strength composed of non-materialized elements can be referred as soft power which is an important part of a country's comprehensive national strength, including the attraction of normative values, media, business practices, education, and language. It can exert its intangible influence on another country relying on the attraction of its political system, the appeal of cultural value, and the affinity of national image.

National Image

Initiated in the 1950s, research on national image focused first on the perspective of international relations and then gradually expanded to the fields of international politics, psychology, commodity advertising, and so on. K. E. Boulding, the first and representative scholar, makes a stimulating contribution by simplifying a complicated international environment. The three dimensions he initially put forward are vital to the formation of national images: a nation's geographical space, its perceived hostility or friendliness, and its perceived strength or weakness (Boulding, 1969). These three dimensions help shape strategic decisions and shed light on the study of foreign

policymaking by subsequent scholars who explore how images are shaped and in turn shape decision-making processes in a variety of international settings and foreign policy domains (Cottam, 1977).

In the early 1990s, Herrmann and Fisherkeller's (1995) international image theory made the definition of national images much sharper. They expound that national images can operate as cognitive simplification devices to organize information into meaningful clusters of categories. In social psychology, studies of national images and theories of stereotyping are closely bound together. Indeed, in the early study of social psychology, national images and stereotypes were understood in the same way (Gilbert, 1951; Peabody, 1985; Schneider, 2004). National images, as stereotypes, are not simply summaries of the information that one has about a state in the international system. They may simplify our views of the world, but they do so by adding interpretative elements not present initially (Castano et al., 2016). In accordance with three dimensions, national image will be activated by bilateral state-to-state relations. The formation of national image normally has a three-part configuration. First, it assesses whether both countries have similar or opposite goal compatibility, i.e., whether the other country is threatening, can be exploited, or provides an opportunity for mutual gain. Second, it judges whether the other country is weaker or stronger in terms of capability. Third, it gives a role to cultural judgment as a determinant element for images, considering what norms and values the other country respects and what cultural connotations the other country has. On the basis of this configuration, five ideal-type images are outlined respectively as the enemy image, the degenerate image, a dependent or colony image, the imperialist image, and the ally image.

Anholt (2008) argues that branding is not a method but rather an acquired image. He (2011) regards the national image as a national brand from the perspective of marketing. The impact resulting from a good national image can not only promote employment but also improve political relations. When people in other countries have a high level of awareness of a national brand, it will correspondingly enhance their understanding and

acceptance of the country. The brand effect is backed up by the development of economy and the stability of political order. However, the condition of economy, politics, and culture can exert an influence on a country's national image, and there is also a tendency to demonize the image of a country based on national interests and ideological differences. Only positive images should be woven into the branding process and the brand (Sammut-Bonnici, 2014).

As an indication of the comprehensive national strength and international status of a country, national image can be imagined and constructed and often changes with the development of society (Boulding, 1959). Therefore, there has never been a universal standard for the understanding of national image. The notion of national image has been classified variously according to different criteria. According to the way it is perceived positively or negatively, there is positive image and negative image; according to the distinct stage in chronology, there is current image and future image; according to different fields, there are political image, economic image, diplomatic image, cultural image, as well as domestic image and international image (Zhang & Xu, 2007).

Von Bertalanffy (1993) pointed out in general system theory that national image is also a system with integrity and multi-dimensionality. Its external manifestation reveals a certain integrity while its internal structure is multi-faceted, showing the image of different subjects, such as government image, enterprise image, citizen image, etc.

Inestimably unquantifiable merits and benefits are achieved from a good national image (Fayomi et al., 2015). Consequently, image shaping is a necessary feature of a nation's foreign policy. National image is determined by the perception of members in the international system toward a country, the way a country pursues its relations with others, and particularly the behavior of its citizens at home and abroad (Zimako, 2009). Holsti (1996) elaborates this point by defining image as an individual's perception of an object, fact, or condition in terms of badness or goodness.

National image is based on the learning, personal experiences, booklore and knowledge from the media, and societal relations of this person (Ittefaq & Kamboh,

2022). Chinese understandings of national images can be analyzed with three prevalent approaches: the international audience's relatively stable assessment or evaluation of a certain country; the appearance and behavior of a sovereign state and its people on the international stage and how they are perceived by global public opinion; and the sum of assessments, evaluations, and convictions of both the domestic and international audiences (Hu, 2011; Yan, 2000). As a key part of national cultural soft power, national image has always played an important role in international social exchanges. Hartig further explains national image from the Chinese perspective. A good national image can promote national unity and enhance national cohesion and self-confidence, which affects cooperation in the international community and determines whether it can be accepted by other countries and obtain more international support to further its own interests and achieve diplomatic goals (Hartig, 2016). Another Chinese scholar Li defined the term "national image" as the image of a country on the international stage, that is, other countries' overall impression and view of a certain country, which mainly includes three levels: government views, scholars' comments, and the impression of nongovernmental organizations and individuals (Li, 2008).

In conclusion, national image contains so many factors that a generalized or simplified perspective would be hasty and dangerous. National image can be shaped both by oneself and by others. The former means that the actors of a country (including the government, news media, nongovernmental organizations, and ordinary people) actively shape their own image for a certain purpose. The latter is that the actors of another country shape the national image of a country out of their own interests and purposes. Image shaping is necessarily a fundamental element of a nation's foreign policy, especially in the 21st century, indicating that the way a country is perceived, the objectives of foreign diplomatic policy, and national interests must be closely aligned if aims are to be achieved. The development of cultural industry can provide various cultural symbols for the shaping of national image (Peng & Shi, 2021). The research on national image in this paper specifically refers to the cognition of relevant personnel

from both Portuguese-speaking countries and China who are related to Confucius Institutes.

1.2. Redefining Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural exchange, one of the driving forces behind the development of human societies, has spontaneously functioned as an early form of cultural diplomacy from time immemorial(Newsom, 1996). Cultural exchanges with foreign counterparts have inevitably taken place since the emergence of countries in the forms of migration, trade, missionary work, colonization, war, tourism, study abroad, book circulation, diplomatic activities, and so on. In diplomatic history, cultural exchanges at the nongovernmental level have been gradually incorporated into the field of national diplomacy and turned into a government-led official realm. As far back as the ancient Greek, Persian, and Roman Empires, culture has been an important tool for external expansion and domestic ethnic integration (Agnew, 1993). Such cultural communication exerted an important impact on the development of complex countries. Accordingly, ancient civilizations are the result not only of cultural integration but also of collision and conflict with other cultures (Moyer, 2006).

On the occasions of many political dialogues and negotiations with national interest involved, culture can play a role to break the ice (Teece, 1986). Strengthening cultural exchange and dissemination is conducive to jointly solving world issues and promoting the development of world civilization (Gienow-Hecht, 2010). One country cannot exist alone in the context of globalization. Consequently, communication between countries must be launched not only at the political diplomatic level but also at other less traditional levels such as the employment of cultural diplomacy. The status of culture in diplomacy has been increasingly acknowledged, especially after the end of the Cold War. Since the ideological struggle and disintegration of the US-Soviet bipolar blocs occurred, the sweeping tide of economic globalization has contributed to pushing cultural diplomacy onto the world stage (Chakraborty, 2013). The shift of the bipolarity of the

Cold War to the uncertainties of the present multipolar world offered cultural diplomacy a chance to exert its full power. Cultural diplomacy also helps shape the ways in which nations construct and project their national image (Briggs, 2007). Many countries, especially big powers, attach great importance to the dissemination of their culture as a way to help achieve their overall diplomatic objectives (Evans, 1998).

Looking back at the history of the mainstream study of cultural diplomacy, it is aptly considered an interdisciplinary research field which breaks through the boundaries of culture, international relations, and bilateral exchanges with rich cultural connotations. Both of the terms culture and diplomacy are ambiguous terms that can have diverse meanings with variable usages, which could spawn a string of contrasting associations with mixed fortunes (Xu, 2018). The *Oxford English Dictionary*, in 1934, first interpreted cultural diplomacy while describing how the British Parliament created a new means of cultural diplomacy by adopting the policy of teaching English abroad (Dictionary, 1989). Ralph Turner, an American scholar, submitted a memorandum on foreign cultural relations to the U.S. State Department in 1942, which clearly put forward the concept of "cultural diplomacy" developed by Frank Ninkovich (Ninkovich, 1977). As a tool in international relations activities, it was first formally used in the 1960s by the U.S. News Agency. Then, in the second edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, in 1989, cultural diplomacy is interpreted as promoting international relations through cultural exchanges, such as the promotion and display of culture to foreign countries. Cultural diplomacy, as an integral part of national diplomacy, generally benefited from the provisions of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which wrote the following duty of embassies and consulates: "promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations" (Article 3, e). Since then, cultural diplomacy has achieved confirmation in international law (Oelfke, 2018). Furthermore, the role of cultural diplomacy is not limited to the duties of embassies and consulates written in Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Rather, it is increasingly introduced into other

features of a country's foreign policy. It complements traditional political and economic diplomacy and jointly shoulders the task of realizing national interests in the overall diplomatic practice of a country and becomes a diplomatic matter as an important branch of business and other activities. Although countries such as France have used the term since the late nineteenth century, cultural diplomacy entered common parlance in most other countries only in the 1990s. (Ang et al., 2015)

As a concept, cultural diplomacy has become one of the research focuses of academics and practitioners. Culture has its conceptual attributes as an equal field and covers all fields of human civilization. The flexibility and strength of culture will be given full play. As the product of the 'spirit of the time' at different historical stages, cultural diplomacy has assumed different contents and forms of expression. Today, in the toolbox of cultural diplomacy, language training programs and acceptance of foreign students, cultural assistance, academic exchanges, cultural trade, etc., are regarded as prominent tools and means. Thus, effective cultural diplomacy should not only be propped up by a country's rich culture but also needs to be guaranteed by practical diplomatic means. On this Schneider (2006, p. 191) says, "hard to define, but you'd know it [cultural diplomacy] if you saw it."

Huntington's clash of civilizations suggests that if one country simply lets another passively accept its own culture, even if the culture is attractive, it will not necessarily bring about cooperation because different cultures have characteristics of permanence, stability, and even exclusiveness (Huntington, 2000). This theory helps explain the bidirectional nature of cultural diplomacy and implies both sides are supposed to take the initiative to cooperate with each other, while expecting to obtain mutual understanding and trust. Authenticity is another basic attribute and objective requirement, for it is not easy to show the real and objective image of the country to the received country (Fan, 2013). Therefore, to achieve specific political, strategic, and diplomatic objectives, cultural diplomacy actors are required to carry out a vast range of long-term practices by means of cultural communication, personnel visits, literary and artistic performances,

cultural trade, and other means. In a nutshell, there is no agreed-upon definition of cultural diplomacy in the literature. Its conceptualization has proven to be complex, especially because it conflates two terms that are themselves difficult to pin down (Ryniejska–Kiełdanowicz, 2009). The semantic field of the term "cultural diplomacy" has broadened considerably over the years and is related to purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or groups of nations (Ang et al., 2015).

Cultural diplomacy has traditionally been "an instrument … and a way of interacting with the outside world" (Gienow-Hecht, 2010, p. 11). Such awareness can lead to interaction among various players, states, and individuals with the organization of events or a series of cultural activities among countries, and the instrumentality of 'culture' is employed in promoting a country's interests in economic, political, and strategic fields. Defined as "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understanding" (Cummings, 2003), cultural diplomacy aims to bring people from different countries together so they can learn about each other's cultures and traditions.

The instruments of cultural diplomacy are wide-ranging and can include language, cultural and trade missions, broadcasting, social media, tourism, national airlines, promotion of the arts, gastronomy, science and technology, as well as high-profile national heroes and icons.

Cultural diplomacy helps to achieve national strategic goals. Because the international community lacks a world government to coordinate the distribution of interests, countries rely on their own strength to pursue specific national interests for their survival and development. The rapid development of economic globalization makes countries form various communities of interests. The Sino-U.S. trade war is a typical case. In March 2018, a presidential memorandum signed by Donald Trump, establishing a 25% tariff on 60 billion U.S. dollars of Chinese goods, marked the beginning of the Sino-U.S. trade war. After many rounds of consultation, both sides failed to reach an effective agreement to resolve the economic friction. The U.N. Trade and Development

Organization, in November 2019, released a 17-page report on the impact of U.S. tariffs on China's trade, in which it concluded that China and the United States both suffered from the trade war (Xu et al., 2020).

The dispute increased the cost of bilateral trade with three major consequences: the decline of trade volume, the rise of consumer prices, and the transfer of trade (Ma et al., 2021). This new feature of international relations suggests that traditional political, military, and economic means are not sufficient to safeguard modern nation states' interests and realize their strategic goals, so new means of diplomatic policies must be put in practice to make up the deficiency (Chen, 2018).

In the 21st century, the advent and growing popularity of digital technologies and electronic means of communication facilitates the construction and dissemination of democratized bottom-up discourse so that the ways and patterns of communication and social interaction among countries have been reshaped and restructured (Kalim & Janjua, 2019). Social media, being commonplace and pervasive, make various unofficial actors including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and high-profile individuals the main body of diplomacy, and unconventional non-state actors have been newly highlighted so that diplomats are no longer the exclusive official agents to carry out cultural diplomacy (Jora, 2013).

In conclusion, cultural diplomacy, the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals and international understanding, constantly performs diplomatic actions with multidimensional approaches and long-term intentions. Effective action in cultural diplomacy can result in a greater awareness of each other's cultural background and arouse bidirectional interests while promoting the authentic culture of each country. The actors of cultural diplomacy are not limited to official government agents, for NGOs and institutions as well as individuals can develop cultural diplomacy even when not sponsored by the state.

The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in National Image Shaping

Cultural diplomacy and national image are complementary and mutually reinforcing.

First, cultural diplomacy can disseminate and shape the national image, a country's intangible asset, which shows its influence through internal attraction and image competition (Xu & Han, 2016). A country's image is made up of the following factors represented in the nation brand hexagon, namely, tourism, exports, people, governance, culture and heritage, and investment (Anholt & Hildreth, 2004). The quality of the national image can not only affect the world's understanding of the diplomatic behavior of the country but also affect other countries' formulation of foreign policy (Lai, 2012). Therefore, if the national image is threatened, the country will variously repair, explain, and perfect it. Cultural diplomacy is one of the effective ways to build a good national image (Mark, 2010). With the intensification of competition between countries and their comprehensive national strength, cultural soft power has gradually become the core content of national competitiveness (Hu, 2007; Lu, 2018). Today, culture is not only an important way to position nations in the field of international economic competition but also an important way to safeguard and expand national interests (Trubowitz, 1998).

As a result, many countries regard cultural diplomacy as an important strategy in their diplomatic activities, disseminating their national traditional culture through cultural communication and other means, and striving to transform their own culture into the mainstream international culture (Mark, 2009). For example, many countries promote cultural diplomacy through cultural exchanges, cultural negotiations, and the signing of cultural treaties, to display their excellent cultural image and enhance their national cultural competitiveness. At the same time, many countries have carried out cultural communication activities through radio, television, the Internet, etc., to defuse their negative reputations in the international community and enhance their international influence (Schneider, 2003). By carrying out cultural diplomacy, sovereign countries can win the understanding and recognition of their own culture and establish a good public image. As a kind of foreign cultural exchange strategically conducted by agents such as Confucius and Goethe Institutes, cultural diplomacy is a bridge connecting all nationalities and peoples and also an important means to enhance the national image of

each culture on the world stage (Lu, 2014; Pan, 2013).

Secondly, national image can exert an influence on cultural diplomacy. If a country has a good national image, it tends to have high international credibility, making it and its people more easily accepted by the international community and promoting the implementation of the national cultural foreign policy in an easier way (Tang, 2005). In contrast, if a country's national image is hurt, it will not be able to carry out cultural diplomacy smoothly (Boulding, 1959). In a networked society, power comes from networked cultural diplomacy, which is built in the multidimensional space of local, national, and global interactions. Worldwide, national image is highly valued by modern countries as an essential part of their soft power. The image of a country is the embodiment of a country's comprehensive national strength and spiritual cohesion and the decisive factor of the country's cultural soft power. A good national image will make people have affinity and will have a positive impact, which may be more effective than a display of military strength (Wu, 2012). According to their national conditions and international environment, countries actively carry out cultural diplomacy in varying degrees and use cultural diplomacy to promote the construction of their national image. Cultural diplomacy plays an important role in the construction of national image by strengthening the interaction between the subject country and the target country, enhancing the perception of the subject country and changing eventual negative stereotypes (Wallis, 2004). It employs cultural exchange as its main content, enhancing the cultural soft power of a country in three ways. As a two-way interactive process, cultural diplomacy enhances its national image abroad, but more importantly it can better develop its own culture. For example, panda bears, Wudang Mountain, and Taiji Quan are well-known elements in Chinese culture. The American film industry, drawing on these cultural elements, created cartoon movies such as *Kung Fu Panda*, which achieved good box office performance in the Chinese market and imperceptibly showed American values to viewers (Ke, 2014).

Edward W. Said (2012) believes that the old imperialist hegemony has two forces:

direct ruling and cultural influence. It thus brings influencing power to the subject country, as in the cases of Hollywood movies or Japanese animation. The dissemination of culture always reflects a trend that can spread beyond national boundaries. Cultural diplomacy can make the culture of the country maintain a relatively long-term attraction and build a positive national image. This kind of interest and preference for culture can sometimes be expressed as a subtle influence and can be less affected by political and economic factors (Yan, 2020).

1.3 Multilevel Governance of Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is not a simple interpretation and direct propaganda of foreign policy but a process of systematically and naturally demonstrating nations' cultural characteristics, values, and social life. It requires generations of people to realize the specific political purposes of foreign strategic policy by cultural dissemination, exchange, and communication (Ying, 2016). In a polarized global world, cultural diplomacy actors expand the range from the government to the private sphere and civil society organizations. The government is not the only actor to shoulder the responsibility in practicing cultural diplomacy. The actors of cultural diplomacy can be international organizations such as UNESCO, the European Union Network of Institutes of Culture, the French Speakers Community, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Subnational actors have also occupied a place in multilevel governance of cultural diplomacy, and they can be states, provinces, regions, and city municipalities such as Quebec in Canada, the Macao of China, and the Aveiro of Portugal. It may be argued that they don't have the traditional sense of legitimate actors, but they actually contribute greatly to cultural diplomacy by deploying autonomous policy. They may establish international friendships as twin cities with subnational cities abroad. They also hold musical or sports events such as the Eurovision Song Contest held in Lisbon in 2018 or all-level Marathon games in different cities throughout the world. To affirm its

distinctiveness as the only province in Canada with French as the official language, Quebec launched a series of cultural policies such as opening representative offices abroad to support cultural and educational exchanges. Macao has done similarly and uses its overseas offices to carry out bilateral and mutual cultural communications in Lisbon, Brussels, Geneva, Taiwan, and Beijing. These actors operate separate diplomacy policy or mix with other actors to accomplish their goals (Mytelka & Smith, 2002).

Private sectors such as various foundations, companies, and cultural creative businesses also exert great influence in the field of cultural diplomacy. The Foundation for Culture and Art of Istanbul, established by the Eczacıbaşı in 1973, deployed a variety of international artistic events at home and abroad including the 2009 *Season of Turkey* in France, collaborating with diverse cultural institutions to promote Turkish culture in Europe. In America, the private Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford foundations seek positively to eliminate misunderstandings and promote international culture by emphasizing ideological output in American cultural diplomacy. In terms of firms, they can diffuse their company values and targets, which subconsciously influence individuals abroad to shoulder their social responsibility. BMW Group sponsors various cultural activities on all continents like the Festival of Jazz of Beirut (Lebanon) and art exhibitions in Buenos Aires and Havana. As discussed above, branding strategy has been effectively achieved by this kind of cultural communication. Huawei, a global leader in communication and information technology, also sponsored and organized international cooperation. In Brazil, for example, Huawei partnered with the University of Brasilia and the University of Sao Paulo to establish scientific labs and is committed to building a healthy industrial ecological environment in Brazil. *Future Seed Project* is Huawei's worldwide flagship project cooperated with local distinguished universities, aiming to cultivate more communication and information technology talents since 2014.

Companies in cultural fields, such as Hollywood in the US and Bollywood in India, can also be involved in the process of cultural diplomacy. Chinese Wanda not only invested in Hollywood but also built megaproject cinemas and became the largest owner

of cinemas after the acquisition of several foreign companies. Due to the prevalence of digitalization and transnational mobility, grassroots cost less to get involved in cultural diplomacy. On the grassroots list, NGOs are a double-edged sword. On the one side, they can mobilize resources to supplement the government in the process of cultural diplomacy, whereas on the other side, NGOs may become destructive forces in international or bilateral relations. With the rapid development of transnational civil society organizations, the role of nongovernmental organizations becomes more important. They are independent of government influence. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Greenpeace International are renowned examples.

1.4. Innovation in Cultural Diplomacy

The purpose of this section is to report a critical analysis of the development of cultural diplomacy from the perspective of innovation. The analysis encompasses the ancient practices and innovations of several countries. Innovation leads to macroeconomic growth, a concept first formulated by a notable innovation theory pioneer, Schumpeter, who coined the concept of "creative destruction" to describe the process by which new products replace old products. The study of innovation has primarily focused on the behavior of firms. Few studies have specifically focused on cultural diplomacy, and the benefits of innovation are not captured in existing theories. Schumpeter (1982) argued that the real leader of the productive process is the consumer, emphasized the role of the State as producer, and confirmed the role of end-users as drivers of innovation. Another innovation theorist, Drucker (2011), put forward that the most productive innovation is a new potential of satisfaction created by a different product or service. He emphasized that innovation can be social or economic, which provides theoretical support for us to explore the innovational practices of cultural diplomacy.

Innovation of cultural diplomacy under different circumstances is regarded as a

means to foster changes in the social and economic environment by inducing new patterns of behavior and creating new habits (Junior & Rodrigues, 2019). This offers a starting point for analysis. Cultural diplomacy can be understood in older practices articulated to the challenges of the present under the light of innovation.

An important innovation in the history of cultural diplomacy was the establishment of various organizations to promote language and culture. Human languages are heterogeneous, and human beings are scattered in different speech communities, and these facts highlight the importance of language and relevant language policies (Odeh, 2021). The initial innovative effects of the cultural policy took the form of a shock provoking an unprecedented change. The conceptual initiative of science and technology diplomacy has emerged over the past twenty years as one of the major axes of reflection on new diplomatic practices. It is used as a diplomatic channel for maintaining relations and functions as a factor of peace (Griset, 2020). Technology diplomacy caters to the final receiver of cultural diplomacy, and innovations have involved natural dynamics from events to projects. Conforming to the important role of end-users, cultural diplomacy actors must adapt to changing times and changing attitudes among end-users in the received country. Instead of selling an image directly, countries gradually embrace the conceptual practices of communicating the image through cultural values. The change in the economic or social remits can create new behavior patterns, new wealth, or new potential for cultural diplomacy's development. Insights from innovation theory also discover the new practice of cultural diplomacy changes from bilateral to multilateral. Innovation boosts cultural diplomacy's potency as a driving force for developing and improving national wealth creation and attracting investment and talent (Drucker, 1985). The following section aims to single out the cultural diplomacy practices of leading countries in the context of innovation.

France

In terms of the initial innovative effects of the cultural policy which provoked unprecedented change, France has been the forerunner to disseminate French as an

important means of cultural diplomacy (Bouisset, 2021). As early as Napoleon I, Frenchmen had been to Egypt and Africa for cultural and scientific investigation, lobbying activities, and cultural activities centered on French teaching.

As France's relative hard power declined, the French government focused on soft power and advocated active cooperation with foreign cultures. Successively, France has established the Alliance Française, the French Cultural Centers, and the French Academy. Since it was first created 1883, the Alliance Française has established more than 800 offices in 132 countries and has more than 500,000 students. It plays an enhanced role in the massive 21st century overhaul of French cultural and diplomatic services abroad, and its global sites can be viewed as a field or culture front (Horne, 2018; Alliance Française, 2019). Language and culture promotion has been given priority as a national goal of France.

Besides the global language and culture network, there are two important public institutions involved in the development and implementation of French cultural diplomacy: the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Communication. Among all the divisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the General Directorate of Relations in the field of culture is one of the largest divisions in terms of number of employees, which indicates the position of cultural diplomacy in France's national strategic framework.

Harnessing the platforms of international organizations is also a remarkable feature of French cultural diplomacy (Nassif, 2021). In response to the increasing influence of American culture in France, the French government put forward its cultural diversity policy to protect the share of domestic and European films against the invasion of Hollywood. Under the banner of promoting cultural diversity, France raised its own cultural interests to the same level as the EU. In recent years, French cultural diplomacy has insisted on the reform of digitalization, such as adding African content in French on Wikipedia, supporting digital projection in cinemas, promoting domestic movies with the most advanced technology, and digitalizing the traditional cultural heritage. Since the

1980s, France has gradually established a global audio-visual network for French learners around the world, and the French Film Federation and France 24 have enriched France's cultural audiovisual network.

In order to expand its influence, improve its international status, and construct a positive national image, France has since the end of World War II never wavered in using cultural diplomacy as a vehicle of French cultural renaissance, no matter how the French government changed or how the country's political, economic, and military policies were adjusted (Lu & He, 2016).

United Sates of America

The starting point of American cultural diplomacy was the establishment of the Department of Cultural Relations in 1938 (Rosenberg, 1982). In order to reduce the government's involvement in cultural affairs, the United States has made it clear that nongovernmental organizations are the main body of educational and cultural exchange activities and that the government's participation in cultural diplomacy activities should not exceed 5% of the total, thus minimizing the impact of the government on cultural exchanges (Arndt, 2005). American government also conforms to another principle of two-way communication and avoids the implementation of certain propaganda. The educational and cultural programs of the U.S. government have different targeted audiences. At the elite level, the U.S. government's international visitors program mainly provides chances for foreign social elites who might become future leaders to visit the country. The Humphrey Fellowship, in turn, serves middle-level managers from target countries, while the Fulbright project conducts academic exchanges for scholars.

The Great Depression in 1929 completely defeated the "night watchman" theory, and Roosevelt's new cultural policy in the 1930s was a watershed in the evolution of the American government's functions in cultural affairs (Yang, 2015). The New Deal announced that the Roosevelt government began to move to the front stage of cultural diplomacy and set up a series of institutions to strengthen American cultural influence on the axis countries during World War II. During the Cold War, the U.S. government

established the U.S. Information Agency to confront the former Soviet Union in a cultural way. The nonprofit Franklin Book Programs, established in 1951 and existing from 1952 until 1978, helped publish some 3,000 books in diversified languages including Portuguese, Arabic, Indonesian, Urdu, and Bengali. The intelligentsia of each country were actively involved in the process of book selection and translation, and an international market for American values took root in those countries. On one hand, the program resulted from concerns about Cold War censorship, and one the other hand, it manifested librarians' and publishers' assertions of the importance of free access to ideas as a counter to communist ideology (Robbins, 2007). After September 11, a combination of government and NGOs was adopted to deal with the hostile attitude of the Islamic world towards the country.

The United States always aims at maximizing the pursuit of its economic interests, its political influence, and its national image branding with its strong national power (Reinhard, 2003). American TV and movies account for about three-quarters of the global market, and this dominance helps build an international market for American values (Mearshemer & Walt, 2006). Today, its cultural diplomacy ranges flexibly and diversely in the fields of cultural products, education, science and technology, sports, art, etc. The convergence of the role of government and spontaneous nonofficial activities is the outstanding characteristics of its cultural diplomacy, and the dissemination of values is its core goal (Men, 2001; Shi, 2010; Yang, 2015).

Britain

As one-time master of world hegemony, Britain used to achieve its foreign goals only by virtue of its superb national strength. But fierce competition among European powers and the Great Depression forced Britain to radically change its attitude toward cultural diplomacy in order to safeguard its overseas interests.

In 1923, the British government adopted a proposal to promote English teaching and spread British culture in African colonies, Egypt, and Latin American countries. The Council for International Understanding and Cooperation (the predecessor of the British

Council), founded in 1934, became a major landmark in the history of British cultural diplomacy. The original aim of the British Council was "to create, in a country overseas, a basis of friendly knowledge and understanding of the people of this country" (British Council, 2016). Today, British cultural diplomacy strengthens its dominant position by promoting a wider knowledge of the UK and the English language abroad and developing closer cultural relations between the UK and the wider world (British Council, 2016). In line with the Annual Reports, the grant-in-aid of the British Council was reduced by £8 million to just 16% of its total income in 2014, and more than two-thirds of its income is generated from English teaching, administering overseas examinations, and partnerships and contracts (British Council, 2015). Therefore, it has become the largest international organization for educational opportunities and cultural exchanges. Based on the country's rich cultural resources, the British Council disseminates British culture through language education, receiving overseas students, exporting English books and data, and cultural and arts exchanges. It enhances Britain's cultural influence and broadens the understanding by elites and young people throughout the world of the culture of the UK (British Council, 2015).

One singularity of British cultural diplomacy is the three-circle model that the British government uses to offset its declining strength because Britain aims to keep its position as a major power and pursue its global interests (Liu, 2008). Global governance is the driving force behind its transformation of cultural diplomacy. The goal is to better consolidate collaborative relationships with European and Commonwealth countries. Among the Commonwealth countries and former colonies, English teaching, personnel training, technical assistance, and educational exchanges are the main diplomatic activities. In contrast, the main cultural practices focus on educational and literary exchange among the European countries. Elsewhere in the English-speaking world such as Canada, Britain relies on nongovernmental organizations, namely universities and foundations, for cultural exchanges to promote commercial interests and attract investment (Ma, 2002).

However, the focus of British cultural diplomacy began to shift to the Arab world after suffering many terrorist attacks between 2003 and 2007. In order to save Britain's declining national image in the Arab world, the British government undertook more actions in Arab countries such as holding cultural lectures and rebuilding hospitals and schools. Following the Cold War, Britain began to transform to all-round cultural diplomacy after the Blair government came to power. Since then creative diplomacy has developed such as attending the Second Asia-Europe Summit to show the British image of innovation and launching cultural activities abroad to convey the new image of Britain's creativity, diversity, inclusiveness, freedom, and openness to the world (Yang, 2013). Although British cultural diplomacy is a latecomer, it could still come to force because of its accurate orientation and clear objectives.

Germany

In Germany, cultural diplomacy is treated as an option for a creative and less inhibited self-representation (Herrschner, 2015). In addition to the power policy, cultural power is another choice for the William Dynasty (Piller, 2020). The external dissemination of German culture can lessen the political isolation caused by militarism (Piller, 2021). In the 20th century, Germany employed a unique model to display an authentic and varied picture of itself by authorizing an entire branch of foreign policy to independent NGOs. The Goethe-Institute, famous for language teaching and the promotion of German culture, has experienced several stages of innovation. In 1925, the Deutsche Akademie, the predecessor of the Goethe-Institute, was officially established and renamed as the Goethe-Institute seven years later which had a profound influence on the modern history of Germany: during the Weimar Republic, it was mainly engaged in German language teaching; during the Nazi period, it was backed up by force and propagated Nazi ideology in the target countries (Haigh, 1974). For example, Polish children could only learn school subjects in German and received German ideological education. The negative effects sank the public image of Germany since such unilateralism violated the principles of cultural diplomacy (Von, 2018). Both in the

Weimar Republic period and in the World War II period, the Goethe-Institute contributed immeasurably to German cultural diplomacy and imposed a positive and far-reaching impact on the popularization of German and the spread of German culture (Lanshina, 2015). In 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany formulated a specific foreign cultural exchange plan and budget and asserted that German culture could no longer serve as a tool for world domination. Instead, it would be an important bridge for international cooperation, understanding, communication, and mutual learning. Culture has become the only way for the Federal Republic of Germany to get rid of isolation, to rebuild the German image, and to return to the international community with a positive image (Guo, 2012).

There are two prominent features of Germany's post-war cultural diplomacy. One is the thorough ending of the unilateralism of the traditional cultural policy. Cultural diplomacy as a propaganda tool has instead become a tool for peaceful cooperative politics. The other is the building of universality and diversity between the Federal Republic of Germany and countries with different values and beliefs. Internationalization of higher education and scientific research is another key point in its cultural diplomacy. The tuition-free policies and preferential measures for foreign students have made German universities internationally attractive and earned them a higher reputation.

Germany highlights global commonalities and engages in international dialogue to create a reflective and productive intercultural dialogue (Herrschner, 2015). Such cultural diplomacy helps paint a picture of contemporary Germany that is less dependent on stereotypes formed around WWII (Cull, 2010). The process of continuous civilization of cultural diplomacy is demonstrated by Germany's cultural diplomacy changing from power politics to cooperative politics (Schneider, 2009). Since its reunification, Germany's national status has been significantly improved. Germany has formed a new implementation mechanism of cultural diplomacy and innovated in the practical model. German cultural diplomacy has transformed from unilateralism to multilateralism, from propaganda to two-way learning. Germany now presents the world with a civilized and

diplomatic image of a realistic trading country (Zheng, 2014).

India

India's cultural diplomacy aims to present an image of India as a contemporary, scientifically advanced country (Isar, 2017). Increased international engagement provides India with greater opportunities to show its cultural uniqueness to other countries, for example, through Bollywood movies or India's cuisine. This focus can also be seen as a way of appealing to preexisting concepts of culture and image, of attracting audiences through preconceptions of India.

The Indian Council for Cultural Relations is the core of Indian cultural diplomacy, and its work and scholarship programs have overwhelmingly focused on students from less developed countries (Wagner, 2005). Many African countries are pursuing rapid development so India has made full use of its technical and educational advantages to carry out diplomacy with African countries. India has increased its technical support to African countries by building exhibition centers, connecting remote African hospitals and regional universities with famous Indian universities and professional hospitals through network and engineering projects, and installing satellite stations in some universities. Indian officials argue that the education and training institutions invested by its government in Africa are long-term, invisible projects conducive to the long-term development of African countries, while China's investment in Africa's mineral resources, oil industry, and infrastructure is a short-term explicit investment and behavior (Kang & Hao, 2016). Cultural and educational exchanges and transnational training have become the most influential and promising international cooperation projects. India and many African countries have launched extensive student exchange training and teacher visits. India has set up special talent training programs and scholarship systems for African students. Under the leadership of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the council has established about 21 scholarship programs for Africa, and Indian universities recruit about 15,000 African students annually. In 2011, India announced the establishment of four academic colleges and 10 Indian African vocational training

centers in Africa, specifically training talents for African countries. In these ways, Indian initiatives have achieved remarkable results in African countries (Mark, 2008).

Another singularity of Indian cultural diplomacy is the important role of the Indian diaspora. The Indian diaspora has been an exceptionally active stakeholder in shaping the country's cultural presence abroad. Except for the Chinese, few diasporic populations have identified so closely with narratives of the 'homeland' and with both the discourse and practice of its current global narratives (Isar, 2017). The overseas population of Indians can be estimated at around 25 million people who are a significant segment of the target audience and a significant 'co-producer' in projecting the Indian image.

By the early years of the 21st century, India's cultural diplomacy was becoming more associated with advancing India's economic and trade interests, at a time when both were becoming more important. While India's cultural diplomacy has moved towards a greater recognition of the country's modernism, its economic and scientific progress, one must nevertheless wonder about the capacity of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations to completely reflect India's dynamism through its activities (Hurn, 2016; Mahapatra, 2016).

Japan

In Asia, Japan is a successful pioneer in terms of launching cultural diplomacy (Wang & Piao, 2007). World War II not only caused heavy losses to Japan's domestic economy but also excluded Japan from the world diplomatic arena. Only after the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty did Japan formally resume its independent cultural diplomacy. In the 1960s Japan embraced its economic boom as the second largest economic power. Meanwhile, Japan's international status and image were damaged due to constant friction in foreign trade so that the government came to realize the role of culture in economic development. The Japan Foundation specialized in international cultural exchanges, providing strong support to the development of cultural diplomacy. The Japan Foundation plays a vital part in the cultivation of long-term interest towards Japanese culture abroad (Gadjeva, 2018). It arouses overseas people's curiosity with

Japanese traditional folk culture and provides scholarships for research-oriented people to study in Japan.

As early as 1985, Japan tried to change its national image from an "economic power" to a "cultural power." Japan has actively devoted itself to cultural assistance such as the protection of world cultural heritage, including the Angkor monuments in Cambodia. In 1988, Japan put forward the concept of international cooperation so as to deepen mutual understanding with the international community and promote Japan's internationalization, especially focusing on countries with historical grudges with Japan. Since 2002, 'Cool Japan' has become a national image and brand strategy for Japan. 'Cool Japan' has been a cross-departmental policy agenda for the Japanese government that has gained prominence over the last 10 years or so. Although the government has been reticent about cultural policy in general and particularly with East and Southeast Asia in post-war decades, attention has recently been given to the international popularity of Japanese popular culture such as manga and anime with policies aiming to cash in on this 'Cool Japan' phenomenon (Kawashima, 2018). Moreover, the Japanese government attaches great importance to "animation diplomacy" and hope to "create the image of Japan which makes people immediately associate the word Japan with lightness, warmth, beauty and coolness."

In 2005, Japan defined dissemination, absorption, and symbiosis as the three main concepts of cultural diplomacy and carried out multi-level cultural exchanges to disseminate traditional Japanese culture. Japan spares no effort to introduce their traditional culture to foreign countries and holds the Year of Japan abroad. In addition to government-led cultural exchanges, Japanese nongovernmental personages and organizations also carry out cultural exchanges in various forms to disseminate Japanese traditional culture and export core traditional values (Gadjeva, 2018).

To conclude, the insights of Schumpeter and Drucker provide a purposeful starting point for discussing cultural diplomacy. Their ideas are still appropriate to use in analyzing the forms of cultural diplomacy of the 6 countries mentioned above. From the

acts of cultural export and cultural expansion carried out at the folk level before the 20th century, to the birth of cultural institutions represented by the Alliance Française, the Japanese Foundation, and the British Council, and then to the Cold War, cultural diplomacy is regarded as the most powerful innovative weapon to achieve ideological goals (Schneider, 2003). Today, countries promote trade and export through various cultural diplomacy activities to gain international recognition of their own culture and political system. As a branch source of soft power, cultural diplomacy lacks systematic theory and a core literature because of the ambiguity of research boundaries caused by the broad concept of culture itself. Culture's ubiquity also leads to the overlap and confusion between culture and other means in diplomatic practice. For example, China has sought to attract foreign investment through cultural platforms. Although this is a form of economic diplomacy, because culture has played a role in public image-shaping, it also becomes a form of cultural diplomacy. The successful experience of cultural diplomacy in the world is of great significance for China to learn how to carry out cultural diplomacy and enhance its cultural soft power. With a high economic level and strong overall national strength, cultural diplomacy has a greater chance of success, and it is easier to achieve its goals in the overall pattern of world (Wei, 2002). Not only is culture itself the key to cultural diplomacy, but the innovative ways of cultural diplomacy and the feedback of recipients are also very important.

Cultural diplomacy, therefore, is a branch of overall diplomacy. Its goals are to realize national interests, disseminate values, enhance cultural attractiveness, and enhance international image. The implementation of cultural diplomacy is a complex and dynamic process. The cultural diplomacy of these countries share at least one commonality: A stage of brand shaping and construction of core projects will be the future trend of developing cultural diplomacy. Although necessarily not comprehensive, this review can shed light on the history, tradition, and diplomatic model of the contemporary world. The history of cultural diplomacy provides a good reference for how to integrate Chinese culture with world culture and also encourages China to launch

its own innovative model of cultural diplomacy.

Chapter 2: China's Cultural Diplomacy: Instruments for International Insertion

Different from Samuel Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations, German philosopher Ernst Kapp (1845) and British historian Arnold J. Toynbee (1966) in their works General and Philosophical Comparative Geography and Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time, respectively, propose that the world will adopt a harmonious way to integrate human beings and all their traditional and modern cultures, societies, and civilizations into one human organism, so the world will coexist peacefully in the 21st century. It is still too early to judge whether their theories prove persuasive or finally hold water. But these views conform to China's national goals to some extent. China plans to enhance its comprehensive national strength, achieve its national goals, and improve its national image by utilizing the attraction, inspiration, and influence of culture (Wang, 2008). The practice of China's cultural diplomacy has been received positively inside China. Cultural diplomacy takes Chinese culture as the carrier to spread Chinese thoughts, culture, and art to the world and plays a unique role in improving the soft power of Chinese culture and realizing China's peaceful rise (Ren, 2020; Yan, 2020). It has promoted international cultural exchanges, the development of China's cultural industries, and the international competitiveness and influence of Chinese culture, and it enhances China's national image and cultural soft power (Liu & Qu, 2013; Miao, 2006). Alongside correcting a negative image in the West, China wants to present itself as a country that works hard to give its people a better future, is a stable, reliable, and responsible economic partner, is a trustworthy member of the international community (D'Hooghe, 2011), and finally is an ancient but vibrant culture (Hartig, 2016). Some opinions also exist that the world misjudges China and is potentially hostile to the country, fueling China's desire to be hailed as a friendly, peaceful, and reliable partner (Becard & Menechelli, 2019; Hartig, 2016).

This chapter reviews the singularities and innovations of Chinese doctrine and practice of culture diplomacy. It first explores the historical grounding for its preferences,

as well as the attitudes and practices that flow from those preferences. As one of the goals of culture diplomacy, this chapter also offers illustration of China's national image and its symbiotic relation with the state-of-affairs of China's cultural diplomacy.

2.1. The Creation of China's Cultural Diplomacy

Fukuyama (2016) believes that the value core of China's development model stems from its 5,000 years of political history. The rapid development of China's economy reflects the effectiveness of China's mode. The British historian Toynbee (1931) once pointed out that China may consciously integrate the flexible and intense vitality of the West with its conservative and stable traditional culture, potentially providing a new cultural pattern for mankind (Lin, 1994).

As early as the Spring and Autumn period, there were written records of "和" (hé, 'harmony' in English) and "同" (tóng, the same in English) in oracle bone and Jin inscriptions. Chinese civilization has formed a diverse and attractive set of cultural resources. Many ancient thinkers emerged such as Confucius and Lao Zi whose thoughts provide the major foundation and the spiritual sources of Chinese diplomatic doctrines (Ding, 2006; Zhang, 1998). Sun Tzu (2016, p.5) starts his book *The Art of War* with "war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence, it is a subject of inquiry, which can on no account be neglected." Its essence is to avoid launching wars. Confucius emphasized the philosophy of harmony but not sameness (和而不同, hé ér bùtóng). Lao Zi warned that there will be an unfortunate year after big warfare (大军之后必有凶年, dàjūn zhīhòu bì yǒu xiōng nián). The idea of peace runs through the history of Chinese civilization from the outset and ultimately is reflected in the context of diplomatic relations. The distinctive Chinese cultural system is the soul of China's cultural diplomacy (Liu, 2019). One of the reasons why China advocates the establishment of harmonious community within a shared destiny can be found in these traditional Chinese thoughts (Xing, 2015).

Confucianism, an academic school founded by Confucius and developed by Mencius and Xun Zi, has a time-honored history and remains vital in many fields. As early as 400

years ago, *Analects of Confucius* (论语, lúnyǔ) was translated into Latin. The virtue of human-heartedness (仁者爱人, rénzhě àirén) and the idea that gentlemen seek harmony but not uniformity (君子和而不同, jūnzǐ hé ér bùtóng) are not only people's spiritual pursuits but also elements enriching diplomatic wisdom (Zhang, 2018).

The core value of Confucianism is human-heartedness (仁爱, rén'ài). The philosophy that one should not impose on others what he himself does not desire (己所不欲,勿施于人, jǐsuǒ bùyù, wù shī yú rén) indicates that whenever people do anything, they should take the principles people can accept as a way to treat others. The doctrine of human-heartedness is a fundamental principle of Confucianism. It is also the ground on which China should conduct its relations with other nations in the world. Mencius wrote that seeking one's own interests at the expense of others is the last thing that the human-hearted person will do（以邻为壑, 仁者所恶, Yǐlínwéihè, rénzhě suǒ wù). According to the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸 zhōng yōng), a Chinese classic of Confucianism, harmony is the universal path which all human actions can follow and along which peace can be ensured in society. It advocates that all human feelings and desires can be achieved in a proper degree instead of going to extremes. China's traditional culture values harmony, emphasizing that people should adhere to win-win co-operation and build a common prosperous world and avoid violence or war.

The golden mean and harmony (和谐 héxié) are the central Confucian conceptual values and methodologies that underpin the Chinese way of thinking. The golden mean as embodied in diplomatic practice is to oppose extremism and all forms of war and instead to advocate the peaceful settlement of international disputes (Jie, 2009). Conforming to the concept of harmony, diverse civilizations should be allowed to coexist. All civilizations should seek common ground while reserving differences, respecting each other, and coexisting peacefully (Xi & Yong, 2010). Harmony is also consistent with other fundamental principles of Chinese civilization (Puranen, 2019). Advocating peace and respecting nature are important values that shaped the spirit of Chinese civilization over the centuries (Zhao, 2010). In fact, as delivered by Xi Jingping in his

lengthy speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress, establishing a harmonious world is China's diplomatic concept of peaceful development in the 21st century (Dimitrijević, 2018). Such ideas also express Taoist thoughts, mirroring Lao Zi's famous utterance: All Things carry Yin and hold to Yang; Their blended influence brings Harmony (Lao, 2021, Chapter 42).The idea of peace originates from respect for life. Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, the most representative figures of Taoism in the pre-Qin period, expound a large number of life philosophies and show the way of human co-existence in their ideological system (Chen, 2014). Respect for life and kindness to nature are second to none in Taoism. The dignity of Dao and the nobility of virtue will naturally evolve (道之尊， 德之贵， 夫莫之命而常自然 dào zhī zūn，dé zhī guì，fū mò zhī mìng ér cháng zì rán) (Lao, 2021, Chapter 5). In terms of relationships between people, Lao believes that the best goodness is like water (上善若水 shàng shàn ruò shuǐ) (Lao, 2021, Chapter 8). Water helps all things but does not compete with other things. People should be as gentle as water, tolerant and generous. Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi say that we should ignore gains and losses, respect others, and work towards mutual benefit, mutual accommodation, and friendly coexistence in interpersonal communication and opposing war (Chen, 2014).

Taoism generally holds a negative attitude towards warfare due to its respect for life. Taoists believe that a country may form an army for defense, but not for arbitrary use, and they oppose any initiatives taken to launch war (Wang, 2014). However, when a country is attacked, it should actively fight and defeat the invaders. The principle of non-violence embodied in China's practices is to strengthen the military for peace rather than for war (Lao, 2017). Lao Zi thought that a major power should function as a sea to embrace all rivers (大国者下流 dà guó zhě xià liú) and that all parties can treat each other modestly and moderately, so that all achieve the goal of getting what they want (Mao, 2015).

Director Zhang (2017) of China's Cultural Soft Power Research Centre asserts that Chinese traditional culture contains the ideas of displaying human-heartedness, being benevolent, advocating the doctrine of the golden mean, striving for greater equality, and

keeping peace in the world, which makes China different from other countries. Therefore, China pursues peaceful development rooted in its national conditions, history, and cultural traditions, while its strategic choices are also determined by its need for development and the trend of human progress (Zhao, 2010).

2.2 The Development of China's Cultural Diplomacy

Zhang Qian's westbound journey in the Han Dynasty initiated the Silk Road. Afterwards, the legendary figure Zheng He, regularly commemorated as China's historic envoy of peace to the West in the Ming Dynasty, undertook what one might now call cultural diplomacy. Some see his activity as a reflection of the Ming Confucian concept policy (Suryadinata, 2005; Zheng & Zheng, 1983). Other scholars believe that these voyages functioned as maritime protocolonialism (Wade, 2005; Widodo, 2005). China's cultural diplomacy can date back almost to the very beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China (Liu, 2008).

Culture Serves Socialism, Culture Serves the People

The Chinese government started to strengthen international cultural exchanges and co-operation after the founding of New China in 1949 when socialism and capitalism were two fundamentally opposing social systems and many countries in the world had not yet recognized the independence of China. Therefore, from 1949 to 1971, China was excluded from legitimacy in the United Nations and other influential international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Cultural diplomacy was therefore a necessary choice for Chinese leaders in combating China's international isolation. But China's policy used to be relatively monotonous external propaganda instead of mutual cultural interaction and integration. The other countries were mainly Asian socialist countries or countries fighting for liberation in Africa and Latin America. The isolation and blockade of Western countries left little space for China to launch international economic and political activities (Zhou & Chuang, 1990). Cultural diplomacy naturally became the

main tool of overall diplomacy. Premier Zhou commented that making friends with other countries should start with their people and culture (Liang, 2008). In 1951, Chairman Mao Zedong recommended to Let hundred flowers blossom (百花齐放 bǎi huā qí fàng), which acknowledged that other cultures outside of the mainstream Chinese ideology exist and that China should learn the strengths of the other countries in the cultural field (Zhang, 1994). Culture functions in two directions: namely, culture serves socialism, and culture serves the people (Mao, 1964).

Although leaders had reached a consensus on the importance of cultural diplomacy, cultural diplomacy in the early liberation period was closely centered on political and military diplomacy. The vicious Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s prompted the reborn China to strengthen its military forces so as to safeguard the independence of the new regime and its territorial integrity. Such protection was prescribed as the primary content of national security and diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy was obviously underestimated as a continuation of national political relations. Cultural diplomacy lost its cultural characteristics and overlapped the boundary of politics, reflecting the corresponding military and diplomatic relations (Zhou & Chuang, 1990).

When China and the Soviet Union formed a strategic alliance against American imperialism in the 1950s, policies of cultural diplomacy were closely intertwined with political relations. When political relations became tense, cultural relations were seriously affected. The same situation applied to Sino-U.S. cultural relations. When the U.S. viewed its relationship with China in zero-sum game mode, cultural exchanges did not happen at all. However, China and the U.S. had normalized their relations in a joint, unified front against the Soviet Union. China innovated Table Tennis Diplomacy to invite the American Table Tennis Delegation to visit China, so Sino-U.S. diplomacy gradually entered a healthy period of normalization (Chen, 2018). Before the reform and opening up, China's frequent political turmoil and the planned economy mode made cultural diplomacy a weak presence (Liu, 2008).

Reconfiguration: From Business-oriented Policy to "Go-out" Strategy

After the Cold War, cultural soft power gradually appeared on the stage of international relations. General Secretary Deng Xiaoping demanded that domestic cultural construction be regarded as one of the important goals of socialist construction as well as economic construction, emphasizing that both should be developed equally (Vogel, 2011). Cultural diplomacy then gradually leaped out of its original position of dependence on political and military diplomacy.

China's economic development has been given priority and emphasis on political ideology has decreased. President Jiang Zemin (1997) labored to set up a strongly supportive international public opinion that matched China's prestige and position. The concept of four modernizations, namely, 四个现代化 (sì gè xiàn dài huà), triggered China's adoption of the advanced science, technology, and business management of Western countries (Meissner, 2002).

Initially, exhibitions of ancient artworks and traditional music performances were used to attract Chinese diaspora and thereby build a mutual platform for investment and business (Miu, 2006). Gradually, the targeted group started to include foreign investors. Since the 1990s, China's accelerated economic progress has provoked cultural nationalism within everyday Chinese people, and emphasis on making culture a bridge for business continues (Knight, 2006).

China's cultural diplomacy has undergone significant changes and transformed from singularity to diversity (Chen, 2006). Overseas Chinese cultural centers undertake three functions: organizing cultural activities, providing information services, and developing Chinese teaching and training programs. The first CI was founded in Seoul to promote Chinese language and culture. Large-scale cultural activities including Chinese cultural festivals abroad have been held to showcase China. At the end of 2005, the Chinese government for the first time issued a white paper on peaceful development, in which "harmony" (和 hé) was described as the ultimate goal of China's development, namely, to build a peaceful and prosperous world. President Hu Jintao officially put forward the essential principal "harmonious world" as China's world philosophy for the new century

(Yu, 2007). Since the 16th congress in 2002, culture-building and reform of the cultural system were given urgent strategic positions due to an excess of imports over exports and a high deficit in international cultural exchanges (Cao, 2007).

The forms of cultural diplomacy, such as the Year of Culture, the Year of China, and the Cultural Festival, have gradually matured. China has actively participated in multilateral cultural co-operation activities, such as the project initiated by the United Nations as the protection of world cultural heritage. In 2004, the 7th Annual Ministerial Conference of the International Forum on Cultural Policy was held in Shanghai and the 28th World Heritage Committee Meeting was held in Suzhou, China. The following year, China and ASEAN signed The Memorandum of Understanding on Cultural Co-operation between China and ASEAN, which became the first official document on cultural exchange and co-operation signed by China and regional organizations. China also successfully held the 2008 Olympic Games, Shanghai World Expo, and Guangzhou Asian Games.

While attracting people to visit China, the Chinese government also takes culture abroad and strives to display China's cultural achievements to the world. Various initiatives seek to build an image of China as a peaceful, developing, and co-operating power (Hu, 2007).

Cultural Diplomacy after the 18th National Congress

Since the 18th Communist Party of China National Congress, Chinese diplomatic strategies have adjusted to actively promote the innovation of diplomatic practices. In terms of cultural diplomacy, the cultural origin of President Xi Jinping includes world consciousness, the combination of justice and benefit, harmony in diversity, and the unity of heaven and man (Xing, 2018). The report of the National Congress notes that cultural strength and competitiveness are important symbols of China's prosperity and national revitalization. Friendly exchanges with political parties and organizations in various countries will consolidate a social foundation for the development of foreign relations. The requirements and tasks are so clearly pointed out that cultural diplomacy has been

upgraded to an unprecedented level of national strategy (Yang, 2014).

In 2014, China's GDP of $10 trillion ranked second in the world for the first time. UNESCO (2016) reported that China was the fastest growing country of global trade in cultural products from 2004–2013 and surpassed the U.S. as the world's largest exporter of cultural products. China's total import and export of cultural industries reached $126.5 billion, among which the Confucius Institute has been hailed as the best cultural product ever (China Daily, 2014).

In the era of Xi, focus on the internal construction of cultural diplomacy is intended to revive comprehensively China's excellent traditional culture that is the root of the Chinese national spirit and cultural soft power (Anonymous, 2013). Xi (2017) underscored the importance of China's cultural diplomacy, which should contribute to inherit the Chinese culture, comprehensively improve the people's cultural literacy, safeguard the national cultural security and enhance the national cultural soft power. In 2018, the General Office of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China and the General Office of the State Council issued Opinions on Implementing the Project of Inheritance and Development of Chinese Excellent Traditional Culture, which clearly promulgated the idea of reviving traditional culture in an all-around way, for instance, implementing the revitalization project of Chinese traditional festivals.

The world's welfare and economic development are still unbalanced and inadequate. President Xi put forward a strategic conception of the Silk and the Road Initiatives (BRI) which conforms to the worldwide trend of multipolarization, economic globalization, cultural diversity, and the tide of social information. China aims to shape its national image as a peaceful and responsible country, and BRI is identified as significant elements of Beijing's current effort to fasten ties with its geographic periphery. The BRI initiative offers considerable potential in the realms of economy, politics, culture, and international strategy and provides surrounding regions with opportunities (Anonymous, 2013). Along with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the BRI policies are part of an audacious vision for transforming the political and economic landscapes of Eurasia and Africa over

the coming decades via a network of infrastructure partnerships across various sectors (Kumar, 2018). Connecting people's hearts and minds, the important contents of BRI have become the highlight of co-operation among all parties. Therefore, along with China's ever-changing relations with the world under the framework of BRI, China's cultural diplomacy presents a comprehensive, wide-ranging, and innovative development (Yang, 2020).

Today, the concept of a harmonious world and a communal shared future of mankind are important milestones in China's overall foreign relations. However, at different stages of historical development, cultural diplomacy has different contents and expressions. Deploying its unique cultural resources and diverse platforms, China has been trying to enhance its soft power and project its image of peaceful rise (Lai, 2012).

2.3. Major Instruments of China's Cultural Diplomacy

The highlights of the 6th Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) were a deepening of the reform of cultural systems and promotion of the prosperity of socialist culture. It was the first time that such a central decision-making conference had focused on cultural issues (Hyun, 2011). There is now consensus to enlarge the international influence of Chinese culture efficiently by means of cultural diplomacy. In order to present a clear network of China's cultural diplomacy, the means are divided into the following categories that explain the main actors and explore the concrete policies.

Sport Diplomacy

Sports diplomacy used to function as a door connecting China with the outside world. As an effective diplomatic means, it demonstrates a soft and ultimately progressive mode of cultural intervention of China in target countries (Xue, 2019). In 1949, China's first sports delegation took part in the 2nd World Festival of Youth and Students which officially started the journey of China's sports diplomacy. In 1971, a Chinese delegation participated in the 31st World Table Tennis Championships in Japan.

The interaction between Chinese and American athletes were the first nongovernmental exchanges since 1949. Ping-pong diplomacy created a new U.S.-China international relationship. The 1st Asian Games in 1990 helped showcase China's development and its national image as a great power (Hong, 2015). Relations with neighboring countries began to normalize, especially with South Korea and Vietnam. The former sent a large sports delegation of more than 700 people, and the latter sent more than 100 people, paving the way for the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam to visit China the following year. Sports diplomacy empowered China to implement more extensive exchanges in the international community. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games caught the world's attention and accelerated the integration of China into the world (Dong & Mangan, 2013). The Games attracted more than 11,000 athletes and set up potential diplomatic platforms for China. Moreover, China has taken advantage of the media of sports to implement its diplomatic strategies by holding mega sporting events such as the 2019 Men's Basketball World Cup, the 19th Asian Games, and the 24th Winter Olympic Games. However, global opinion polls indicate that these mega sporting events had little impact on changing global perceptions of China (Manzenreiter, 2010). Obviously, the world had a different understanding of China.

From the 18th National Congress onward, President Xi has fully utilized sports diplomacy to strengthen bilateral relations, such as during his visits to Mexico City, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. President Xi started a precedent for Chinese presidents to attend the opening ceremony of the Sochi Winter Olympics, which also showed China's strong efforts at cultural integration outside of political motivations. When Prince William of the U.K. visited Beijing in 2015, both parties hoped to strengthen football co-operation and exchange. The leaders of China and Russia watched the Sino-Russian Youth Ice Hockey Friendship Competition in 2018, which has been praised as effective sports diplomacy to strengthen bilateral friendship.

China's sports diplomacy has another branch in providing overseas sports aid including material assistance and technique support. Since the 1950s, China has provided

foreign aid to sports in developing countries. In China's sports industry, overseas sports investment is given great importance. Stadium construction is a new mode of co-operation for China, especially in African countries. There is no official document to define the term "Stadium Diplomacy," initially described by Copper (1979) as "friendship stadiums." Along with a growing list of developing countries accepting China's generous foreign aid in the form of stadiums, the Olympic committee and foreign scholars (Menary, 2015; Will, 2012) began to call this "Stadium Diplomacy," the building or donating of stadiums and sports facilities in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. China offers donations or low interest loans, or jointly builds stadiums with host countries. The biggest beneficiaries of China's stadium diplomacy are African countries (Vondracek, 2019). While providing foreign aid, China also trains sports talents and provides technical help for target countries. In 2017, when Gabon hosted the African Cup of Nations, the cost of the Gabon National Stadium was about $55 million. Therefore, though China didn't participate in the Cup itself, it scored goals with the event (Ndenguino-Mpira, 2012). China has employed more soccer policies than any other country in its foreign affairs, especially in Africa. China is thus promoting its geopolitical influence in Africa through soccer (Cornelissen, 2010).

The export data of the African countries where China built stadiums show that China became the main trading partner of these countries. The foundation of Sino-African co-operation lies in the premise that African countries are rich in natural resources and China can get preferential access to these resources by various means, such as constructing advanced sports stadiums (Cockayne et al., 2021). As China constructed about 100 stadiums throughout the world in Angola, Mozambique, Gabon, Cairo, Costa Rica, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Belarus, Chinese-built stadiums became a skillful catalyst for enhancing bilateral relations. Foreign aid with Chinese traits is showcasing China's palpable influence in the target countries.

Education Diplomacy

With the further broadening of China's opening to the world, an innovative round of

cultural exchanges in educational fields has gradually formed. Firstly, in the field of education scholarship, Chinese government scholarships are classified into undergraduate, master's, doctoral, and various other scholarships. Scholarship winners tend to become civil ambassadors for friendly exchanges between the respective countries because stories told by scholarship winners are more credible and convincing (Ma & Lin, 2012). Additionally, Chinese corporations are engaged in the granting of scholarships. Huawei's flagship project "Future Seed" aims to cultivate more communication and information technology talents, enhance people's understanding and interest in the IT industry, and encourage countries to build a digital community. By the end of 2018, the project has sown seeds of hope in 108 countries or regions, benefiting more than 30,000 students. As the largest shareholder of Energy of Portugal (EDP in Portuguese), the Three Gorges Corporation has adhered to a philosophy that not only pursues economic returns but also actively fulfills social responsibilities in the host country. While carrying out co-operation between enterprises, the corporation functions as a bridge to conduct all-around co-operation between China and Portugal (Pereira, 2017).

Secondly, the "Lu Ban Workshop" is named after an ancient Chinese craftsman. It provides a Chinese vocational education that actively responds to BRI and the "going out" initiative of Chinese-funded enterprises (Zhao, 2019). The international innovation of vocational education takes the engineering practice innovation project as its core concept. It has become an entity bridge for China's vocational education service to exchange with the world. Its main task is to share vocational training and technical instruction with the world. The first overseas Lu Ban Workshop in Thailand cultivated high-quality technical personnel and improved the economic and social development of the co-operating countries (Zhang, 2020). The Lu Ban Workshop in Chichester College was officially unveiled in 2017 as the first European Workshop. It offers courses in Chinese cooking technology and has entered the British Academic Qualification Certification System and been recognized by European countries. India and Pakistan

have also built Lu Ban Workshops. At the opening ceremony of the China-Africa Co-operation Forum in 2018, China promised to set up 10 Lu Ban workshops to provide vocational skills training to African youth. As an innovative means for China's vocational colleges to participate overseas and demonstrate international co-operation, Lu Ban Workshops rely on strategic co-operation between governments. It is incorporated into China's diplomatic strategy to facilitate intergovernmental co-operation, thus building a bridge of dialogue and exchange. This bridge shares with the world the teaching model, specialty standards, technical equipment, and teaching programs of China's vocational education (Zhang, 2020).

Thirdly, since 2004, China has worked at establishing CI, often perceived as emanating directly from the political powers (Arodirik, 2015). The institutes develop nonprofit partnerships with universities and other institutions to teach the Chinese language and promote Chinese culture. However, CIs are often criticized for playing against the disinterested rules of cultural diplomacy (Kessler, 2020). When focusing on Chinese cultural centers abroad, people often use CI for comparison. CI takes the promotion of education (especially language) as the goal and adopts the mode of co-operation between China and foreign universities or schools. Cultural centers focus on literary and artistic exchanges, and use more diplomatic channels with a marked official color (Pan, 2013). CI's purpose and mission determine its inevitable connection with China's cultural diplomacy. CIs not only cause global sensations and great effects, but they have also resulted in a series of criticisms which will be explored in depth in Chapter 4.

Finally, the establishment of the South-South Co-operation and Development Institute is a milestone in China's foreign co-operation history (De Renz & Seifert, 2014). After the Second World War, developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America lost their status as colonies and semi-colonies and began to pursue modernization. Solidarity and co-operation with other developing countries form the unshakable foundation of China's foreign relations. Built against such a backdrop, the Ministry of

Commerce built the Development Institute with master's and doctoral programs and empowered Beijing University as its host university. The Institute aims to promote modernization of the governance systems and governance capacity of developing countries. The launch of the Institute marks a shift in co-operation between China and South-south countries from financial and engineering support to intellectual exchange and support. It is also a new milestone for China's foreign economic co-operation as it has moved from the provision of funds, technology, and products to the exchange of experience and ideas. In the field of international development, this event marks the transition from one-way exchanges between the north and the south to mutual exchanges and co-operation between the South and the south (Modi, 2011).

Art Diplomacy

As an important form of cultural diplomacy, art exchange plays an increasingly important role in international relations. When it is inconvenient to conduct formal diplomatic activities, countries often use music or other art forms to better explore diplomatic channels. The "symphony diplomacy" and "jazz diplomacy" of the United States are typical cases. Cultural diplomacy used to be an important pillar supporting Sino-Russian relations, with the China-Russia Cultural Festival as an example. Sino-Japanese Ballet diplomacy is another typical example of co-operative diplomacy used to enhance mutual understanding and create a favorable public opinion for bilateral relations. To some extent, such activities pave the way for the normalization of diplomatic relations (Liu, 2021). The Vatican exhibition show is another successful practice of China's cultural diplomacy. The Vatican is the only country in Europe that has not established diplomatic relations with China, but the two countries have been constantly interacting, for instance, through the exhibition of Chinese Cultural Relics from the Vatican Museum in the Forbidden City Museum. A highlight of the exhibition is the mixture of Catholic art with Chinese aesthetic taste, which shows a process of continuous integration of Catholic art and Chinese culture. Besides such individual activities, China organizes systematic and long-term events held by varied funds and

organizations. Compared with other countries, China still has a large gap in financing the export of its own excellent culture due to few brand projects and immature mechanisms and institutions (Chang, 2012).

The China National Art Foundation, founded after the 18th Congress as a public welfare fund, aims to support China's diplomatic policy of going global by art creation, communication, and talent training. In order to coordinate with the country's overall diplomatic network, the Foundation has funded various kinds of exchange promotion projects, including the activities of Chinese and foreign cultural exchange years, cultural festivals, and arts festivals. The China National Art Foundation respects the laws of overseas art communication and normally co-operates with influential foreign institutions and exhibitions so as to smoothly enter mainstream society. For example, a first-class Chinese ballerina performed in the David H. Koch Theater known as the home of the New York Ballet. Local mainstream media and magazines published positive reviews of the performance. The audience of art diplomacy is mainly the well-educated elites of various countries who tend to have a strong sense of internationalization and often pay attention to national diplomatic activities (Kirby, 1997). The China National Art Foundation focuses on telling Chinese stories, disseminating Chinese voices, and establishing Chinese images by funding brand activities based on bilateral or multilateral cultural agreements. It harnesses government funds with a long-term co-operation mechanism and coordinates the advantages of diplomacy practitioners.

The Chinese government has made full use of overseas cultural centers to organize cultural festivals, exhibitions on cultural relics, book fairs, film festivals, and tourist activities to promote traditional Chinese culture. The first Chinese cultural center was set up in Mauritius in 1988. By the end of 2018, the number of such centers reached 37, with a global network spreading across five continents (Hong, et al., 2020). Their building designs and interior decorations continue to include the latest digital facilities and equipment.

Over the past 30 years, overseas Chinese cultural centers have been innovating and

co-operating with mainstream institutions in the local countries. The center in Paris hosted eight French Chinese Film Festivals with France's Pathé Film Company, showing more than 150 Chinese films in seven French cities. The center in Moscow has set up its own "Reading China" Literary Translation Award which has become a benchmark for Russian translators (Bassnett, 2011).

The Ministry of Culture, in addition to developing brand projects, has also formed a mode of co-operation with China's provinces and municipalities, providing opportunities for domestic personnel engaged in cultural exchanges with foreign countries. Chinese Cultural Centers have established cultural relations with other countries based on the common needs of cultural exchange and the mutual intentions of reciprocal co-operation. The overall cultures and art performance selected represent high-quality standards and multiethnic characteristics which can better cultivate the respect and favorable feeling of the local people towards China. There have been many fixed projects with unified brands, such as the annual "Happy Spring Festival," the "Mid-Autumn Festival," and "Non-Heritage Culture Week." Top-level planning from the government provides quality control and effective allocation of resources. Currently, China has established 35 cultural centers overseas which are responsible for continuously organizing various Chinese language teaching activities, sinologist exchanges, art exhibitions, cultural performances, sports competitions, and more, so as to introduce Chinese history, culture, development, and contemporary social life to other countries. The establishment of cultural centers is consistent with the popular mode of international cultural diplomacy. It is more legitimate to set up quasi-official institutions and promote national culture on the basis of cultural exchanges and reciprocal co-operation. After 30 years of accumulation, the cultural function of overseas Chinese cultural centers in serving national diplomacy has grown and the scale effect has begun to appear. However, Chinese culture has long been depicted as a culture of difference, misery, and agony (Zhang et al., 2019). In the digital 21st century, its rich cultural character and charm need to be communicated across cultures via new media platforms. Only in this way do the traditional cultures and arts

have new opportunities for their demystification and approbation.

Media Diplomacy

Positive internal and external publicity via domestic and international media establish a good national image (Knott et al., 2015). China's main goals are to present China as a reliable friend and partner and meanwhile to make sure that China's image is positive, at least in the developing world (Farah & Mosher, 2010). Media are used significantly by China to promote its image, while generating local media attention to the multiple commercial programs in target countries. The concept of soft power guides China to invest in the international expansion of news media including China Central Television and the growth of overseas media conglomerates (Flew, 2016). Media diplomacy is likely to be prioritized for political reasons. Although China has clearly defined its purpose in developing media diplomacy, these concepts have not universally been recognized by the international community. In today's international society, Western powers still have the advantage of discursive power. The logic of international relations theory in Western countries is that the increasing security of one country often leads to the decreasing security of other countries, known as the security dilemma (Liff & Ikenberry, 2014). Realistic theory of international relations holds that the rise of a country will inevitably challenge today's international order. Mearsheimer (2017) once directly pointed out that China's peaceful rise was impossible. Therefore, for the construction of media diplomacy in China, a more specific and clearer national image must be presented in order to be accepted by the international community and gain international discursive power. The latter can influence local people through effective information dissemination and knowledge control in the international community.

Western media have spread an image of China according to their own value standards by virtue of a strong position in expressing international public opinion (Zhao, 2016). Due to differences in ideology and media system, it is difficult for Chinese media to effectively disseminate information to the people of foreign countries, especially Western countries. Most external impressions and evaluations of China come from

Western media (Zhao, 2015). Discourse plays a constructive role in social rules and identity, which is an important carrier for the cross-cultural dissemination of national image. The China Threat Theory is an embodiment of the monopoly of discourse in the Western world (Broomfield, 2003).

Since the cross-cultural propagation of national image is a complex systematic project, China also integrates and utilizes various resources to achieve its goal. Chinese efforts emphasize forming anti-Western alliances and using an anti-Western media model. China also has prioritized expanding media influence in nations that still have diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Farah & Mosher, 2010). Regions where China has strong economic and political presence and military sales have also attracted China's attention to expand its influence. China constructs its media model by offering government aid to state-run media in the form of radio transmitters and financing for national satellites, providing content and technologies, signing memoranda of understanding to share news, and training journalists with expense-paid trips. Newspapers, radio, television, and other traditional media are the main forces in the position of public opinion in China. In addition to "hard power," China's national soft power construction has entered the fast lane through the establishment of the State Administration of Radio and Television, the production of Chinese national promotion films, and the broadcasting of the Central CCTV Overseas International Station in many countries (Zhang et al., 2016). China's mainstream media have landed overseas, such as CCTV in Kenya and Xinhua Agency in the United States. New media, too, are an indispensable force for the cross-cultural dissemination of national image. China strengthens the construction of financial media and promotes the convergence of newspapers, radio, television, mobile terminals, networks, and other media. This new convergence breaks the boundaries between different media and broadens communication channels. For example, the use of short videos has become a new trend of communication. The rapid development of major short video platforms such as Douyin (抖音), Kuaishou (快手), and Miaopai (秒拍) affects the dissemination of modern information in a fragmented and visualized way. Some

mainstream media in China have begun to attach importance to the use of short video transmission, such as the 2018 *People's Daily* promotional film *China in One Minute* which disseminates an image of China through rapid editing and exquisite pictures.

When China strengthens exchanges and co-operation with overseas media, people start to get original news from authoritative Chinese media. This has a deep effect on the dissemination of Chinese values and influences media especially in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia (Farah & Mosher, 2010). China is making full use of the visibility and influence of media in the target countries to disseminate Chinese stories and voices. While the final results of these efforts remain hard to judge, according to China's performance in hosting major media conferences, China has obviously shown itself to be a firm force not to be neglected in the international arena.

Chinese Diaspora Diplomacy

The term "Chinese diaspora" refers to Chinese descendants of any citizenship residing outside mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has classified the definition of diaspora according to cultural allegiance instead of citizenship (Nyiri, 2001; Thunø, 2001). Therefore, the Chinese diaspora includes ethnic Chinese with foreign citizenships (华人 huá rén or 华裔 huá yì), Chinese nationals working and residing abroad（华侨 huá qiáo), and overseas students (留学生 liú xué shēng) (Li, 2012).

According to d'Hooghe (2005), the Chinese diaspora acts as an important intermediary between the host country and the country of origin and plays a special part in China's foreign diplomacy by being both the actor and the target of diaspora diplomacy (Li, 2002). The diaspora is unique in being both the target audience for international cultural relations and a 'co-producer' in projecting that image (Isar, 2017). Except during the period of Cultural Revolution, China has upheld a consistent principle to embrace the Chinese diaspora. Diasporic people provided China financial and political support to overthrow the Qing Dynasty, to fight against Japan during World War II, and so on (Li, 2007). China's authorities aim to win the Chinese diaspora over to their side because such diasporas facilitate the popularization of Chinese culture and help lobby the

political interests of the People's Republic of China in the residence countries.

In 2011, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council put forward the concept of diaspora diplomacy, which involves three closely connected actors: China (the actor), diaspora Chinese (the media), and the public in the country of residence (the receiving party). Similar to the diaspora conditions of Israel and Cape Verde, China has always valued the unique advantages of its approximately 60 million diaspora resources, 40 million of whom live in countries along the BRI area (Kerimbaev et al., 2020).

The focus on diaspora diplomacy is intended to enhance China's national image by encouraging overseas Chinese to introduce the real China to the host country and to help local mainstream society objectively view and understand China. On the one hand, the Chinese government, or its entrusted social groups, mobilizes the overseas Chinese businessmen, schools, media, communities, and other Chinese groups to transmit the real situation and cultural symbols of China to the local society so as to form a positive public opinion toward China. This is a kind of bottom-up operation mechanism. On the other hand, the Chinese government harnesses a top-down policy by directly contacting the Chinese diaspora who has influential social status to promote the local government to form a favorable policy for China. China's government views elites among the Chinese diaspora as the backbone of diaspora diplomacy (Wang, 2003).

In the process of diaspora diplomacy, China proactively employs cultural resources to convey its traditional culture to the Chinese abroad so as to enhance their familiarity with China's image. Cultural and art projects in local Chinese communities are carried out such as "Celebrating the Spring Festival," and "Home Journey to China" Summer (Winter) Camp. China also holds the annual World Conference of Chinese Businessmen to share business information and builds affinity by operating economic exchanges and academic and cultural activities. A series of continuous activities helps revitalize the Chinese economy and overseas Chinese education. Jiangsu Normal University and Malaysia's Tunku Abdul Rahman University jointly established China's first overseas Mencius Institute to spread Chinese culture to overseas Chinese through student

exchange, culture lectures, and a series of academic activities. The establishment of Mencius Institutes participates in the implementation of the overall "going global" strategy of Chinese culture (Xu, 2010). The Institute is designed especially for members of the Chinese diaspora to enhance their national cultural identity. Its mission differs from that of CI, which focuses on promoting classic Chinese traditional culture to the whole world.

Diaspora diplomacy tends to become more complicated due to restless circular migration, hierarchical identities, and more convenient access to new media. The Chinese government needs to integrate diasporas into its overall diplomatic system to overcome the complexity of transnational relations (Brinkerhoff, 2019).

2.4 An Appraisal of China's Cultural Diplomacy

China's cultural diplomacy has made great progress (Sterling, 2018). However, the recipient countries where it has been intensely practiced are not very fond of China (Pew Research Center, 2019). According to the survey, although most people believe that China's influence has significantly increased, people from the majority of developed countries have a relatively negative view of China. Casting the political reasons aside, China's cultural diplomacy itself still needs to follow more effective policies to convey a positive image of China.

The prime problem in China's cultural diplomacy is attributable to the crisis of cultural identity inside China. In the context of globalization, China's cultural exchange deficit triggered crises of cultural identity and cultural anxiety (Wu, 2017). China has started to revitalize traditional culture and strengthen people's cultural self-confidence in order to narrow the cultural exchange deficit. However, in research on the Portuguese community living in Guangdong Province, respondents generally believe that China's mainstream value culture lacks a contemporary international perspective (Ding & Shang, 2019). Therefore, to clarify the mainstream value of Chinese culture is a must to enhance China's soft cultural power. There are many potential problems in the implementation of

policies. For example, holding the Chinese Cultural Year tends to produce short-term effect, sometimes even in vain. In addition, the government provides strong financial and technical support for its cultural diplomacy but it offers the target countries an impression of political behavior. Topnotch diplomacy policies are absent in the realm of global governance. For example, China's infrastructure assistance in Africa is clearly evident, but there are few Chinese professors lecturing in African universities. Instead, professors from the United States, Japan, and India can exert direct intellectual impacts on the educated class in Africa. China needs more participation in global initiatives and creativity such as global ecological protection and life assistance. This absence of high-end cultural diplomacy is one of the shortcomings in China's overall cultural diplomacy.

Joseph Nye (2005) declared that the rise of China's soft power threatens the interests of the United States. Only China can actively improve China's national image and take practical actions to confront this "China Threat Theory." The concept of soft power, a core concept in the Chinese policy framework, gives the Chinese government an innovative way to conceptualize and exercise its power (Wang & Lu, 2008). In the 17th CPC National Congress, the term was officially woven into the keynote report of President Hu, who recommended taking Chinese culture as part of the country's 'soft power' (Hu & The 16th CPC Central Committee, 2007a, p. 7). Adoption of this term represented a strategic shift in the CPC's policies concerning China's developmental path (Zhang, 2010). Soft power centers upon a country's cultural and political charm instead of coercion and threats (Hunter, 2009; Nye, 1990). In practice, as discussed above, cultural industries, scholarly interactions, and humanitarian communications are the main vehicles China harnesses to expand the soft side of its influence. The booming film industry and market, for example, were conducive to expanding China's cultural influence in the international arena (Vlassis, 2016), and CIs around the world are venues for academic exchanges and the knowledge transfer of Chinese values (Zhou & Luk, 2016).

The concept "sharp power," coined by an American think tank, refers to the ability to

impact audiences in the target countries by penetrating informational and political environments (Shao, 2019). China is labeled with sharp power because they exert their national influence outward with money-consuming propaganda to shape public opinion and perceptions in democratic societies (Nye, 2018). China is challenng the present world order with its unprecedented economic strength, massive overseas investment, fast-growing military force, and burgeoning technology. Walker (2018) stressed that sharp power could limit free expression and distort political environments because of the asymmetric levels of freedom between democratic and authoritarian systems. It tends to expand its influence on the international stage with its foreign diplomacy efforts to match its status as a rising great power (Chan & Fung, 2021). Regarding the rise of China and its effects on the international order, this transnational influence has put Western countries on the alert (Shao, 2019).

Armed with China's military budget with a yearly growth rate at 8% and deployment of new weapons, academic dialogues about soft power and sharp power have illuminated heated disagreements. While China was once perceived as an ascending stakeholder in the global village, it has been criticized due to its authoritarian governance and formidable international influence in the new millennium (Nye, 2018).

China's effort to develop its soft power has encountered mixed international responses. The tools of China's cultural diplomacy discussed previously are sometimes perceived as a "toolkit" of its sharp power (Walker, 2018). China's interpretation and implementation of soft power is characterized by the involvement of state power and economic coercion, which contradicts the core conceptualization of soft power as a charm to gain voluntary attraction in transnational societies (Chan & Fung, 2021). Zhou and Luk (2016) alleged that CIs failed in promoting China's soft power because they are regarded a propaganda tool and a threat to host countries.

From the author's perspective, on the one hand, according to the traditional Chinese philosophies noted in a previous section, there is a strong connection between the idea of soft power and the ideal of a harmonious world. Chinese culture, ideas, and principles

and current Chinese diplomacy resonate with the Chinese ideal of building a harmonious world. On the other hand, when international scholars and politicians comment on China's soft power in foreign policy settings, they frequently compare it with sharp power. Soft power in China, by contrast, has the implication of the rise of China and its cultural renaissance. The gap between foreign and domestic policy should close in terms of soft power development (Zhang, 2010). China should focus on strengthening the construction of multichannel development for the future of its cultural diplomacy.

2.5 China's National Image Management

China's national image in the international arena is still largely shaped by others rather than by China itself (d'Hooghe, 2005). This image is the overall impression and evaluation given by countries and people at home and abroad. China has been strengthening the construction of its international communication capabilities and accelerating the promotion of its international influence. However, again, China's national image is mainly formed by Western media because more than 90% of the spread of global news is controlled by Western media (Rumi, 2004), so even though the Chinese government has built a global media network for decades, the spread of China's national image is still far from satisfactory.

China's national image has changed dynamically since the birth of New China, resulting from China's changing national strength, national behavior, and activities (Guo & Wang, 2018). Along with China's accelerating economy and integration into the international community, China's image in the world is changing from "an injured country of the Third World" to "a responsible major power" (Yi, 2005). China has largely removed its reputation for poverty and backwardness and entered a new era of building a prosperous and developed socialist nation (Zhang, 2019).

When China's national economy was weak in the 1950s, the state lagged behind others in terms of economic development, scientific research, and international status. Under such circumstances, China strove for a peaceful external environment as a priority.

Before the ensuing "Great Leap Forward" (大跃进 dà yuè jìn), "People's Commune" (人民公社 rén mín gōng shè), and "Cultural Revolution" (文化大革命 wén huà dà gé mìng) brought China an image of "political supremacy," China was viewed as an ancient Eastern country that was both backward and self-isolated (Zhang, 2018). However, now as the second largest economy in the world, modern China bears major country responsibilities in global governance and international politics and continues remarkable development in various fields such as high-speed rail, electronic payments, the Internet of things, 5G communications technology, BeiDou navigation satellites, nuclear power, shipbuilding, and so on. The image of an advanced socialist power gives the world a new impression (Zhu, 2019).

The issue of national image has always been the concern of China's Head of State. In 2005, the Chinese government published a white paper entitled "China's Road to Peaceful Development" that advocates peace, openness, harmony, and win-win co-operation as China's positions (Guo, 2005). Six years later the white paper of China's Peaceful Development, published by the Information Office of the State Council (2011), pointed out that China's road to peaceful development should be to develop itself through maintaining world peace and seeking win-win situations with other countries. Thereafter, the 18th National Congress put forward the development goal of building a socialist cultural power and added cultural self-confidence to the category of the other three types of self-confidence, i.e., development road self-confidence, theoretical self-confidence, and institutional self-confidence (Hu, 2012). President Xi emphasized in the 12th Collective Learning of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee that China should focus on displaying the image of a great civilized country with a profound history, diverse ethnic groups, and harmonious cultures (Xi, 2013). The report of the 19th National Congress further advocated that "we must show a true, three-dimensional, and comprehensive China, and improve the country's cultural strength" (Xi, 2017). China should convey itself in terms of a peaceful rise and a positive national image. The 19th National Congress clarifies the development goal of China up to the middle of the 21st

century as building a prosperous, strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and beautiful modern socialist power (Swaine, 2018). Therefore, it can be concluded that culture has been prioritized in the shaping of China's national image. The concepts of "cultural soft power," "cultural Diplomacy," "community of shared destiny," and "civilization exchanges" have become high-frequency words in the policy documents of the Chinese government, which reflects a major change in China's diplomatic philosophy. The core of that philosophy is the optimization and improvement of China's national image.

Today, China continues its long-term goal to shape and gain a national image as a civilized, responsible, Eastern, and socialist country (Xi, 2017). However, this goal may be hampered by the international community. The imbalance of self-awareness versus external perception originates from the fact that the world's view of China is "too often an unstable cocktail of out-of-date ideas, wild hopes and unshakeable prejudices and fears," and "China's greatest strategic threat today is its national image" (Ramo, 2007, p. 12). The harmonious unity of both the domestic and the international image is indispensable in constituting China's national image. Incongruity between these two images remains a headache for the Chinese government. The reason why China's image of itself and other nations' views of China are out of alignment is that China has changed so incredibly fast that national image shaping can't keep up with the times (Chen, 2018). Except during the recent Covid-19 period, China's national image in the eyes of the international community has continued to improve in recent years. China scored 6.3 in a 10-point system concerning its overall image in 2019, 0.1 point higher than in 2018, according to a report released jointly by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies. The report indicated that respondents from developing countries generally have a better impression of China's image, rising from 5.8 points in 2013 to 7.2 points in 2019 (China Daily, 2020). According to Anholt (2008), China tries hard to brand its image, but results from the Nation Brands Index (NBI) do not make comfortable reading for China. From the end of 2005 to the second quarter of 2007, China's overall score declined by

4%, nearly double the ground lost by any other country in the NBI. The worst figures are for people's willingness to live and work in China. Although the world's impression of China has improved, survey results from the Pew Research Center show that the proportion of positive recognition towards China by developed countries is not high. Sharp power, cultural invasion, and neocolonialism are widespread negative evaluations (Jin, 2019; Li, 2008). Further, there is no denying that the global outbreak of COVID-19 has created new issues for China in shaping its national image, making more demands on the nation to accurately position its image in the new era (Pew Research Center, 2020).

It is essential for China to win the understanding and support of the international community. China's major-country diplomacy, the proposal of the BRI, and efforts to build a shared future for mankind show China's ideal plan to be a responsible power. However, Westerners may think differently even though China emphasizes minority equality and common prosperity among all minority groups. The minority problems of Xinjiang and Tibet are sources of criticisms.

Generally, China's national image has been reshaped in the new era by China's restless efforts including employment of advanced information and communication technologies in international broadcasting, close connections with the Chinese diaspora around the world, and cultural promotions along various channels (Wang, 2008). However, China's national image management is still restrained by weak political credibility, reviving popular nationalism, and various missteps in its foreign policies (Ding, 2011). More importantly, there exists an imbalanced view of national image inside and outside China. National image is not only a channel to wield a state's national soft power but also an important national power resource. It has become crucial for China's smooth integration into a relatively favorable international environment.

To conclude, in order to effectively adjust to the changing environment, the Chinese government and other public service organizations must consider innovating the means and implementation of cultural diplomacy. There is always a need to actively incorporate creativity into decision-making processes and create valuable outcomes for citizens

(customers). China's cultural diplomacy needs to create new forms of co-operation among nations, citizens, private enterprises, social enterprises, and NGOs. Innovation brings different exploration and planning methods into decision-making processes. Therefore, after examining six countries' cultural diplomacy in Chapter 1, it is meaningful to have a close inspection of China's practice. The making and implementation of China's cultural diplomacy can be understood as part of an exploratory creative process to deal with the unpredictability and potential of the world. The question is what processes are needed to effectively incorporate innovation into public governance and where to start building a new model of cultural diplomacy (Blomkamp, 2018). The trend of China's cultural diplomacy is to tell the Chinese story to the rest of world proactively instead of passively accepting international judgment. Cultural security, military security, and social security all have the same important position in China (Xi, 2017). It has become a national task to deal with potential cultural prestige. As an ancient country with a rich cultural heritage, China formulates cultural diplomacy strategies through institutional innovation to achieve the ultimate goal of ensuring cultural security (Zhao, 2005). To date, China's cultural diplomacy is moving towards a "new paradigm" advocated by the government and complemented by NGOs, enterprises, the Chinese diaspora, and other actors in direct contact with the foreign public. Cultural diplomacy channels involve active cultural communication based on the political intention of the government, such as the communication of the government and the people of the target country (e.g., overseas cultural centers) and folk communication (e.g. CI, Lu Ban Workshop, Mencius Institute). Its model has formed Chinese characteristics with multidomained, official-led, and multiactor participation. However, among the international community, China's cultural diplomacy is seen more as an instrument of functional and strategic purposes and lacks mutuality to transmit its message and convince the world of its benign intentions (Hatig, 2017). Therefore, the importance of unofficial cultural diplomacy is increasingly more prominent, though it is the Achilles' heel of China's cultural diplomacy. Based on this situation, the research in

the following chapters will focus on the CI, one remarkable flagship of China's cultural diplomacy, to uncover and analyze the innovative effects of China's cultural diplomacy, especially in improving national image.

Chapter 3: China's Lusophone Cultural Diplomacy

There are nine Portuguese-speaking countries (PSCs) in the world, spanning over Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa and embracing Portugal, Brazil, East Timor, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Equatorial Guinea, with a total population of nearly 280 million. PSCs coexist with a shared language and historical legacy (Ambrósio et al., 2019). In 1996, Portugal initiated CPLP, whose achievements, especially at the economic level, are way behind its members' expectations (Alves, 2008; Hewitt, 2017; Santos, 2003). CPLP has been restricted by many factors, including different geographical dimensions, diverse political systems, different stages of financial development, and so on. Due to the special relationship between Macao and Portugal, China maintains a privileged link with the PSCs (Ye et al., 2019). Therefore, it is necessary to review the literature of the bilateral relations between China and PSCs before exploring what influence CI has exerted to shape China's national image in PSCs.

3.1 Synthetic Review of the Bilateral Relations

China occupies more than a fifth of the world's population and is the world's second largest economy, creating a strong need for various natural resources. China's energy-intensive economy needs many resources and energy supplies, while its manufacturing industry also has certain advantages in the international market.

Both sides have the potential for developing mutually beneficial and win-win relations. These characteristics of the economy can form economic complementation with the PSCs which are judged by China through the pragmatic lenses of energy and food security concerns (Alves, 2008). In such a context, China proactively develops its South–South co-operation to form a closer alignment with the ASEAN countries, Central Asia, Latin America, and Africa for their unexploited or underexploited natural reserves (Amanor, 2016; Muekalia, 2004). Beijing's intention to pursue an economically oriented long-term strategy has been strengthening its connection with Lusophone regions in

many fields (Alves, 2008). Other political features also aroused China's interest in this distinctive group because China's remarkable economic presence in PSCs can build invisible corridors that connect the regional blocs in Asia, Africa, South America, and Europe where PSCs are members. PSCs have a peaceful relationship with China in the 21st century (Matias, 2014). Bilateral co-operation has become a new force and model of co-operation in reshaping international trade patterns. China has established comprehensive strategic partnerships with Portugal (2005), Brazil (2012), East Timor (2014), and Equatorial Guinea (2015). Further, there is no serious conflict of interest between the two sides in international affairs. In spite of former conflicts with São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea Bissau over Taiwan, the other seven PSCs have always supported the one-China policy. Bilateral relations, especially economic, folk, and cultural exchanges, have developed favorably besides some minor unstable factors.

In addition, the 280 million people in PSCs constitute a vast expanding consumer market, and most people from developing economies tend to consume inexpensive Chinese goods. China's bond with PSCs deepened bilateral relations through many channels, such as the Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation between China and PSCs (Macao Forum), BRICs Economic and Trade Ministers' Meeting, the China International Fair, the Belt and Road Forum for International Co-operation, the China-Africa Co-operation Forum, and the Forum of China-Latin American and Caribbean States. Among various platforms, the Macao Forum launched not long after Macau's handover to China. The Chinese link with Macau helps smooth the relationship between China and the PCS. Moreover, frequent high-level official visits and exchanges have continuously strengthened bilateral political co-operation and cultural communications. China has been committed to carrying out comprehensive co-operation with PSCs in various fields (Arduino, 2017).

Economic Co-operation

Booming bilateral trade testifies that China has successfully opened a gateway to the Lusophone world. In 2017, bilateral economic and trade co-operation accounted for 17%

of the global economy. In 2019, with a GDP of 14.4 trillion US dollars, China continued to maintain its position as the world's second largest economy. The total GDP of PSCs is one fifth of that of China, and Brazil has the largest economic scale, accounting for more than 80% of the total GDP of PSCs. Since the establishment of the Macao Forum, bilateral trade has increased rapidly, and total commodity trade has achieved an average annual growth of 17.7% from 2003 to 2019 (World Economic Outlook, 2020). Brazil is China's largest trading partner among PSCs. Besides media and stadium aid, China's State Grid as well as the state-owned Power Construction and Datang Corporations have invested in electric power projects in Portugal, Brazil, Mozambique, and Angola. As PSCs' leading trade partner and the fastest-growing export market, China hosts nearly one thousand PSC-owned companies and has invested approximately $50 billion in agriculture, environmental protection, transport, telecommunications, and finance. According to analysis by the China-Africa Trade Research Center, the GDP of PSCs in Africa, excluding Angola and Equatorial Guinea, has achieved or is expected to achieve positive growth until 2022. Take Angola for example: China has more than 100 state-owned or private enterprises and 180,000 working staff. Among PSCs, Angola is the largest destination for China's direct investment. According to data released by the Mozambique Investment Promotion Agency in 2017, China has replaced the United Arab Emirates and South Africa as the largest foreign investor in Mozambique. It can be predicted that the African PSCs will have vigorous economic futures. China's investment is mainly concentrated in Brazil, Angola, and Mozambique. When BRI is put into practice, PSCs also seek their own breakthroughs. China's BRI is highly compatible with the development plans of many PSCs because all PSCs are located along crucial international shipping routes. Although Portugal is a developed European country, it has suffered a debt crisis since 2008. The economy of Brazil showed negative growth in 2015. Many other Lusophone countries seek their own development opportunities to cope with economic crisis. China's achievements provide a strong impetus to deepen economic and trade co-operation.

Foreign–aid Policy

The Chinese government has provided various types of training for media workers in African PSCs, including offering training sessions on China's social development and media operation to editors, journalists, and technicians. China has also assisted the countries in media dissemination projects. For example, StarTimes, the most influential system integrator, network operator, and content technology provider in China's radio and television industry, has made great contributions to building and distributing the signals and the digitization of media in Mozambique. Further, China has built various platforms through which China and PSCs can expand their co-operation in the media field. The Chinese government's support for PSCs with radio and television equipment can not only alleviate the scarcity of media facilities in African PSCs but also gain recognition from PSCs in both economic and media fields (Arduino, 2020). China is promoting its geopolitical influence in PSCs through stadium policy in foreign affairs more than any other country, especially in Africa. The number of sports stadiums built by China in Africa is increasing, which brings economic benefits to the African countries. Through stadium aid, China can gain preferential access to African natural resources, which is the foundation of their strategic co-operation (Cockayne et al., 2021). African countries have benefited from China's stadium diplomacy. When Angola hosted the African Cup, the total cost of four venues was estimated at 600 million US dollars provided by the Chinese government. When the National Stadium in Mozambique was built in accordance with Olympic standards, the media in Mozambique praised the stadium as a symbol of friendship between the two countries (Dubinsky, 2021).

Cultural Interaction

China has close ties within PSCs, especially with universities in Brazil and Portugal. Bilateral interaction has developed rapidly in the forms of national education and people-to-people exchanges. The demand for Portuguese talents is increasing because of the expanding of BRI and the return of Macao to China, as well as the deepening co-operation between China and PSCs (Leandro, 2021). In Macao, 6,838 students in

primary and secondary school were studying Portuguese under 54 teachers in 1999–2000, and the two figures rose to 8,000 students and 105 teachers 10 years later (Ye & Liu, 2019). Portuguese is growing at an amazing rate, and there are about 50 universities teaching Portuguese in mainland China. Portuguese has far exceeded its historical role in Macao (Zheng, 2021).

Bilateral academic exchanges are increasingly frequent. In addition to numerous seminars and keynote lectures, the Ministry of Commerce of China, in co-operation with various provinces and regions of China as well as the Macao Forum, has held seminars and training courses relevant to PSCs: medium-and-long-term national planning, urban planning and construction, agricultural production and fishery development, nursing technology training, and small- and medium-sized enterprise research.

Annually, Chinese Embassies in PSCs hold Spring Festival Celebrations, Chinese culture weeks, and other performances for the local people. Meanwhile, PSCs have organized various cultural activities in China, such as Brazilian Film Day, the Brazilian Cultural Food Festival, and the China-Portugal Cultural and Art Festival. Such two-way communication has deepened the bilateral cultural exchanges (Matias, 2014).

3.2 Macao: A Bridge between China and PSCs

Historically, Macao was the first place of contact between China and the Portuguese-speaking world (Costa, 2021). Culturally, Chinese and Portuguese cultures coexisted in Macao, which gave the region a natural identification accepted by the Portuguese world. The distinctive value of Macao lies in its cultural intersection between China and Portugal. PSCs not only use Portuguese as their official language but also share national characteristics because of similar historical experiences and culture. Macao's official languages are Portuguese and Chinese. Portuguese talents in Macao accumulated to a certain extent to facilitate contact with PSCs. This situation has persisted even after Macao's return to China, and the cultivation of Portuguese talents has continued to receive the support of the Portuguese government and attract social attention. Portugal

objectively provides PSCs and Macao with a historical and cultural link. Macao and the PSCs have formed a natural public diplomatic relationship with cultural links and civil exchanges as the platform (Simões, 2012). After returning to China, Macao has successively twinned with Lisbon, Coimbra, and Porto in Portugal; Praia in Cape Verde; Sao Paulo in Brazil; and Luanda in Angola. Its renowned Freeport is highly developed and internationalized, with a lower tax rate that attracts further bilateral economic interaction (Chen & Wang, 2021). Macao has become an unprecedented bridge for economic and cultural exchanges between China and PSCs.

Macao functions as a national exchange hub and an irreplaceable platform for both sides. In 1985, the Metropolitan Union of PSCs was founded in Lisbon. As one of its members, Macao hosted General Meetings in 1997, 2001, and 2007. Many departments of Macao, such as the Macao Cultural Bureau and Macao Economic and Trade Office, have set up official institutions in PSCs for more nongovernmental exchanges. PSCs also build corresponding branches in Macao, such as the Consulate Generals of Portugal and Angola, the Macao-Angola Association, the Sino-São Tomé and Príncipe Friends Association, the Macao-Cape Verde Friendship Association, and the Guinea Bissau Friendship Association. These multilayer and multidisciplinary cultural exchange platforms form a comprehensive network for China and PSCs.

Also, Macao functions as a gateway to insert into the regional blocs. China's active economic performance in PSCs opens a gateway for itself into various regional blocs in South America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. PSCs have associated with many other regions, such as Mauritius, Galicia, and Casamance, and Goa, Damão, and Diu in India. Considering this, it has been proposed that the Macau Forum expand to include all Latin countries into the huge network built by the Chinese government (Alves, 2008). While the proposal may not be practiced soon, Chinese enterprises have already optimized the advantage to sustain regular contact with PSCs, the European Union, and Latin-American countries. They enter European markets via Portugal, South American markets via Brazil, African markets through Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and

Mozambique, and the markets of ASEAN via East Timor. At the same time, positioning itself as a world center of tourism and leisure as well as a service platform, Macao actively implements various regional and international co-operation initiatives to support the Macao-based companies of PSCs to enter the mainland of China (Yang, 2019).

As an intergovernmental and apolitical multilateral co-operation mechanism, Macao Forum (2003) launched the "Three Centers" initiative, consisting of a business and trade service center, a distribution center, and a convention and exhibition center. It seeks to consolidate economic and trade exchanges among China, Macao, and PSCs. Since the establishment of Macao Forum, thousands of heads of government departments and technical personnel of PSCs have participated in various co-operation activities on mainland China and Macao (Matis, 2014). Diversified cultural exchanges have been stimulated under the influence of the Macao Forum. The University of Macau, the Portuguese Institute of the Orient, and Camões Institute (The Portuguese cultural agency) signed an agreement to jointly teach Portuguese language and promote culture as well as undertake international research projects to publish scientific literature and translations of Portuguese literary works. This high-level intergovernmental, semiofficial, and unofficial interaction accelerates cultural exchanges.

Since the development of the Metropolitan Region of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Great Bay was officially included in China's Working Report in 2017, the role of Macau has become more prominent. The provinces and municipalities in the Pan-Pearl River Delta can take advantage of the Macau platform to deepen economic and trade co-operation with PSCs. In short, in relationships between China and PSCs, Macao exerts its full advantages not only in trade and economics but also in culture. High-level cultural forums and related conferences, and various cultural activities and exhibitions, have regularized and institutionalized bilateral cultural exchanges. Macao radiates and spreads the sparks in bilateral exchange, and its role cannot be underestimated in the 21st century. More importantly, China here makes the most of the chance to demonstrate its soft power (Tran & Dos Santos, 2015).

3.3 China's Diplomatic Connection with Each PSC

International exchange between China and Portugal began in the middle of the 16th century (Flynn & Giráldez, 1995). After the 18th century, China started to interact with other PSCs. In the long term, the relationship between China and the PSCs has maintained a co-operative nature. Their strategic partnership is based on a solid and mutually beneficial foundation. Despite the huge potential of co-operation, certain challenges cannot be ignored, for example, geographical distance, little historical connection, and different political systems, all of which may bring obstacles for the two sides.

Portugal and China

Portugal, a European country with a time-honored relationship with China because of the colonial history of Macao, has been China's significant partner in Western Europe (Le Corre, 2018). When Portuguese explorers came to the Macao Peninsula in 1557 the landscape was mountainous, and cultivated land accounted for less than half of the total area. Portuguese chose to live near the former southeast Praia Grande Bay. However, Macao, that is the Peninsula, soon became the major regional economic center for Europeans trading with Asian states (Sheng et al., 2017). Its relationship with the Portuguese colonial empire accompanies the history of Macao and its internalization (De Matos, 2020). Portuguese were the first Westerners to live in Chinese territory and were also the last Westerners to withdraw from the occupied territories. Many important events in Sino-Portuguese relations are closely related to Macao, which occupies a core position in bilateral relations. Bilateral co-operation is mainly manifested in tripartite interaction among China, Portugal, and other PSCs. The ancient Maritime Silk Road has closely linked the Chinese and Portuguese. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, friendly exchanges and comprehensive co-operation have maintained a steady and healthy momentum of development. Agreement on Co-operation in Culture and Science and Technology between China and Portugal, signed in 1982, was the first

official treaty to guide bilateral cultural exchanges. This comprehensive strategic partnership helpfully promoted a soaring amount of bilateral trade and cultural exchanges (Zhou, 2017). New breakthroughs have been made in the fields of science and technology, renewable energy, and the blue marine economy (Liang, 2020). China has become Portugal's first major trading partner in Asia and one of Portugal's main overseas investment destinations. In the European Union (EU), Portugal is the first country to officially establish a blue partnership with China (China Daily, 2019). From China's perspective, Portugal is an important pivot and an active participant in the construction of BRI (Information Office of the State Council, 2016).

In the cultural realm, in 2005 China and Portugal legislatively acknowledged each other's higher education qualifications and degree certificates, which rapidly increased the number of overseas students in both countries (Luijten-Lub, 2005). BFSU-UL-Camões Institute Language and Culture Center has been established in Beijing Foreign Studies University to promote language teaching and other co-operation. A Sino-Portuguese cultural exchange center was also set up in Shanghai to train local Portuguese-speaking professionals. Shanghai University of Electric Power along with the Consulate and Macao Polytechnic Institute offer Portuguese language courses for students majoring in electric power who can work for these overseas projects after graduation. The Fundação Oriente branch in Macau has been the main center of Asia-related artistic activities in Lisbon. However, in accordance with the diplomacy of the two parties, intergovernmental cultural exchanges have naturally become the main platform for Sino-Portuguese cultural diplomacy. Social organizations supported by the government have played a positive role, and diverse China-sponsored cultural activities are held to promote the overall prosperity of cultural exchanges, such as the Fifth China International Youth Art Week and China Film Week held by the Chinese Foreign Cultural Exchange Association. Five Confucius Institutes have also been established with the ultimate goal of deepening Portuguese understanding of China. China's rise as an economic influencer has simultaneously triggered the bilateral practices of cultural

diplomacy (Le Corre, 2018).

Brazil and China

Historically, Sino-Brazilian connection can be traced back to the 15th century when Portugal started to establish its maritime empire. The Brazilian people first developed trade with China via the medium of Macao. Portuguese ships brought fine Chinese porcelains, tea, and silk to Brazil, and China imported gold and tobacco from Brazil (Finlay, 2010). In August 1880, the Qing government agreed to sign the China-Brazil Treaty of Business and Navigation. When Brazil established diplomatic relationships with New China in 1974, the bilateral economic and trade relations were the driving force and cornerstone of diplomatic relations (Marcondes & Barbosa, 2018). In 1993, this bilateral relationship was upgraded to a strategic one. Since the new millennium, China's rise has become a strategic variable for Brazilian foreign policy. The bilateral relationship developed so rapidly that economic and commercial co-operation has achieved mutual benefits and gainful results in the context of strategic partnerships (Zhou, 2019). Global governance and cultural co-operation have been strengthened against this background. The 2010-2012 Implementation Plans for Cultural Co-operation emphasized that both sides should explore various forms of cultural promotion activities and strengthen co-operation between universities (Xinhua Agency, 2019). The two countries deepened their commercial links and have also further improved the quality of their co-operation by setting up multilateral cultural institutions and mechanisms (Cardoso, 2013). The Brazilian government supported the expansion of bilateral cultural and educational exchanges, welcomed the opening of more Confucius Institutes, and encouraged Brazilian young people to study in China. By the end of 2019, 11 Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classrooms had been built. These will be further explored in Chapter 5.

As the largest developing countries in the Eastern and Western hemisphere respectively, China and Brazil are the second and seventh largest economies in the world. Among PSCs, Brazil is the largest economic aggregate and has the most frequent

economic and trade co-operation with China. In 2009, China surpassed the United States to become Brazil's top trading partner. In 2010, China became the largest source of foreign investment in Brazil. Since the two countries established a comprehensive strategic partnership, their bilateral relationship has been developing at a fast pace (Xu, 2020). Since 2012, China and Brazil have upgraded their bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. In 2013, for the first time, China surpassed the EU as the largest export destination of Brazilian agricultural products. In 2018, Brazil became the first Latin American country to trade more than US $100 billion with China. Currently, as an important member of BRICS, Brazil is China's most important partner in Latin America (Brosig, 2021; Gusarova, 2019). However, major foreign policy shifts of the Bolsonaro government redefined Brazil's foreign policy narrative and triggered tensions in Sino-Brazilian relations even though in his visit to China in 2019 Bolsonaro emphasized that China is a great partner as the largest export market and the largest import source for Brazil (Sawicka, 2020). Recent years have witnessed a sharp intensification of multifaceted bilateral relations mainly due to Brazil's Western sense of belonging (Gehre, 2020). A complicated self-conception as a faithful ally of the United States casts a shadow over Brazil's co-operation with China.

China and African PSCs

In their development, African PSCs share linguistic and cultural commonalities. Among all the nine PSCs, only Portugal and Brazil can exploit their cultural resources to develop corresponding cultural diplomacy toward China. China has exerted diversified cultural policies in Portugal and Brazil, while in Africa Confucius Institutes play a vital role in terms of cultural diplomacy (Caruso, 2019). This section will explore the cultural diplomacy of the African PSCs as a whole.

Cape Verde and China

The Republic of Cape Verde was a Portuguese colony in 1495 and became Portugal's overseas province in 1951. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976, bilateral relations have developed smoothly without major setbacks. This has been

partially due to the deep friendship between the African Independence Party of Cape Verde and the first generation of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party in the struggle for the national liberation movement (Mabeko-Tali, 2020).

Cape Verde has been a hub for maritime transportation by Latin America, Africa, Europe, and Asia (Ferreira & Loureiro, 2021). With its unique and strategic geographical advantage, Cape Verde gets more investment from China to develop its tourist economy and fishery, while China transports goods from Zambia and Mauritius to Cape Verde to complete transactions with West African countries. China's assistance to Cape Verde includes offering interest-free loans and crops as well as sending highly praised medical teams. China has built many important infrastructures and buildings there, including the People's Parliament Hall, the National Library, and Poilão Dam. The Special Maritime Economic Zone is currently the most preferred project of the Cape Verde government, which sees the construction as an opportunity to actively integrate into the construction of BRI (Martinez-Galán et al., 2022). In 2015, the University of Cape Verde held the opening ceremony of the Confucius Institute at Cape Verde. The cultural exchange between China and Cape Verde has reached a higher level because of this cultural platform.

Angola and China

Angola has been making a clear stand in its economic development to diversify its diplomatic relations and avoid very close relations with a big power. Such pluralistic diplomacy has made Angola a vibrant economic power in southern Africa and even on the entire African continent (Begu et al., 2018).

Angola established diplomatic relations with China in 1983 and has adhered to the stance of the One China Policy, supporting China's reunification and major international issues. In return, China gave generous support to Angola's post-war reconstruction and helped Angola's economic recovery and development. With the continuous increase of China's direct investment, bilateral co-operation has deepened under the popular Angolan model which stipulates that China ensures economic growth and infrastructure

development for Angola and Angola provides a source of energy for China. In 2016, Angola became the largest supplier of crude oil to China. Given the impact of the Angolan model, Angola desires to reduce its reliance on China and tends to find other sources of funding from other states (Pawar, 2022). Therefore, the future evolution of the Sino–Angolan partnership is difficult to predict because of many political factors, such as whether China will continue to invest in Angola. In 2016, the Confucius Institute at the University of Agostinho Neto held an inauguration ceremony to usher the bilateral cultural exchange into a new stage (Li, 2021).

Mozambique and China

Historically, Mozambique was located at the southernmost end of the ancient Chinese Maritime Silk Road and was once an important dock for China's maritime trade with Africa and the West (Li, 2022). Although Mozambique is listed by the United Nations as one of the least developed countries, its tantalum reserves rank first in the world (Jatula & Conshello, 2021). As an agricultural country, its output of cashew nuts totals half of the world's output. The Mozambican government has intensified its privatization efforts to improve the investment environment and maintain its economic growth.

After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1975, friendly and co-operative relations between the two countries developed continuously. In 2001, China and Mozambique established the Joint Economic and Trade Commission. China has undertaken 23 complete projects, such as the National Stadium and the Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center. Under the framework of the China-Africa Co-operation Forum, China offered due debt relief (Du Plessis, 2014). China and Mozambique have co-operated fruitfully in the fields of economy, trade, culture, education, and health via the Forum. Under the BRI framework, the two countries' economic and trade relations are in the most closely related period. China became the largest foreign investment source country in Mozambique in 2017 (Song, 2020). In 2011, the Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University was established in Maputo.

Generally, bilateral high-level government visits are frequent and bilateral relations are friendly.

The Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe and China

São Tomé and Príncipe is the second smallest country in Africa after Seychelles. Possessing rich oil and mineral resources, the country plays a pivotal role in export and transshipment in the region, especially in the context of BRI (Leandro & Lobo, 2020). This microstate is of geopolitical value to China and can serve as a platform for co-operation in the sub-region of the Gulf of Guinea. As an engaged partner, the country can provide regional services for shipping, banking, finance, high-quality education, and tourism, all of which explain China's interest in this region (Matias, 2014). Although a middle-income country, it still receives assistance from multilateral institutions such as the IMF. China resumed diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe in 2016 and established a comprehensive co-operative relationship the following year. The two countries signed a bilateral co-operation agreement, the total sum of which involves around 146 million US dollars. Accompanied by frequent bilateral high-level visits, in 2018 the Confucius Institute of São Tomé and Príncipe was established to promote bilateral cultural exchanges.

The Republic of Guinea-Bissau and China

Located in the west of Africa, Guinea-Bissau is one of the least developed countries in the world. Guinea-Bissau once catered to Western development initiatives and realigned itself with Taiwan, which caused retrogression in the Sino-Guinea-Bissaun relationship (Lundy, 2012). The two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 1998. Since then, bilateral economic and trade relations, and technological co-operation, have progressed smoothly. China carried out agricultural technology co-operation with Guinea-Bissau and provided training programs. China has helped build several sports venues, hospitals, and rice technology promotion stations. Bilateral trade mainly depends on Chinese exports of mechanical and electrical products, high-tech products, textiles, and so on (Folger, 2018). Since 1977, China has accepted its international students. In

2016, there were 373 Guinea-Bissaun overseas students in China. China has dispatched medical teams totaling 230 people to Guinea-Bissau, and at present there are 17 medical team members working in Guinea-Bissau.

The Republic of Equatorial Guinea and China

This country has taken energy as its pillar industry, which led to the country's negative economic growth when the price of international crude oil decreased (Guinea, 2019). Since China and Equatorial Guinea established diplomatic relations in 1970, China, its largest oil importing country and trading partner, has assisted Equatorial Guinea in the construction of hydropower stations, roads, and other projects so that Equatorial Guinea is the African country with the largest per capita infrastructure investment (Dong & Fan, 2020). Exchanges and co-operation between the two countries in the fields of culture, education, health, and military have been continuously strengthened. The Chinese Embassy presented its China Ambassador Award to Equatorial Guinean teenagers who love Chinese learning. Besides sending medical teams to Equatorial Guinea, China also welcomes Equatorial Guinea university students studying in China, their number reaching 1075 in 2018. In 2015, the Confucius Institute of Equatorial Guinea National University was unveiled, which diversified bilateral cultural exchanges (China National Radio and Television International Online, 2018).

China and East Timor

As the youngest country in Asia, East Timor is also one of the least developed countries. The country rapidly established diplomatic relations with China within two hours after its founding. Although East Timor is basically in a state of natural economy and needs foreign aid to compensate for lack of goods, China still shows great interest in parleying its natural resources and excellent geographical location while promoting BRI (Gunn, 2021). Correspondingly, East Timor has responded positively in joining the BRI framework. While East Timor is short of advanced equipment and sufficient funds, China has exactly what East Timor needs. Such a complementary relationship triggered more bilateral co-operation in energy, infrastructure construction, national defense, education,

and personnel exchanges (He, 2018). In 2019, the East Timor Confucius Classroom was established in the Institute of Business of East Timor.

3.4 China's Image in Portuguese-Speaking Countries

Historically, China was a closed country in the eyes of Western countries that believed China was a strange, mysterious, and even dangerous country (Turner, 2014). The stereotype formed gradually in the minds of Westerners via news reports, documentaries, and films, as well as contacts with the Chinese diaspora. The number of Chinese in the diaspora has increased rapidly since the mid-19th century (Kuhn, 2006). According to the data of Chinese embassies in PSCs, there are 300,000 diasporic individuals in Brazil and 30,000 in Portugal. Angola is the fastest growing African country in terms of the number of Chinese diasporic individuals, from tens of thousands 10 years ago up to 260,000 in 2020. There are 30,000 in East Timor, 2,000 in Cape Verde, fewer than 2,000 in Mozambique, and fewer than 200 in São Tomé and Príncipe.

As China ascends as a global power, its international interaction spans over the world. Its foreign and economic policies are undergoing profound changes. Its expanding presence in PSCs has illustrated the growing complexity and sophistication of China's foreign policies. China's contribution to the promotion of bilateral relations has been affirmed by PSCs, and China spares no effort to enlarge its influence and shape a peaceful, responsible major power image through various diplomatic means (Xinhua Agency, 2019). In a poll concerning the views of the international community on China's image, Brazil was the only country surveyed among all the PSCs. Therefore, based on the survey results, the image of China in Brazil is analyzed.

China's image used to be associated with these elements in Brazil: Mao Zedong, collectivism, inferior pirated products, martial arts films, rural scenery, ancient traditions, communism, and so on (Teixeira et al., 2020). Not until China rose on the world economic and political stage did stereotypes in the minds of PSCs start to change. Although China and PSCs have different languages and cultures, bilateral business opportunities will naturally lead to cultural exchanges and inevitable conflicts. Political

changes will also shape a diversified China's image, such as in the Brazil of today (Teixeira et al., 2020). As an important economic and trade partner of Brazil, China has established a positive image in Brazil as a good partner (De Onis, 2014). However, in the Sino-U.S. trade competition, a competitive and aggressive China also poses a threat to Brazil, so that China's image as a bad partner of Brazil has also emerged (Oliveira, 2021).

Table 3.1 Brazilians' Response to *Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of China?*

Year	Favorable response	Unfavorable response
2010	52	34
2011	49	37
2012	50	39
2013	65	28
2014	44	44
2015	55	36
2016	---	---
2017	52	25
2018	49	33
2019	51	27
Simple Average	51.9	33.7

Source: Pew Research Center, Pew Global, Global Indicators Database. Http://www.pewglobal.org/database/custom-analysis. Retrieved date: 2021/11/1; The following data listed in the tables also derive from the above source. **Notes:** Favorable combines "very favorable" and "somewhat favorable" responses. Unfavorable combines "very unfavorable" and "somewhat unfavorable."

According to Table 3.1, from a diachronic perspective, Brazil's simple average percentage of people responding favorably is 51.9%, compared with the 33.7% unfavorable ratings. The ratings fluctuate between 44%–65%. In 2013, the favorable rating hovers at its historic high of 65%, with a historic low of 44% the next year. Generally, the favorable rating of 2019 remains 1% less compared with 52% in 2010. In contrast, the unfavorable ratings fluctuate between 25% in 2017 and 44% in 2014. The unfavorable rating decreased to 27% in 2019. This nine-year trend masks a significant reversal of opinion in 2014 since the peak of pro-China sentiment in Brazil in 2013 (Blanchard, 2019). This is likely the result of unease about China as a commercial competitor and frustration with Chinese unilateralism in foreign affairs (Ellis, 2018). A decrease in trade surplus may also have a particularly corrosive effect on the bilateral

relationship (Kohut et al., 2013). Still, bilateral economic and trade co-operation has a solid foundation, and the Chinese market is the best starting point for Brazil to expand the popularity of its high-quality products.

According to Table 3.2, from a synchronic perspective, the favorable rating of Brazil conforms to the simple average of Latin American countries, taking five countries as examples. The percentage of favorable ratings remains above 50%. A similar sense of partnership exists in most of Latin America, including Venezuela which sells a great deal of oil to China and Chile which sells China copper.

Table 3.2 Five Latin American Countries' Response to *Do you have a favorable view of China?*

Country	2007	2013	2014	2015	2017
Brazil	--	65	44	55	52
Chile	62	62	60	66	51
Mexico	43	45	43	47	43
Peru	56	--	56	60	61
Venezuela	--	71	67	58	52
Simple Average	53.7	60.75	54	57.2	51.8

Nevertheless, attitudes toward China vary in different regions of the world. Latin America's cognitive attitude towards China is much higher than that in developed European countries and much lower than that in Africa. Portugal and other African PSCs belong to different worlds: the developed European countries and the developing African world. Although they are not covered in the survey, by illustrating how different China's image is in the developed European countries and African countries, we can track down some clues about China's image in PSCs.

Similarly, we chose five European developed countries listed in Table 3.3. The survey result apparently reflects the changes and trends of the developed Western world's positive conception of China from 2005 to 2019. Generally, the five representative countries all have a more negative image toward China. More specifically, this changing trend embodies three characteristics. First, the proportion holding a positive attitude towards China is relatively low, showing an overall downward trend. Most of the time, the proportion is no more than 50%. In 2016 and 2019, it even reached 31.6% and 36.2%,

respectively. Second, the attitude of the five countries is slightly different, but it does not affect its overall downward trend.

Table 3.3 Five European Countries' Response to *Do you have a favorable view of China?*

Country	2005	2007	2009	2011	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
England	49	52	52	48	45	37	45	49	38
France	58	47	41	51	50	33	44	41	33
Germany	46	34	29	34	34	28	34	39	34
Italy	--	27	--	--	40	32	31	29	37
Spain	57	39	40	55	41	28	43	42	39
Mean	52.5	39.8	40.5	47	42	31.6	39.4	40	36.2

Shifting our attention to the developing African countries, Table 3.4 reflects the changing trend in Africa's positive perceptions of China, and we employ the data from 2007 to 2017 of five representative African countries. Given that the African countries didn't participate in the survey annually, we chose the years with the most available data among the five African countries. Contrary to the performance of the developed countries, the developing world in Africa has maintained a relatively high perception of China for most of the time. China's popularity in these five countries has remained around 65%, much higher than that in the developed countries.

Table 3.4 Five African Countries' Response to *Do you have a favorable view of China?*

Country	2007	2014	2015	2017
Ethiopia	67	--	75	--
Nigeria	--	70	70	72
Senegal	--	71	70	64
Tanzania	70	77	74	63
Uganda	45	61	65	---
Mean	60.7	69.8	70.8	66.3

According to the survey results, perception of China is a bit different in different regions. The developed European countries generally regard China as a threat and challenger (Rapkin & Thompson, 2003). Further, the low esteem of China in developed European countries is largely due to the strength of Western culture and a sense of historical superiority (Zhang, 2020). Brazil's stance has been complicated by perceiving China as an international ideological enemy but meanwhile treating China as an

economic and political ally (Amorim & Ferreira-Pereira, 2021). On the contrary, developing African countries generally have a relatively high opinion of China and treat China as an emerging partner. Based on a 2013 survey, America's Global Image Remains More Positive than China's, a median of less than half of those surveyed in North America, Europe, and the Middle East has a positive view of China. A median of 72% in Africa and 58% in Asia and Latin America look favorably on China. But it is worth noting that science and technology are China's most popular soft powers in African and Latin American countries. Most countries surveyed have a positive view of these attributes of Chinese influence, and Chinese companies have made great strides in building large-scale infrastructure buildings, some of which have become local landmarks. Moreover, as a major trade and investment partner in African PSCs, China's strong economic growth is particularly attractive. The most important factors contributing to a positive image of China in Africa are its infrastructure development, business investments, and the cost of its products (Lekorwe et al., 2016). This result is also confirmed in the report released by Afrobarometer (2021), showing 66% of respondents believed that China's political and economic impact on Africa was positive. National image has a profound influence on international relations and economic development and may also influence other factors (Graham, 2006). During the worldwide outbreak of COVID-19, according to a Pew Research survey (2020), 14 developed countries showed that the public's positive evaluation of China's national image reached a record-low 24%, and there has been an overall sentiment change from non-negative to negative in the general public's view of China's image (Chen et al., 2020).

Generally, as strategic co-operative partners, PSCs and China confirm the breadth and depth of co-operation in various fields. The Macao Forum is a cultural bridge between China and PSCs to develop cultural interaction (Ye, 2016).

To conclude, PSCs have distinctive economic structures and developmental stages, so each PSC evaluates China differently. In Brazilian and Portuguese eyes, China is

perceived as a priority market for their enterprises and a potential export market for their products (Alves, 2008). Brazilian exports to China remain dominated by commodities such as oil, soy, copper, and iron ore, while Portuguese exports are mainly electronic equipment, wine, cork and construction materials. In term of their different domestic market sizes, the former's stakes in China are much higher than the latter's. The economy of most of countries in African PSCs and East Timor is at an embryonic stage. China is seen as a major importer of raw materials and a partner for development. China's soaring demand for minerals can increase the price of raw materials, and these countries' reserves of a great variety of minerals are attracting China's involvement. Therefore, since there is a stubborn cognitive rigidity among Westerners toward China, China should put more emphasis on building its image in developing countries which are the fundamental forces for China to exert its influence globally. Maintaining a positive image in developing countries in Africa and Latin America is crucial to China's interests (Gallagher, 2016). In terms of mutual cultural diplomatic development, the CI project also plays a certain role, especially in African PSCs. The overall effect of CI is too complex to be evaluated with the simple words *good* or *bad*. So as to avoid overgeneralizing, the next two chapters of this study will focus on how China employs the innovative CI project to promote China's cultural diplomacy and what contribution CI has made to build China's image.

Chapter 4: Confucius Institutes: China's Innovation in Cultural Diplomacy

More than 30 countries create their own language and culture promotion organizations to disseminate their language and culture to people of different nationalities (Li, 2017). After crossing the threshold of the 21st century, China's unprecedented growth in national strength and its time-honored culture have attracted global attention and alertness (Broomfield, 2003). China's soaring economic power has triggered global interest in its culture and language, and the country has entered the center of world politics (Zhao & Huang, 2010). Under such circumstances, China launched the CI project so as to break cultural and linguistic barriers, enhance sociocultural understanding, and globalize Chinese culture (Kurlantzick, 2007; PRC Ministry of Education, 2012; Sall, 2016). CI adheres to a development strategy similar to the Goethe Institute, Alliance Française, British Council, and other language institutions. It serves China's national interests and aims to provide local residents with Chinese cultural activities and language teaching under the joint efforts of all parties. China thus consciously explored language and cultural resources and adopted this manner of "going global" (Pan, 2013).

China's leadership emphasized the deployment of culture to enhance its soft power and promote external harmony for national development, so China's soft power construction and the development of cultural diplomacy have been set in the national agenda (Lee, 2016). President Xi has signed more than 80 documents concerning CI and attended more than 20 activities held by CI (Liao, 2019). In 2013, the General Office of the State Council issued the Confucius Institute Development Plan (2012–2020), which provided institutional guarantees for CI's sustainable development (Cichosz & Zhang, 2014). In the opening ceremony of the British Confucius Institute Conference, President Xi delivered a speech in which he noted that CIs have played an active role in helping people around the world to learn the Chinese language and understand its culture (Xi, 2015). In January 2018, the Central Leading Group for Comprehensive Deepening

Reform launched the guiding opinions on CI, which stressed CI should help build a socialist cultural power to serve major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics by deepening reform and innovation and optimizing the distribution structure (Xi, 2018). Therefore, as an instrument to enhance China's soft power, the number of CIs and Confucius Classrooms (CCs) has increased significantly in the past decade. The world has witnessed a dramatic expansion of Chinese as a second or foreign language, and the rapid development of CIs is seen as an effort by the Chinese government to enhance interaction with other countries and facilitate participation in globalization (Honolulu, 2019; Hubbert, 2019; Luqiu, 2020; Pan, 2013; Yang, 2010). The exponential growth of CIs has generated heated discussions among scholars. This chapter provides a detailed account of the current status of the CI project from the perspective of soft power.

4.1 A Narrative Review

Culture has increasingly become a third pillar in Chinese diplomacy next to politics and economics (Odinye, 2020), making the cultural project of CI one of the tools of Chinese cultural diplomacy in the 21st century (Huang & Xiang, 2019; Lahtinen, 2015). CI's unique culture network has aroused the interest of scholars. Foreign academic articles center on the overseas influence of the CI project, while the focus of Chinese scholars is on the self-development of CIs (An et al., 2014; Chen & Lai, 2019).

Proponents tend to describe CIs as benign instruments of cultural exchange (Hartig, 2018; McCord, 2014). Critics describe CI as a propaganda arm of the Chinese Communist Party and a tool for China to implement cultural invasion (Sahlins, 2015; Van, 2014). As a transnational organization, CI plays a positive role in providing economic ties (Lien et al., 2014; Ren, 2012; Xu et al., 2020). Linguistic and cultural barriers are the main transaction costs in trade and foreign investment (Lien & Oh, 2014). However, as a global platform for cultural exchange, CI has effectively promoted sustainable development among countries and regions (Usmanova et al., 2019). CIs have acted as power stations to facilitate all-round co-operation between Chinese and foreign

co-operative parties (Lien et al., 2012). Hubbert's ethnographic research shows that more personal contacts with CI teachers can change students' attitudes toward China as an authoritarian state (Hubbert, 2014). From the lenses of BRI, CIs shoulder the dual mission of improving soft power while facilitating foreign trade and economic co-operation (Li et al., 2021). The findings of Kang et al. (2019) confirm that CIs' cross-cultural communication along BRI routes has greatly promoted China's export trade in host countries and has had positive spillover effect on neighboring countries, as well as on the host countries.

CI can stimulate the growth of China's outward foreign direct investment (Xu et al., 2020). Lian et al. (2012) analyzed CI's impact on China's foreign trade and overseas investment and concluded that, in developing countries, the establishment of a CI is conducive to foreign trade and overseas investment, but in developed countries such establishment has not achieved significant results. As shining cultural products, CIs are important carriers of China's unique culture. Whether foreign consumers can identify with the cultural values behind cultural products largely determines the development of trade in cultural products. Hence, the government needs to enhance the status of cultural communication to lay a foundation for Chinese enterprises to go overseas with culture and value identification (Chen, 2021). Further, based on the theory of five cultural dimensions by Hofstede and Bond, Lin and his co-authors found a positive influence of CI on China's tourism (Lin et al., 2016). CI has bridged cultural distance between China and international tourists through language education and cultural promotion. CI reduces the cost of information acquisition for tourists to China, thus significantly increasing the number of tourists to China. The CI project impacts inbound arrivals of tourists in China, and meanwhile its presence in the host country enhances overall tourism development (Qiang et al., 2019).

In recent years, an increasing number of scholars has devoted close attention to public opinion on CI and demonstrating whether China maximizes its soft power to promote China's educational, economic, and political interests with the CI network (Xie

& Page, 2013; Yuan et al., 2016). The CI project is known as an international strategic tool of the Chinese government, and some scholars have drawn insights from the purposes, nature, features, structure, operation, controversies, and challenges of the CI project (Ding & Saunders, 2006; Ma, 2018; Pan, 2013; Zhu, 2021). The rise of China gives birth to a global CI project which increases collaboration with foreign academic institutions by promoting language and culture. The network increases China's soft power and helps it project an image as a benign country (Paradise, 2009).

However, many problems emerge when CI tries to introduce China to the world with a better national image (Cai & Li, 2013; Liu & Chang, 2015; Nye, 2008). Lo and Pan (2016) stressed that China's CI project relies more on coercion and inducement than on attraction because of the massive employment of utilitarian resources, so that CI has failed to help foreigners view the nation from a more rational, objective, and empathetic perspective. In terms of the CI project, China's soft power has not contributed much to improving China's global image. If people tend to learn Chinese language and culture for economic purposes, any change in Chinese economic development would inevitably make its cultural attractiveness disappear (Barr, 2011; Gil, 2008).

Ding (2011) holds that China's national image benefits from its strong commitment to cultural diplomacy but its management is affected by China's political credibility and some foreign policies. As the most important and most controversial diplomatic instrument, CIs are joint ventures, and the inbuilt engagement of local stakeholders with expertise is the highlight of each CI (Hartig, 2015). Even so, few liberal democratic countries have acknowledged China's soft power, although it was warmly accepted by some developing countries (Huang, 2013). China's intensified cultural diplomacy did not appear to be accompanied by a steady rise in popularity worldwide (Zhou & Luk, 2016). Luqiu and McCarthy (2019) argued differently by providing clear empirical evidence that the Chinese government employed CI to expand its global soft power so successfully that the project seems to have gained wide acceptance in hosting countries, particularly in the United States. This led to the successful dissemination of the CPC's perspective on

Chinese culture into U.S. universities (Wang & Adamson, 2015).

Today, CI exists as a non-profit education institution jointly hosted by Chinese and foreign partners, with the aim of communicating Chinese, deepening international understanding of Chinese language and culture, and promoting people-to-people exchanges between China and the rest of the world (CIEF, 2020).

4.2 The Global Footprint of Confucius Institutes

Globalization has made countries interdependent in politics, economy, and trade and increasingly linked with one another. Nevertheless, it is also a double-edged sword for the national cultures of all countries. On the one hand, it promotes the innovation and development of national cultures, and the integration of different cultures sparks the diversification of global cultures (Sotshangane, 2002). However, on the other hand, it may also lead to a crisis of traditional cultural identity in certain countries (Flew, 2020). Under the trend of globalization, China adheres to the Confucian doctrine of the Golden Mean (中庸 zhōng yōng) and the strategies of going-global and bringing-in to strengthen cultural exchanges and self-innovation (Wang, 2013).

As a prestigious thinker and educator, Confucius not only initiated the tradition of tutoring lectures in China but also advocated benevolence, righteousness, courtesy, wisdom, and faith, which form the core of Confucianism (Fu, 2021). However, the status of Confucianism has ups and downs in the history of Chinese liberal education. Therefore, naming the language promotion organization as CI signals China's return to its traditional heritage by reasserting one of the key traditions of ancient Chinese wisdom (Zhang, 2021). The National Office for International Promotion of Chinese Language (汉办 hàn bàn; afterwards Hanban), affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, launched the project of CI-Hanban used to formulate and improve the standards of international Chinese teachers, the standard of International Chinese proficiency, and the courses of international Chinese teaching. It was responsible for selecting and training Chinese teachers and volunteers to go abroad, developing Chinese Proficiency Tests, and

carrying out important global activities such as the "Chinese Bridge" series (Li & Wu, 2013). In July 2020, Hanban and the Headquarters of Confucius Institutes have been restructured into two different organizations, namely, the Center for Language Education and Co-operation and the China International Education Foundation. In order to explore CI systematically, we still employ the name of Hanban when it is necessary.

China initiated its global network of CIs in Seoul and started its journey to flourish worldwide. In CI's global network, 135 CIs have been established in Asia where China's soft power is supposed to strengthen, in particular through Chinese language promotion (Mikhnevich, 2015). The number of CIs in Europe and the Americas ranks topmost over other regions due to their geopolitical relations with China (Kluver, 2014). Only 61 CIs are established in Africa, accounting for 11.2% of the total number of CIs. Noticeably, the number of CIs increased most rapidly in 2006 and 2007, which were the last two of three years for China's GDP to maintain double-digit growth with 12.7% and 14.2%, respectively (Li & Li, 2019). CI's explosive growth lasted until 2015, the year Prince Andrew and President Xi Jinping jointly unveiled the 1000th CC in the world. CIs often teach Chinese and introduce Chinese culture to university students and people from all walks of life in universities, while CCs' teaching object is students in primary and secondary schools. An average annual increase from 2008 to 2015 goes to 37 CIs and 122 CCs (Gil, 2017). The number amounted to 550 in 2019. In 1982, Sweden became the first county in the world to sign Bilateral Investment Treaties with China (Zeng, 2016). In 2005, China opened the first European CI in Stockholm University. But Sweden also became the first European country to interrupt all relations with CI (Wang et al., 2021). Some partners have terminated co-operation agreements or shut down CIs, such as two universities in Lyon, the University of Chicago, and the Toronto District School Board. Closure of CIs in North America, Europe, and Australia has imposed profound effects on CI's brand image (Lien & Tang, 2021). CI is often accused of having strings attached to the Chinese government's generous support (McCord, 2014; Peterson, 2017). Foreign scholars mainly attributed the closures to CI's intention of spreading political ideology in

the target countries and hindering academic freedom in the host universities, while Chinese scholars and related stakeholders reflected CI's mode and function in spreading Chinese culture (Luqiu, 2020; Peterson, 2017). Bilateral political and economic conflicts can be to blame in addition to CI's own reasons (Liao, 2019; Yang, 2020).

Despite potential challenges and crises, CI has become one of the largest language and culture promotion institutions in the world in terms of four indicators: countries covered, branch institutions, number of teachers, and number of students (Xinhua Agency, 2019; Chinese International Chinese Foundation, 2019). As China's cultural exchange flagship, CI's development is closely related to real Chinese policies (Starr, 2009). In most cases, a CI is located in local universities and co-hosted by a Chinese partner university and a foreign host university. A foreign director from the host country and a Chinese director from the Chinese university jointly manage CI's daily operations. Chinese universities and CI Headquarters are responsible for dispatching Chinese teachers. CI Headquarters are now restructured and in June 2020 were renamed as the International Chinese Foundation. In order to avoid confusion, this chapter still employs the former name. Headquarters maintains close ties with each CI to build a multidimensional global relationship network. The present policy of setting up new CIs is tilted in favor of areas and countries with fewer CIs. Hanban's major concerns prioritize CI's operating quality, global layout, and balanced development (Yanni, 2021). Hanban has tried to ensure CI's service and quality so as to enhance the positive perception of the international community toward the CI project (Acquaye, 2020).

4.3 Development Strategies of Confucius Institutes

SWOT analysis is used to analyze the current situation of an enterprise and reveal its internal strengths, weaknesses, and external opportunities and threats based on changes in the various operating environments of the enterprise itself (Rachid & El Fadel, 2013). Based on the theory of language economics, this section harnesses SWOT analysis to explore CI's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges in the process of

practicing China's cultural diplomacy.

Strengths

The CI project aims to provide convenience and opportunities for Sino-foreign exchange in various fields. CI's construction relies on the coordination of Chinese and foreign resources. CI not only is an important actor in China's cultural diplomacy but also helps partner countries spread its national culture, ideas, and values among many project participants. Being a cultural product with bi-directional characteristics, CI is devoted to completing its social and cultural values (Xu & Montgomery, 2019). People in host countries can achieve China-related information via CI, which not only deepens their understanding of China but also helps increase trade opportunities for both sides and ultimately promotes the growth of bilateral import and export trade (Yanni et al., 2021). Cultural differences often hinder economic co-operation and bring additional cost and superfluous financial commitment (Czernek, 2013). CI is devoted to reducing language barriers and cultural heterogeneity (Yanni et al., 2021). Lian (2012) argues that CI helps China develop foreign markets and provides opportunities for foreign trade and direct investment. Significant increases in both Chinese exports and outward Foreign Direct Investment now flow to developing countries thanks to CIs' operations. When other factors remain unchanged, a CI can increase bilateral trade volume by 6.1%–34.4% (Kang et al., 2019).

Further, CI has a solid cultural and economic foundation on which to build. China has an eye-catching traditional culture that is part of global culture as well. Some Chinese figures and products enjoy popularity in their distinctive fields, such as the Nobel Prize Winner for Literature Mo Yan, the basketball player Yao Ming, the Kung fu film, Chinese traditional medicine, and so on. China's rising national strength has been embodied in hosting mega sports events, enrolling a fast-growing number of foreign students, and increasing foreign tourists (Wang, 2020). All these can be positive stimuli and advantages for CI to exert its full power in completing its mission.

As a Chinese soft-power product, CI is an embodiment of China's planning

capability in shaping its international reputation (Marwah & Ervina, 2021). CI bridges Chinese culture with other cultures so that Chinese culture can gain more affinity and centripetal force at the turning point of cultural globalization (Zhang, 2021). China tries to stand out by maintaining its cultural connotations in the global cultural competition (Yan, 2008). Meanwhile, international recognition of China also contributes to obtaining stronger national identification for Chinese people. The complementary effect triggers CI to further Chinese teaching and cultural promotion abroad by making full use of the opportunities brought by China's current socioeconomic development. Therefore, the global products of language promotion empower CI to promote more international co-operation through different channels.

Weaknesses

The first disadvantage of the CI project concerns its imbalanced global distribution structure which does not match its economic and trade structure and needs to be further optimized (Lin, 2019). CI's distribution reflects the economic and political priorities of the host countries. Most CIs are distributed in regions with better economic and social development. The imbalance of resource distribution lacks sustainability and does not meet China's needs to promote culture and language globally (Yanni et al., 2021). Therefore, the layout of CIs should be oriented to major trading partners to better achieve win-win situations and sustainability. Gao (2014) holds the different opinion that there is no relationship between CI distribution and the local country's national strength because it is closely concerned with the whereabouts of Chinese students abroad.

CI's second disadvantage concerns its organizational mode. As a project-oriented organization, CI is based in foreign universities or communities and conforms to the rules and development plans of these hosts. However, China's education system and culture are not like those of the West, so that CI's development inevitably encounters conflicts and hinderances. This model of Sino-foreign co-operation has limited CI's influence on local communities (Wu, 2019). Moreover, the impressive number of CIs is regarded as a highlight when China promotes its culture and language to recipient

countries (Hartig, 2012). However, quantity cannot be equated to scale and influence. Gil (2017) believes that although CI made a valuable contribution to Chinese language and culture education, it did not influence the policies of host countries in ways favorable to China.

CI's domestic management derives from a typical 'leading group' system (Wang et al., 2021). The CI Headquarters used to be responsible for managing the project, and its Council is its highest decision-making body. This type of governance structure embodies the concept of 'co-governance,' which brings corresponding disadvantages. The dominant position of China's government, in the process of co-operation with social forces, makes CI more official and political. Further, due to insufficient introduction of the project to the Chinese public, CI is sometimes blamed and gains less domestic understanding and support. CI's imperfect internal management mechanism often leads to many nonstandard problems, such as the absence of timely evaluation, rectification, and supervision for both sides (Yanni et al., 2021).

Another weakness is that CI's teachers and management personnel need more training in responding to controversial topics. Although political questions can easily lose focus and get out of hand, CI cannot always face such situations in silence. It has always been a target for people to criticize CI's transparency and arouse people's concerns about CI being a propaganda tool (Hubbert, 2019).

Opportunities

The CI project embraces new opportunities brought by economic globalization and development of BRI. As two signatures of China to show its growing national strength, CI and BRI have joint space for future development. CI's cross-cultural communication can carry out a series of developing strategies oriented towards BRI. Meanwhile, with the development of BRI, CI can readjust its global layout to adapt to local demands. CI has gained more chances to co-operate with enterprises, governments, and even NGOs at all levels. Such multilevel co-operation in recipient countries along the BRI route belong to China's national development strategy. CI can grow into an essential component for

China to open up to the world and realize its internationalization (Li, 2018). The successful implementation of BRI provides CI with more funding channels and international opportunities to tell the Chinese story (Li & Liu, 2017). Since CI possesses substantial academic resources, in accordance with the regulations of CI and local laws, it can carry out international symposia and academic research regarding BRI and higher education. CI can provide language talents for the construction of BRI. In addition to language learning, the operation of CIs not only offers global access to Chinese philosophies and culture but also provides systematic communication with countries along the BRI (Zhou, 2021). The strategy of BRI covers 65 countries, and its total economic volume accounts for about 30% of the total global economic volume (Pan, 2013). CI can positively get involved in the construction of BRI in a full-fledged way.

Economic globalization and cultural diversity have further accelerated the global boom of CIs. China's economic strength increases the demand of other countries to understand Chinese language and culture. If CI can adapt to the trend of economic globalization and maintain its own characteristics, it has the potential to realize mutual trust and mutual learning among the cultures of different countries (Yanni et al., 2021).

Challenges

Unprecedented challenges always loom ahead for CIs (Liu, 2019), Confucius, Goethe, and Cervantes are such internationally famous celebrities that countries take advantage of their popularity to shape the brand image of their language promotion institutions and enhance the credibility and reputation of the institutions. However, the name "Confucius" may arouse people's doubt that CI is used to promote ancient Chinese values (Hong & He, 2015). Therefore, the cultural content exported by CIs has become a core element to influence CI's future.

While CI has similar goals to its Western counterparts, the perception of the world toward CI varies. In addition to the different operating mode, the main reason lies in the Chinese government's role in the process of operating CI. Though CI isn't a government department, its Headquarters is under the management of the government. The main

leaders are appointed by the government, and the operation of the organizations is supported by the government in finance and policy. It is determined by the attributes of public products and the interests of the state in the promotion of language and culture (Hartig, 2015). The government's background as a sponsor and censor has aroused the skepticism of the outside world (Liu, 2019).

Cultural institutions sometimes work in fragile political circumstances, as in 2012 and 2014 when the United States and Canada expelled Chinese teachers and boycotted CI. The COVID-19 pandemic has not only disrupted daily life and international exchange but also influenced global cultural flows. China still acts as a "pole in the global geopolitical, economic and cultural order" (Grey & Piller, 2020, p. 55). CIs have altered their normal activities and strengthened online teaching and activities. Opportunities and challenges co-exist. The CI project may still exert its impact on global flows once the pandemic has passed, but certainly on a somewhat different scale (Gil, 2020).

4.4 Functions of Confucius Institutes

CIs are designed to implement China's cultural diplomacy using language education, cultural promotion, academic exchange, and media publicity (Liu, 2019; Shuto, 2018; Xu & Wang, 2019). Learning from successful models such as the UK's British Council, France's Alliance Française, and Germany's Goethe Institute, China has also incorporated the spirit of America's former Peace Corps into CI's development (Gil, 2008; Hubbert, 2019). CI's task is for non-Chinese abroad to have the opportunity to learn Chinese and know about Chinese culture so as to arouse their affinity and favorable attitude toward China (Lee & Hao, 2018; Wang, 2007; Wang & Higgins, 2008). Therefore, each CI started its journey of practicing cultural diplomacy using the following means.

Language Education

CI is considered the most authoritative and systematic Chinese-learning base abroad

(An et al., 2014). It functions as the largest international educational co-operation project in human history and China's largest internationalization project to promote the teaching of Chinese (Gonondo, 2021). There has been a significant increase in students of Chinese throughout the world. The core function of CI is mainly Chinese teaching for the Chinese diaspora, the people from Chinese and non-Chinese cultural circles (Petrů, 2021). For the Chinese diaspora, the fundamental driving forces behind learning Chinese are to inherit the cultural heritage and to be more competitive in modern society (Curdt-Christiansen et al., 2014). For non-Chinese speakers, language education can help language learners better understand China. CI undertakes Chinese Proficiency Tests and issues proficiency certifications. CI also provides consulting services and scholarships for students to study in China. As an important global platform for Chinese language, CI reaches local audiences and shows students the real China. Accordingly, CI employs language as a carrier to popularize China in the multicultural pattern of the world and eventually enhance the country's international status and influence.

Cultural Promotion

Language and culture are interdependent and inseparable. Cultural events and festivals can make audiences understand another culture intuitively and help stimulate learners' interest to learn its language (Jurin et al., 2010). CIs have carried out rich and colorful cultural activities in accordance with local needs and their own conditions (Xu et al., 2015). Such activities promote the diversity and intercommunication of global civilizations (Hartig, 2015). In addition, cultural consultation and assistance are provided through business, tourism, medicine, etc. CIs normally create numerous cultural activities to celebrate traditional Chinese festivals. CIs focus not only on displaying specific traditional cultural symbols such as calligraphy and dumplings to attract local people, but also on holding international cultural exchanges to co-operate with local cultural and artistic elites, professional cultural institutions, and media (Liu, 2015). Such high-quality activities encompass art exhibitions, concerts, theatrical performances, lectures, and seminars, which can also showcase China's more contemporary culture to

the world. Cultural promotion aims to improve the attractiveness of Chinese courses, expand CI's brand awareness, and enhance its relations with local governments and other local institutions.

Academic Exchange

The CI project offers scholarships to students and facilitates international academic co-operation. It is a university-piloted effort to gain China a more sympathetic global reception (Pan, 2013). CIs arrange Summer Camps for students to visit or study in China and launch multilevel academic co-operation, such as the Understanding China Program and the New Confucius Sinology Plan (Hughes, 2014). By the end of 2018, 57 Chinese universities co-established at least three CIs with different foreign partner universities, among which Beijing Foreign Studies University ranks first with 23 CIs, followed by Beijing Language University and Xiamen University with 19 and 16 CIs, respectively. On the platform of CI, bilateral universities have carried out various forms of academic interactions, including setting up academic majors, holding international conferences, and hosting visiting scholar programs. In this way, CI promotes the internationalization of bi-directional education, especially for Chinese universities (Kragelund & Hampwaye, 2015). CI's academic exchange is voluntarily participated in by both Chinese and foreign sides (Yue & Xinyi, 2018). As a bridge, CI serves both sides and builds a potential link to stimulate further future co-operation (Volpe & Li, 2016).

Media Publicity

CI expands its influence through a variety of media channels such as interpersonal communication, mass media, and self-media (An et al., 2015). Positive reports and interpretations of mass media can shape CI's positive image. However, the attitudes of media reports are distinctive according to the national conditions of the host country and each CI's actual situation. Negative views of CI reveal people's doubt and precautions toward CI when it is treated as a political propaganda tool funded by China (Otmazgin, 2021). Positive ones believe that CI's development conforms to the growing Chinese Learning Craze and CI provides language teaching resources to foreign universities,

especially ones suffering from inadequate educational funding (Pan, 2013). Media publicity is the icing on the cake when CI applies it to make bilateral communication more pluralistic and fruitful. In order to attract foreigners with an interest in Chinese culture, strengthening media publicity is often seen as a feasible way to eliminate criticism and misunderstanding of CI (Xu & Wang, 2019).

4.5 Innovation in Confucius Institutes

Based on Schumpeter's concept of "creative destruction," this section analyzes CI's innovations, especially in terms of organizational restructuring. Schumpeter not only emphasized the role of the State as a producer but also believed the consumer is a real leader to drive innovation (Schumpeter, 1982). Since innovation can be social or economic (Drucker, 2011), CI's innovation can be regarded as a means to bring change in the social and economic environment, which can induce new patterns of behavior and create new habits. The innovative effects caused by CI's rapid expansion have provoked an unprecedented change in the history of Chinese language promotion. Innovation boosts CI to create more national wealth and attract investment and talent (Kang et al., 2019).

The Organizational Restructuring of Hanban and CI Headquarters

The Council of the CI Headquarters is the highest decision-making body and consists of the Chinese government, Board Chairmen of CIs, and representatives from Chinese host institutions. This type of governance structure fully embodies the concept of 'co-governance,' but there are also some associated problems (Li & Wu, 2013). Its government-led background triggers frequent criticisms. In such a context, CI launched its innovative journey to cater to its potential "customers."

The Chinese government set up a new National Leading Group for Teaching Chinese (the Group) in 1987 and unveiled the first CI in 2004. To coordinate cross-departmental resources, China renamed the Group as Hanban in 2006 and officially founded the CI Headquarters and its Council in 2007. The initial organizational adjustment conforms to

the routine pattern of international language and cultural communication (Acquaye, 2020; Liu, 2015). Since then, the official name is Hanban/Confucius Institute Headquarters, which coordinates all CIs worldwide. Hanban includes representatives from 12 ministries and commissions within the Chinese central government and is directly under the auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Education. Hanban oversees the Chinese teacher qualification examination, the HSK examinations, the dispatch of Chinese teachers, and Chinese Bridge (汉语桥 hànyǔqiáo), a series of CI scholarship and other programs. Hanban tried to meet the needs of foreign nationals for Chinese language study using the 'government-foreign nationals' cultural diplomacy model (Li & Wu, 2013). However, controversial comments never cease. Hanban is still regarded as a government entity and an instrument of the party state (Sahlins, 2013).

As a result of criticism and backlash, in June 2020 Hanban was renamed as the Ministry of Education Center for Language Education and Co-operation (CELC) (Odinye, 2020). It is a new agency to manage overseas language and culture exchanges and continue to help provide Mandarin teachers and teaching materials (CELC, 2020). The new center claims to uphold the concepts of openness, inclusiveness, respect, and trust and provides assistance to people around the world who want to learn Chinese (Dallmeyer, 2020).

Meanwhile, China's Ministry of Education reorganized the CI project and founded the Chinese International Education Foundation (CIEF), an independent organization registered with the Civil Affairs Ministry. It has been set up as a non-profit civil organization initiated by 27 Chinese universities, businesses, and non-profit organizations (CIEF, 2020). It manages the brand of CI and CI-related programs and supports other Chinese international education programs. CIEF together with Chinese partner universities works for contractual and funding arrangements. CIEF President Yang (2020) emphasized that CIEF aims to raise more resources and to pool the wisdom of all parties to achieve better outcomes in Chinese language education.

According to the introduction on its official website, it is obvious that Hanban is no

longer responsible for oversight, and the supervision of CI has shifted to CIEF with its non-profit civil characteristics. CI is only one of many educational institutions affiliated with CIEF, and this conglomeration will further the unified branding of CI. Being a nongovernmental charity organization, CI is a language-teaching institution regardless of its nature, purpose, or business scope. However, such a more open nongovernmental educational institution will go a long way to clarify misconceptions associated with CI and its operations in foreign countries (Acquaye, 2020). Whether this rebranding will alleviate suspicions about CIs will need time to prove since the majority of Chinese universities serving as CI partners are government-funded and conform to CPC leadership. The U.S. took the lead in challenging the role of CI as China's soft power projection and designated the Confucius Institute U.S. Center in Washington D.C. as a "foreign mission." Confucius Institute U.S. Center is suspected of conducting surveillance on CIs in the U.S. even though the center identifies itself as a subsidiary organization without being a headquarters or having any authority over individual CIs (Gilstrap, 2021).

In addition to the rebranding of Hanban/CI Headquarters, the Global Annual Conference of Confucius Institutes was renamed the International Chinese Language Education Conference in 2019. The conference was held annually from 2005 to 2018 to inspire more co-operation and display best practices of global Cis, as well as to grant awards to different parties involved in CI management. In contrast, the focus of the renamed conference is to prioritize various issues related to International Chinese Language Education, such as how to make the most of artificial intelligence and how to develop smart classrooms. The restructuring of Hanban and the establishment of CIEF aim to transmit CI's stakeholders to bilateral universities to be in charge of CI's routine operations, such as dispatch of the CI directors and maintaining and balancing annual budgets. This implies that CI is defined as only one of the projects in China's international Chinese education blueprint. The Chinese government seeks to free CI from politics and to develop different Chinese promotion programs.

The Mushrooming Multilateral Alliance

In December 2016, China's first provincial CI Alliance was established at Shanghai Foreign Studies University. Guided by the implementation of the CI Development Plan (2012–2020), the alliance aims to build a Shanghai model for CI's future development and motivate the internalization of higher education. As of December 2017, 12 universities and 10 primary and secondary schools in Shanghai have built 47 CIs and 70 CCs in 30 countries covering 5 continents. As a pioneer of innovation and expansion, Shanghai fully coalesced the city's educational resources with CI's radioactive function (Liu & Zhang, 2019). Afterwards, the model of CI Alliance mushroomed across China. Chongqing Municipality, Liaoning Province, Sichuan Province, and Hebei Province subsequently established their unique CI Alliances to strengthen full-fledged cultural exchanges. Therein, more regional alliances are weaving a huge global net for co-operation between universities and similar institutions. Further, many universities also established their own CI Alliance to stimulate endogenous power through innovation and create a win-win symbiotic CI ecosystem. CI endeavors to fashion itself into a simple vehicle for conveying national culture to the world in order to enhance China's international influence, thus changing people's stereotypes and prejudices toward China and optimizing China's national image. However, it reaches the global stage so promptly that it must adapt to current situations through constant innovation (Ye, 2015). Through the direct interaction and feedback of its foreign partners, CI can adjust innovative measures to find the convergence of different cultures on the premise of respecting local "customers". CI's diverse innovative process is China's strategic attempt to gain a better national image in the international arena.

To conclude, the purpose of this chapter is to understand how the CI project helps China promote its goodwill agenda to make its soft power positively accepted. CI's development and innovation involve the large-scale development of cultural industry to create a positive national image. As a concentrated expression of the going-global policy of Chinese culture, CI acts as a cultural sign with distinctive characteristics (Ma, 2018).

It plays a role in stimulating the influence of cultural soft power and avoiding cultural conflicts. It links language teaching with economy and trade, tourism, and many other fields to form a profound cultural complex. In this way, CI tries to reduce the influence brought by "China Threat Theory" and builds a positive national image. Current research studies often initiate a discussion of the diplomatic role of CI but lack further theoretical and empirical research to explore how effective CI can actually be. Therefore, the next chapter will elaborate the investigation of China's image from the perspective of CI students in PSCs by analyzing evidence collected through field research and other research channels. China's cultural diplomacy is still in its infancy and needs further improvement and innovation. Since CI is one of the symbols of China against the background of globalization, the following questions should be asked: What effect has CI achieved in cultural diplomacy in PSCs? Have CIs contributed to improving the image of China? Answers will be revealed in next chapter.

Chapter 5: Empirical Study

As a global platform for cultural exchange, CI has promoted sustainable development among countries and regions (Ouyang & Li, 2019). Scholars have examined the CI project through the lenses of soft power theory or cultural diplomacy. However, though some previous scholars could unravel tensions and paradoxes in the CI project, there is a paucity of in-depth and focused study using empirical case studies regarding how the CI project has fared in PSCs. Therefore, based on the perceptions of CI-related people, this chapter aims to fill such a research gap concerning the CI project in the exercise of soft power in PSCs. By examining interactions, engagements, and strategies as they occur "on the spot" in CI classrooms, we expect that the findings may help confirm the functions and brand identity of CI through the evaluation of its consumers. This chapter will delineate an interpretative illustration of the CI project as a platform for China's cultural diplomacy and draw a conclusion with a discussion of the CI project's implications for understanding of China's soft power projection using a combination of methods, including participatory ethnography investigation, qualitative study, and quantitative study. Among the questions I ask are the following: What are CIs in PSCs doing as China cultural diplomacy's innovative program? Has CI deepened students' understanding of China and their attitudes towards Chinese culture? How are CIs perceived in terms of improving the national image, especially when CI-related people get involved? What are the different characteristics of individual CIs in shaping China's national image? What are the potential factors that influence the CI in shaping the country's image? Does CI's influence derive from attractive soft power or from economic and political inducement and coercion?

5.1 Hypothesis Development

In this study, we argue that, to some extent, CI influences people's views about improving China's national image among CIs in PSCs. First, CIs can shorten the cultural distance between China and host countries (Ouyang & Li, 2019). Cultural differences are

likely to be particularly prominent when people judge a country's national image where people with possibly conflicting values coordinate with one another (Ahern et al., 2015; Dikova et al., 2010). Similar to geographic distance, a larger cultural distance between countries can affect people's attitudes toward another country (Brunner & Kuhn, 2018). As a comprehensive platform for China's foreign cultural exchange, CIs enable foreign publics to develop a deeper and more direct understanding of China (Lien & Miao, 2018). Through branded projects and various activities, CIs effectively bridge cultural gaps between China and their host countries (Lien et al., 2017). CIs can also offer substantial educational support for foreigners who wish to learn Chinese in their home countries. In summary, we predict that CIs could increase China's national image in PSCs. Accordingly, we propose the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1:

A positive relationship exists between the presence of CIs and the improvement of national image. China—alongside its highly visible expansion into consumer markets overseas and its ever-increasing investment in PSCs—has made progress in cultural diplomacy through the expansion of its CIs. CIs have tried to promote cultural exchange between China and the rest of world, but the role of CIs may vary from country to country. Accordingly, we propose a second hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2:

The benefits of CIs may be greater in national image shaping when two countries maintain a better political and economic relationship. In the process of people's conception of other countries' national image, the relationship between countries is a very important factor (Liu, 2021). Differing diplomatic relationships are supposed to affect how people perceive CI and China (Huang, 2021). Finally, there is a third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3:

As one of Beijing's people-to-people diplomacy flagships, CI has been accused by some Western governments of overloading educational content with ideological positions

and political values, disrespecting academic freedoms, and engaging in espionage (Huang, 2021). However, in Africa, CI initiatives are currently met with applause. We presume there exist certain potential factors affecting CI's impact on shaping China's national image in target countries, such as the interior characteristics of the target country, cultural distance, the existence of cultural hegemony, and so on.

5.2 Methodology

The study was conducted in three phases revolving around the chosen representative CIs and fieldwork data collected in China and 15 CIs in PSCs across four continents. In the first phase, a comprehensive review of the CIs in PSCs has been done using multisource documents. It was expected that a complete picture of the development process of CI in PSCs would be revealed and it would be discovered how CI operates in China's cultural diplomatic system with its specific practice and what role CI was playing in shaping national image in PSCs. The data on CI were hand-gathered from official websites and publicly available annual reports. Information was also obtained through our e-mail correspondence with the corresponding CIs. Moreover, we drew on persuasive arguments and rich internal materials such as CICRM, official papers, news reports, by-laws and statistics related to CIs, observation results and interviews, and government policy documents. These internal materials and interviews shed light on how China promoted itself globally to improve its national image in terms of CI.

In the second phase, further verification was provided by descriptive case-study analyses of three chosen CIs in PSCs. By analyzing the richness of these phenomena, case analysis can explain the complex relationships among various factors in real life and answer how and why events happen (Yang, 2010). Case studies were deliberately carried out with the support of CI's annual reports, sufficient media outlets in Portuguese, Chinese, and English, and field observations completed over a period of 7 years from 2013 to 2020. Among the three CIs, UA-CI was studied as the main case, while UEM-CI and UNB-CI were explored as confirmatory cases.

Since 2013, the present author has closely observed the work of UNB-CI and UA-CI and attended a wide range of academic conferences and internal training programs on CIs, including for seven consecutive years the Global Annual Conference of Confucius Institutes. The author has visited many CIs in different countries, giving her first-hand understanding and useful background information about China's ambitious flagship project. The author has access to a broad array of texts related to policy engagement and production, including memoranda of understanding, mission statements, public relations documents and videos, Hanban annual reports, administrative and political speeches, Chinese media reports, individual school agreements, teacher training materials, and textbooks. The experience and insight gained from daily management will contribute to her research. To answer the research questions and hypotheses, the author adopted an ethnographic approach to documenting participants' opinions over a long period of time. The author's participatory observations, open-ended interviews, and field notes help examine CI's role in shaping China's national image. Consent was obtained from the participants before we undertook daily observations. All participating subjects were assured of confidentiality and anonymity.

In the third phase, the author distributed the questionnaires to collect students' feedback about how China's efforts in shaping its national image were perceived by the cultural promotion and Chinese language teaching of CIs. In the contemporary world, relationships among countries depend not only on decision-making politicians but also on the conceptions of thousands of people (Hu, 2013). China's image as reported in the media of a certain country does not represent China's image in the eyes of the public. People's perceptions and attitudes are not completely determined by the information disseminated by the media. Many other factors affect people's attitudes. Cultural recipients, Chinese learners in Confucius Institutes, were chosen as research subjects because it is relatively objective to study China's national image from the public's perspective (Hu & Xue, 2010).

CI's students have more intuitive perception to judge CI's performance in host

countries. While verifying its validity, the questionnaire has been commented on by the supervisor and CI-related representatives, such as course directors, teachers, and students. The final questionnaire covers 10 questions and is formulated on the principle of a Likert scale, with seven points which require the subject to indicate how much he agrees or disagrees with each attitude-related statement. Each question in the scale is given seven kinds of alternative answers: *totally disagree, strongly disagree, disagree, neither disagree nor agree, agree, strongly agree,* and *totally agree*. Considering reliability, the 7-point scale provides more options, which in turn increases the probability of expressing people's objective reality, and reveals more description about the motif and thus appeals practically to the real thoughts of participants (Chang,1994; Cox, 1980).

The scale questionnaire requires students from 15 CIs in PSCs to express their attitudes about 10 statements related to the measurement targets and indicate the extent of their level of identification with each statement. Then a frequency analysis was applied to reflect respondents' comprehensive attitude toward the 10 propositions. This survey paid more attention to the average social intention or attitude of the investigated group. Therefore, the total frequency in the scales from *agree*, *strongly agree*, and *totally agree* will be aggregated to show the positive intention of the group, and similarly *disagree*, *strongly disagree*, and *totally disagree* will be aggregated to show students' negative attitude. In PSCs where not all people can understand English, the questionnaire was translated into Portuguese.

Then, to make a more multifaceted comparison of the influence of CIs in different continents and countries, the analysis centered on the general feedback of all the chosen CIs. Among the 15 CIs, five are from Portugal in Europe, six are from Brazil in Latin America, and four are from countries in Africa. Next, comparison between continents with auxiliary crossover analysis were employed on the basis of the collected information.

The reasons why CIs are compared by continents rather than by countries can be illustrated with the following two considerations. On the one hand, the 15 CIs can be

divided into three groups according to the different economic situation of their host countries. Portugal is a developed country in Europe. Brazil is a developing country as well as the largest economic power in Latin America. The four African countries include a low-to-middle-income country such as Cape Verde and low-income countries such as Angola, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. On the other hand, the 15 CIs are located on different continents, namely Europe, Latin America, and Africa. This study aims to explore whether CIs will receive different feedback when regional influence becomes involved.

The European background of Portugal, together with its special historical relations with other PSCs, attracted the author to investigate its five CIs, namely, UA-CI, the Confucius Institute at University of Minho (UM-CI), the Confucius Institute at University of Lisbon (UL-CI), the Confucius Institute at University of Porto (UP-CI) and the Confucius Institute at University of Coimbra (UC-CI).

In Brazil, six CIs are chosen including UNB-CI, the Confucius Institute at University of Estadual Paulista (UNESP-CI), the Business Confucius Institute at FAAP (FAAP-BCI), the Confucius Institute at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PCU-Rio-CI), the Confucius Institute at Campinas State University (UNICAMP-CI), and the Confucius Institute at Federal University of Ceará in Fortaleza (UFC-CI).

CIs chosen in Africa are UEM-CI, the Confucius Institute at Agostinho Neto University (ANU-CI), the Confucius Institute at University of Cape Verde (UCV-CI), and the Confucius Institute at São Tomé e Príncipe University (USTP-CI).

In brief, by analyzing the collected information, we will uncover and elaborate on the potential reasons lying behind the data. With a holistic research structure, the chapter will provide a panoramic view of CI's function and effect as the innovative policy of China's cultural diplomacy.

5.3 Confucius Institutes in Portuguese-speaking Countries

CI functions as a global institution to promote cultural communication (Lien, 2013).

As of June 2020, 22 CIs and eight CCs have been established in PSCs. Although CIs in PSCs are distributed in distinctive political, economic, and cultural environments, they have developed multitier exchanges and co-operation with different societies.

Table 5.1 Number of CIs and CCs in PSCs

Country	Number of CIs	Number of CCs
Brazil	11	5
Portugal	5	2
Mozambique	1	0
Angola	1	0
Cape Verde	1	0
São Tomé e Príncipe	1	0
East Timor	0	1
Equatorial New Guinea	1	0
Macao (China)	1	0
Total	22	8

Source: The data without marked reference in this chapter are collected manually from CICRM of each CI.

The distribution of CIs in PSCs, as indicated in Table 5.1, shows that China takes cultural diplomacy with PSCs seriously. Brazil, the biggest Latin American country, has 11 CIs and 5 CCs, thus ranking first among PSCs. Portugal in Europe ranks second with 5 CIs and 2 CCs. East Timor in Asia has jointly built a CC with Shanxi University to be the youngest CC in a PSC. Guinea-Bissau is the only PSC which has not yet established a CI or CC. CIs in PSCs have set up Chinese credit courses, and Chinese education has been integrated into the local higher education system. In addition, many CIs have profound co-operation with local governments and social service departments. CIs in PSCs implement years of collaboration with their corresponding host universities and function as bridges to practice cultural diplomacy (Song et al., 2021).

Generally, CIs have been under increasing scrutiny in the West, while CIs have more advantages in promoting China's soft power and national interest in Africa (Li, 2021). For a long time, China has been developing complementary relationships with Africa, catalyzing economic co-operation in the fields of trade and investment through development aid (Oqubay & Lin, 2019). More than 1.4 million students of all kinds have

been trained in 54 CIs and 30 CCs across 41 African countries. Ma (2018), the General Director of Hanban, commented that although Africa is not the continent with the largest number of CIs, it is regarded as the global region with the best teaching effects. Although China-Africa exchanges mainly focus on energy co-operation and economic construction, cultural and educational exchanges also get involved in bilateral co-operation so that CIs in PSCs have been empowered with more room to produce effects. For example, during his visit to China in 2018, the President of Angola won the quota of 500 scholarships for students to study in China. ANU-CI undertakes Chinese training for these 500 students. On the platform of ANU-CI, Agostinho Neto University and the Ministry of High Education of Angola lay a solid foundation for further educational co-operation between the two countries as well as improving bilateral economic and trade relationships. It is active in various co-operation projects and provides Chinese courses to registered students and government officers. The training program Learning Chinese with Me is a highly praised collaboration between the Ministry of Youth and the Ministry of the Interior of Angola. Noticeably, ANU-CI was the first CI with wholly owned participation of the Chinese enterprise CITIC, which hires more than 15,000 Angolan employees and enjoys a good image in Angola (Tang, 2016). Such an organizational model has opened a new mode of tripartite co-operation among CI Headquarters, Chinese and foreign universities, and Chinese enterprise. Although in 2019, CITIC withdrew from CI's management, it still has been in good cooperation with ANU-CI.

UCV-CI was unveiled in 2015 and has set up a variety of Chinese-related courses. In only two years the number of registered students reached 1,636, and the number reached 2,029 in 2018. Initially, despite strong demand for Chinese courses, UCV-CI could teach Chinese in only 17 public schools in Cape Verde due to a lack of Chinese teachers. In 2020, the Chinese major program of the University of Cape Verde officially enrolled students, and Chinese teaching has taken a new step forward with sufficient teachers and teaching resources. In 2019, USTP-CI was inaugurated in the only public university in São Tomé e Príncipe and enrolled more than 200 students in the first semester. Its

signature course is a compulsory credit course for students majoring in communication science. In additional routine Chinese teaching, UEM-CI launched courses combining language training with professional skills to meet the needs of local social development, especially the Chinese Plus agriculture project. UEM-CI has set up several scholarships, such as the Ambassador Scholarship and Victor Award Scholarship, to cultivate knowledge of China in young people. Further, Haishan Group of China abroad contributes 500,000 kwanzas (6,756 dollars) to reward outstanding local Chinese teachers with the Haishan Scholarship. Chinese Government Scholarships, CI Scholarships, and other kinds of scholarships have a considerable attraction for African students, especially for the most outstanding students with a poor family background (Li, 2018). They hope to get more educational opportunities and employment channels through their study in CI or in China (Li, 2021). Especially in Africa, CI makes the most of scholarships to recommend local students to study in China. CI in Africa even plays the diplomatic role of an embassy or consulate (Li & Tian, 2017).

Along with the increasingly close economic and trade relations between China and Brazil, Brazilians seem to have more enthusiasm for learning Chinese (Gouvea et al., 2020). From the very beginning, CI Headquarters has given attention to Chinese education in Latin America. Xu (2012), then Director of Hanban, explained that given its weak foundation in Chinese teaching, CI Headquarters would satisfy the strong demand of Latin American countries for CI. In 2008, the CI project installed its first unit in Brazil, conquering the entire market of Chinese learning in that country. Previously there were few Chinese language schools and specialized professionals. CI changed this scenario and created access to the Chinese language for local people (Bueno, 2015).

Brazil's population is concentrated along the Atlantic coast, and the southeastern area is the most populous area, where most CIs in Brazil are located. For example, in Sao Paulo alone, besides UNESP-CI and FAAP-BCI, there are two more CCs, and UNICAMP-CI is located only 100 km away. UNESP-CI is the first CI in Brazil and the largest Chinese teaching organization in Latin America. The Vice President of the State

Council of China praised it as "The best CI in the world" and greatly promoted China-Brazil intercultural communication (Liu, 2016). As the only Business CI in Brazil, FAAP-BCI offers business courses for students, local companies, and Brazilian employees from overseas Chinese companies. CI keeps revising its curriculum, such as combining face-to-face teaching with online teaching and designing Cross-cultural Competence Workshops to meet the needs of the enterprise. UNICAMP-CI promotes academic exchanges and co-operation between the top universities in China and Brazil, and academic exchange in both parties has been underscored and they have signed many agreements and memoranda, which has deepened the education, culture, and science and technology exchanges between China and Brazil.

CIs in Brazil co-operate with CIs in other Latin American countries with the support of the Latin American Center of Confucius Institute. CIs not only promote cultural exchanges among the countries but also promote exchanges and co-operation between China and the Latin American countries (Gilstrap, 2021). Federal Chinese Medicine CI of the Federal University of Goias (UFG-CMCI), the first CI in Latin America specializing in Chinese medicine, plays a role in promoting Chinese medicine in Brazil and in Latin America. Confucius Institute at the University of Pernambuco seeks to provide all-around and multi-tiered curricula that mix with the local national teaching system. As the only Global Model Confucius Institute in Brazil, relying on its prominent position and the influence of the medical profession of the University, Confucius Institute at the University of Pernambuco also aims to set a good example to its counterparts in Brazil and Latin America to promote traditional Chinese medicine and culture.

CIs in Brazil have been consistently dedicated to the continuous improvement of the quality of Chinese language teaching, the organization of influential cultural events, the promotion of bilateral co-operation, and the growth of social impacts. University of Rio Grande Do Sul (UFRGS) is the first Brazilian university to exchange students with Chinese counterparts. The university has a tradition of strengthening UFRGS' affairs

with Chinese institutions and reiterates that, on the platform of CI, exchanging students will bring great contributions to the development of the university (Kahn & Becker, 2019). UFRGS and China Communication University jointly cultivate undergraduate programs for students majoring in Portuguese and arrange exchange visits for students and teachers. Similarly, the Chinese and foreign partner universities of UNICAMP-CI signed an agreement to exchange students each year. Its Foreign Director, Walter Bellick, advocated the building of a strategic platform that integrates language teaching, cultural exchange, and social services. In 2015, PUC-RIO-CI published the book *Chinese in Brazil* to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil. In 2017, it signed a contract with the Commercial Press of China to translate China's most authoritative dictionary, Xinhua Dictionary, into Portuguese. Confucius Institute at Federal University of Minas Gerais was established in 2013 in co-operation with Hua Zhong University of Science and Technology. It focuses on Chinese teaching by providing various forms of courses and promoting Chinese culture with the Chinese Bridge Contest, Confucius Day and Chinese Cultural Week, Scholarship Application Presentation, Art Performance Show, Experiencing Chinese Language and Culture, Summer School, and Taiji Quan Experience. When President Xi visited Brazil in 2014, President Xi and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff jointly witnessed the signing ceremonies for the founding of the Confucius Institute at the Federal University of Pará. Since then, it has played its role in Chinese teaching and Chinese cultural dissemination. Located in a research university, PUC-Rio-CI is located in the largest seaport and financial center of Brazil and tries to improve its teaching and enlarge its course channels. It has offered courses in five universities in three nearby states and has enrolled students for eight years in the state-run school of Intercultural Brazil-China, which has become a teaching site of the Confucius Classroom of the Federal University of Fluminense. Twelve students have participated in The Mathematics Olympic Team Competition held in Beijing, and dozens of students have won scholarships to work or study in China. Among the first graduates, three students were

the first high school graduates in Brazilian history to study for bachelor's degrees in China. Further, PUC-Rio-CI actively helps Chinese and Brazilian universities to participate in the President Conference for BRICS Universities which is held alternately by China and Brazil and serves as a bridge for bilateral educational co-operation. PUC-Rio-CI has helped several Brazilian government groups and economic and trade groups to visit China, laying a good foundation for expanding the network for future development. As the youngest CI in Brazil, UFC-CI is dedicated to providing Chinese courses to government officials in Fortaleza. With the support of the Rector of the University and the state government, UFC-CI set up a Chinese teaching site next to the state government to better meet their needs of learning Chinese. However, on the one hand, the CI project has not completely penetrated Brazilian higher education and its adult education system. On the other hand, courses offered by CIs are mainly minor courses. Chinese teaching has a long way to go before the formation of Chinese major course (Bueno, 2015).

The Chinese government advances in-depth comprehensive strategic partnership with Portugal and deepens cultural diplomacy with a positive attitude (Demir & Im, 2020). Chinese language teaching during the past four decades has been active in Portugal (Wang & Sun, 2021). Five CIs are located in the central and northern regions of Portugal. UM-CI, the first CI in PSCs, has offered HSK courses for Portuguese students majoring in Chinese undergraduate courses. CI is equipped with a stable team of excellent Portuguese Chinese teachers. Its Chinese teaching in primary and secondary schools has covered 17 schools in five nearby cities. These CIs also hold lectures annually on modern China, traditional Chinese thought, the culture of Chinese enterprises, and the history of China's diplomacy. All these lectures have given local Portuguese an opportunity to "talk" to China (Zhao & Huang, 2010).

The findings of Wang and Sun (2021) indicate that most students have strong integrative and instrumental motivations to study the Chinese language in UL-CI. UL-CI offers Chinese credit courses for university students and provides all levels of courses for

people of the local community. Taking advantage of being in the capital, CI also developed many customized courses, such as courses for staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Maritime Affairs of Portugal, and the Rector of the University of Lisbon. The Minister of Maritime Affairs spoke highly of UL-CI: "CI's excellent teaching made me have a deep understanding of Chinese language and culture."[1] The Foreign Affairs Consultant of the President of Portugal commented, "The teachers are very good. I have learned a lot about Chinese and Chinese culture here."[2] Linhares (2019) concluded that participants enrolled in UL-CI are more aware and informed about the Chinese government's policies.

UC-CI, located in one of the oldest universities in Europe, specializes in Chinese medical science, provides Chinese medical science courses for medical students, and organizes summer camps in China (TVI24, 2016). In addition, it organized diverse volunteer clinical visits, lectures, and exhibitions to build a platform for bilateral medicine communication. The practice of UC-CI helps share Chinese medical education resources and promote Chinese medical ability (Chinaqw, 2019). Wetzstein (2020) argues that the existence of the UC-CI itself is not a fundamental condition for influencing the local community's perception of China. UA-CI was founded the same year as UC-CI, and it is devoted to language teaching and cultural promotion in Aveiro and its nearby cities. It has been chosen as the main case to be analyzed in the following section. UP-CI, the youngest CI in Portugal, carries out routine Chinese teaching. Although established for only a short time, UP-CI will further promote Chinese culture and Chinese teaching in Porto, and even throughout Portugal, and also disseminate Portuguese culture and Portuguese language teaching in China (Pereira, 2019). Such bi-directional communication conforms to the aim of Chinese cultural diplomacy.

Having now briefly reviewed CIs, it can be revealed that each CI in the PSCs has its own characteristics and exists in a different stage of development. The domain of CI includes educational and cultural exchanges in addition to face-to-face Chinese teaching

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[1] Retrieved from Annual Report of Confucius Institute of University of Lisboa 2018.
[2] Ibid., 1.

services for local people. They are actively engaged in various routine project promotions, such as the Summer Camp, Delegation of Educators, and Delegation of Government Officers. Benefiting from the promotion experience between China and PSCs, CI reflects a more confident Chinese policy and offers greater opportunities for engagement in implementing cultural diplomacy.

5.4 Case Studies

Although in the above review of CIs in PSCs the research hypotheses have been verified to some extent, three limitations remain. First, the descriptive introduction of these CIs shows CI's development is conducive to improving the national image. Each CI in PSCs has been in a different development phase, so its efforts and achievements in implementing cultural diplomacy is distinct. Second, CI has many stakeholder groups who are involved in daily operations and routine practices, such as directors, teachers, and all levels of officials in the local governments. Analysis should go closer to the attitudes of CI-related people more comprehensively. Third, it is a complex task to investigate CI's daily operations in the process of cultural diplomacy and how CI presents specific diplomatic measures such as language education, cultural promotion, academic exchange, brand building, media publicity, and so on. Revealed using multi-continental case analysis, the complete picture of UA-CI, UNB-CI, and UEM-CI will demonstrate how CIs implement cultural diplomacy with their specific daily practices.

Case Description and Data Collection

The main purpose of the case studies is to verify the operation measures and practical effects of the cultural diplomacy of specific CIs in PSCs. Based on an understanding of the development of CI and consideration of its own research conditions, this study takes UA-CI as the main case, with UNB-CI and UEM-CI as confirmatory cases. These three CIs have been chosen as the thesis's experimental targets due to their special geographical locations in Europe, South America, and Africa, respectively. Because of these locations, typical characteristics of these CIs can be taken as

representative of the other CIs in PSCs.

The reason why UA-CI was chosen as the main case study is because Europe is the continent with the most CIs in the world, currently having 187 (CIEF, 2022). The promotion of China's BRI for Europe has achieved some effects. The diplomatic initiative "17 + 1," comprising China and 17 Central, East, and Southeast European economies, revived European countries' interest in Chinese activities targeted at better physical and digital connectivity in Europe (Gruebler, 2021). Europe has been a crucial stage on which CI can perform its cultural diplomacy policy. Therefore, Portugal becomes a perfect representative country among the PSCs to test the sustainable and effective operation of its CIs. UA-CI won the title of CI of the Year less than four years after its establishment, contributing to its representativeness as the main case study. Latin America used to be a firm supporter of American influence and power, but the continent has shifted towards China in the last two decades. Therefore, China is devoted to employing its diplomatic tools to build a more holistic and pervasive continental influence (Gruebler, 2021). UNB-CI, located in the capital of Brazil, is an ideal subject to investigate how China attempts to achieve its mission of cultural influence. UEM-CI is globally regarded as an excellent CI for Chinese language teaching and cultural communication in Africa, and it also won the Confucius Institute of the Year in 2018. The selection of these CIs is representative and diverse and conforms to the standard of case study research. The three cases will be explored in depth to explain the logic behind the development of cultural diplomacy.

The study uses three methods of data collection: in-depth interview, direct observation, and document review. In 2013, Hanban sent a letter to agree with the co-establishment of CI between the Dalian University of Foreign Languages (DUFL) and the University of Brasilia (UNB). The author has been personally involved in the reconstruction of UNB-CI as the first Chinese Director and collected all relevant information with regard to CI since its establishment. Since March 2017, the author has worked as the second Chinese Director in UA-CI and has closely observed its CI for 4

years. Moreover, from 2013 to 2020, the author interviewed many Chinese and foreign directors of CIs in PSCs during global and regional CI conferences. The author has conducted research on the CI project since 2014 and has had direct access to and experience with CIs and CI Headquarters. With such an ethnographic background, the author attempts to answer the hypothesis questions in a holistic way.

Overview of the Three Case Study CIs

Main Case: UA-CI

Located on the Atlantic coast of western Portugal, Aveiro is the capital city of the Aveiro District and the second largest city in the central region of Portugal. Culture is one of its attractions. Situated between Coimbra and Porto as a port and trade center, Aveiro's history dates back to 959. It is a transportation hub connecting central and northern Portugal famous for its salt production, shellfish farming, marine fishery, shoe making, and so on. It is also known as the Silicon Valley of Portugal since information, communication, and electronics technologies are shining brands for this city.

The University of Aveiro was founded in 1973 and since then has rapidly grown into the most innovative and dynamic comprehensive university in Portugal with nearly 15,000 students, 16 departments, and 4 polytechnic schools. The university is famous for its high level of teaching and scientific research, and it was the first university in Portugal to require Chinese as a compulsory course in its educational system. The university regards CI as a crucial part of its public reputation. In 1998, it undertook a rich Chinese teaching tradition and started a master's degree in Chinese studies. In 2001 and 2006, the university offered Chinese language and culture courses and business Chinese courses to undergraduate and master's students majoring in language and business relations. Since 2005, it has provided Chinese language and culture courses for people in the local communities in the surrounding cities.

In September 2014, UA and CI Headquarters signed an agreement to co-establish CI. The Chinese partner, DUFL, is located in Dalian, Liaoning Province. This university is the only public university in northeastern China specializing in foreign language teaching,

and it has distinctive characteristics of internationalization. It has established friendly co-operation and exchange relations with 232 universities and institutions in 37 countries or regions to jointly train undergraduate, master's, and doctoral students. At present, in Liaoning Province, 100 universities have established friendly relations with more than 1,000 universities, educational institutions, and nongovernmental organizations worldwide, 13 of which have established 30 CIs and 4 Confucius Classrooms abroad. In December 2019, DUFL, as the director unit of the Alliance of CI Co-operative Universities in Liaoning Province, has been actively training Chinese directors, teachers, and volunteers for CI Headquarters. Since establishing the first CI in 2007, the university has built 10 CIs on four continents. It has become the university with the largest number of CIs overseas among all the provincial colleges and universities in China and has been awarded the title of Chinese Co-operation Organization of the Year five times. It has built a solid bridge and base in Liaoning Province for the "Going-global" of Chinese culture. UA and DUFL signed an agreement on co-operation on September 23, 2014, and then signed a supplementary agreement on May 27, 2018. In April 2015, CI was officially inaugurated. UA actively supports the promotion of Chinese language and culture in and out of the university. At present, some departments of the university have co-operated with CI to jointly carry out the promotion of Chinese culture. UA-CI is located on the first floor of the former administrative building of the university, covering an area of 350 square meters. There is a multimedia classroom, a general multimedia meeting room, a library, a reading room, an exhibition hall and activity room, a reception hall, and two teacher offices. The Foreign Director works together with the Chinese director to carry out daily management. Due to its remarkable achievements in teaching, cultural promotion, and academic exchange, it only took UA-CI three-and-a-half years to become one of the best CIs by 2018. Both host universities have devoted themselves to the active construction of CI. Rectors from both sides serve as the Presidents of the CI Council. The council meeting of UA-CI runs smoothly annually and sets clear goals for future development. Currently, UA-CI is systematically organized with stable and healthy

operations and development.

The Foreign Director of UA-CI is the former director of the Department of Language and Culture in the university. Currently, CI's personnel and finance issues are under the unified management of the university. Routine work such as the supervision of Chinese teaching and the selection of local teachers is jointly conducted and managed by Foreign and Chinese Directors. Management of archives is overseen by the secretary who deals with the liaison of administrative affairs between CI and the university, relevant institutions and government departments, and the organization and implementation of cultural activities.

Meanwhile, CI also helped UA to supervise Chinese students in the university. Chinese teaching is included in the national education system of Portugal, and CI also assisted the Portuguese Educational Ministry in managing the affairs of its Chinese teaching programs in the Aveiro region. UA-CI has maintained good co-operative relations with the surrounding municipal governments, museums, and theatres and has promoted the brand reputation of CI in the local community.

Confirmatory Case 1: Confucius Institute at University of Brasilia

Brasilia is the capital of the Federative Republic of Brazil and the fourth largest city in Brazil. Located in the central state of Goias, Brasilia was built in 1956 as new urban planning and is famous for its bold buildings and fast-growing population. On April 21, 1960, Brazil moved its capital from Rio de Janeiro to Brasilia to speed up inland development. Brasilia functions as the political center of Brazil and is a UNESCO World Heritage site.

UNB, founded in 1962 as a federal university, is one of the most important cultural exchange centers in Brazil and is the cultural hub for the Brasilia region. The university enjoys the highest rating in the Ministry of Education's General Course Index and adopts elements of the American management style such as the cancellation of traditional lectures. It has 26 institutions and colleges, nearly 20,000 students, and about 2,000 teachers. Its most powerful discipline is medicine, and the university has also opened

several extension courses, including a series of training, lecture, and intensive classes designed for citizens to improve their all-around cultural literacy. This kind of public education mostly involves literature, art, history, language, culture, and similar subjects. Notably, science and engineering students must complete compulsory courses in Humanities and Arts, which are almost as well represented as the professional courses. Such an active humanistic atmosphere creates an openness to cultures and languages of all countries and thus paves a friendly way for UNB-CI to get grounded in the university. On September 26, 2008, on behalf of CI Headquarters, the Chinese ambassador to Brazil Chen Duqing signed an agreement with UNB's President Roberto Armando Ramos de Aguiar on the establishment of the CI. UNB-CI is the second CI of Brazil. Its first Chinese partner institution was Hebei Media Institute, affiliated with the Jingying Education Group. On March 29, 2010, UNB-CI officially started to enroll students but later paused its operation to change its Chinese host institution. On July 16th, 2013, DUFL became its formal Chinese co-operative university. UNB-CI has an office and teaching space of 337 square meters, including two special classrooms with a teaching area of 48 square meters and two classrooms shared with other departments. UNB's regulations should be synchronized with the federal government, and there is no exception with CI's construction. Therefore, it took UNB-CI a long time to apply for funds to launch activities and basic programs due to the complicated and strict process of approval. The account of UNB-CI is set up under the general account of UNB with strict financial approval terms and lengthy approval procedures, which affects CI's development of teaching and cultural activities. UNB-CI has tried to simplify various payment application procedures conducive to its long-term development. After a series of discussions by the UNB-CI Council, since 2017 its financial management has been charged by Finatec Foundation of UNB, allowing its future development to progress more smoothly.

Another dilemma of UNB-CI lies in its lack of autonomy in teaching. Since its establishment, it has been a branch of Idioms Language Center, a training center for

public education affiliated with the Department of Arts. In terms of teaching and administration, UNB-CI's curriculum, class arrangement, recruitment, and teacher training should be consistent with the teaching of other languages in the Language Center. The decision-making power lies in the center. Students cannot directly sign up at CI and can only register for new classes after they pass the exam. However, when students fail to take the test, they cannot continue learning. Afterwards, new courses can't be set up if the number of students is less than eight. Therefore, an obstacle facing UNB-CI is this awkward teaching situation, which needs to be changed.

Confirmatory Case 2: Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University

Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, is the largest port city in the country. The city is located at the southern end of Mozambique, adjacent to Maputo Bay of the Indian Ocean, with an area of 53.7 square kilometers and a population of 1.06 million. Maputo–Katembe, begun in 2014, is a landmark of Maputo, with a total length of 3,034 m and a main span of 680 m, constructed under the general contract of China Road and Bridge Corporation. The total cost of the bridge and the supporting ring road project is expected to be 1.04 billion US dollars. Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) is the largest and most well-known public university in Mozambique and has played a leading role in cultivating talents in Mozambique's national construction.

The Chinese host university of UEM-CI, Zhejiang Normal University (ZJNU), has six CIs and four CCs built in Ukraine, Cameroon, Mozambique, Tanzania, the United States, and South Africa, making it the university with the most CIs in Africa. In 2015, the university set up the Confucius Institute African Research Center and Zhejiang Confucius Institute Teacher Selection and Training Center with the support of CI Headquarters. The university is the only university in China that has won the honorary title Chinese Institution of the Year four consecutive times.

As a well-known African Research Center in China, ZJNU has engaged in researching African studies and training African-related talents. UEM-CI, founded in October 2012, is the only authoritative institution for Chinese teaching in Mozambique.

Through continuous efforts, UEM-CI has gained considerable popularity and influence in the region. After eight years of development, the inner management system of UEM-CI has been established and is making effective progress towards the future.

Concerning personnel management, UEM-CI arranges one-week trial teaching for all new volunteer teachers. In terms of financial affairs, CI adopts a third-party signing policy and three-quotation method according to the UEM financial system. All files are classified and managed by the relevant people. Its asset management system is also a highlight. CI arranges a fixed person to be responsible for procurement, registration, management, and maintenance, which provides quality assurance for the smooth development of teaching and cultural activities. In May 2018, UEM and ZJNU signed an agreement on the co-education of Chinese majors to promote the joint training of Chinese professionals.

Language Education

CIs in PSCs provides zero-distance Chinese teaching services for the host country, forming the most authoritative and systematic Chinese learning base. CI not only provides various kinds of Chinese training for ordinary people but also for local politicians, business circles, judicial circles, the press, and other specific customers.

Main Case: Confucius Institute at University of Aveiro

UA-CI has limited geographical space for its scale development because it is a one-hour driving distance to CIs at UC and UP. According to its situation, UA-CI has accurately positioned itself and made great efforts to localize Chinese teaching development by co-operating with surrounding municipal governments. Since its inauguration in April 2015, it has set up 16 Chinese teaching sites in nearby public primary and secondary schools. Among them, the public schools in S. João da Madeira, Estarreja, and Espinho have required Chinese as a compulsory course.

UA-CI firmly adheres to the trinity principle of teaching, teachers, and students and prioritizes construction of the teachers' team. UA-CI actively promotes the localization of Chinese teaching and thus becomes an important medium for disseminating Chinese

language and culture in Aveiro and surrounding cities. In 2018, one of its students won the title of Champion of Chinese Bridge for Secondary School Students in Portugal and the title of Global Best Creative Award in China. He was recommended to study medicine at Huazhong University of Science and Technology with the Chinese Government Scholarship in 2019. His achievement demonstrated the teaching quality of UA-CI and modeled a good example for other students. In an interview, he said, "Thanks to UA-CI, I can get an access to the real and beautiful dream. The Journey to study in China is the best experience ever" (Francisco, 2019).

Training for Local Teachers

Teachers are not only directly related to the quality of Chinese teaching but also provide a window for students to see and understand China. The training of local teachers contributes to the sustainable development of Chinese teaching, so it is a core task of UA-CI. Up to the end of 2019, UA-CI has 23 local teachers, including seven Portuguese and 16 Chinese. Chinese teachers dispatched from CI Headquarters undertake credit and evening courses at the university, while local teachers are responsible for Chinese courses distributed in the teaching sites. A dual teacher system for Chinese teaching has been set up since 2015, enabling local Portuguese teachers and Chinese teachers to give full play to their respective advantages through co-operative teaching, so as to meet the Chinese learning needs of students. UA-CI implements a competitive teacher-selection system to encourage local teachers to develop a habit of lifelong learning and improve their enthusiasm for teaching. Annual teaching-skills competitions and weekly lesson-preparation meetings provide local teachers chances to share Chinese teaching experiences and effectively solve practical teaching problems. Further, UA-CI has fixed weekly training courses for local teachers' language ability and teaching skills to guarantee the quality of teaching and stabilize the team of local teachers. In 2019, UA-CI also hosted a Joint Conference of Partial CIs in Europe themed "Construction of Chinese Teaching System." Chinese and foreign directors from 18 CIs in Europe and representatives from Headquarters attended the conference to discuss how

to promote the localization of Chinese teaching under the European framework and establish a mature Chinese teaching system. The conference promoted exchange and learning between CIs in Europe and also showcased the best image of UA-CI to its European counterparts. UA gave such support that an exhibition on the achievements of UA-CI was launched at UA's Rectory. The Minister of Education Department of Portugal João Costa and UA's President Paulo Jorge Ferreira delivered speeches at the opening ceremony and both spoke highly of UA-CI in promoting bilateral educational and cultural exchange.

Combining Examination with Teaching

UA-CI actively publicizes the CI Scholarship and HSK through various channels, including public lectures and media promotion, and has set up Chinese courses based on the HSK standard framework. It not only improves students' enthusiasm and cognition to participate in the examination but also is conducive to the standardization of Chinese teaching in Aveiro. A CI student studying in China commented on CI's HSK courses in an interview: "Thanks to the HSK, I can get the qualification to apply for the Scholarship and study in China."

UA-CI offers multilevel language courses and broadens the impact of Chinese teaching activities in the region of Aveiro. CI provides credit courses for registered university students and Chinese primary courses for students in different grades in the teaching sites. In 2019, the total number of registered students was 2,750, with 250 newly registered students. Meanwhile, UA-CI assists the Education Ministry of Portugal in supervising its Chinese teaching project in secondary schools, which has more than 300 registered students in the Aveiro region.

In 2020, UA-CI broadened its teaching scope by opening online Chinese courses. UA-CI recorded a series of mini-online courses such as Practical Chinese and A Visit to Chinese Campus. After the outbreak of Covid-19, UA-CI launched free online courses such as Study Chinese at Home and Online Taiji, bringing Chinese language and culture onto a broader stage for more Chinese lovers. With a five-year effort, UA-CI provides a

convenient learning platform for more local families to understand the real, three-dimensional China.

Integration into the Portuguese Education System

UA-CI has engaged in Chinese teaching activities in seven administrative regions within the Aveiro region. The teaching programs in Espinho, S. João da Madeira, and Estarreja have been warmly welcomed and praised by national media and local governments.

Table 5.2 Teaching-Related Information of UA-CI

Year	Register Students	HSK Test Candidates	China-Sent Teachers	Local Chinese Teachers	China-Sent Volunteers	Scholarship Winners
2015	1250	0	1	12	1	0
2016	1320	77	1	12	2	4
2017	1265	85	0	12	4	1
2018	2500	97	1	20	3	3
2019	2750	89	1	23	2	4

The program of São João da Madeira is UA-CI's first teaching program. The northern city of Portugal stipulates that all local public primary schools offer Chinese compulsory courses in the third and fourth grades. It aims to improve the competitiveness of the younger generation and its European counterparts in the Chinese market. Chinese is the key to the world's largest market (Global Network, 2011). Portugal is famous for its traditional shoe-making industry. With the development of emerging countries, Portugal has gradually given up the middle- and low-end markets and now focuses on the high-end shoe-making market, which makes Portugal a luxury-footwear export country along with Italy. Meanwhile, although China is the world's largest shoe-making country, Portugal's high-end shoes still successfully enter the Chinese market. In this context, since 2012, the Municipal Government of São João da Madeira has made Chinese courses compulsory in primary schools and has invested around 50,000 euros in Chinese education. Mario Tavares, owner of a shoe-making company, believes that the government's move to make Chinese a compulsory course gives children an advantage in future competition with their peers. The ex-mayor of the city, Castro Almeida, once said, "Chinese is becoming more and more important and

students may have more opportunities to co-operate with China when they grow up, so it is meaningful to have Chinese lessons in the school curriculum" (Xinhua Agency, 2013). The mayor of this prosperous shoe-making city believes that for young people, learning Chinese is not only a matter of interest, but also an advantageous skill. Learning Chinese is like acquiring golden key to the future (CCTV, 2018).

In 2016, RTP television in Portugal covered the signing ceremony of an educational co-operation project between UA and Espinho. The mayor of São João da Madeira reviewed its teaching achievements and evaluated the project highly. The Mayor of Espinho recognized China's rapid development, noting Chinese language can provide a future for children, while Chinese Counsellor to Portugal, Nie Quan, pointed out that all kinds of Chinese courses in Portugal are important witnesses and driving forces for the steady, healthy development of China-Portugal relations (DUFL, 2016). Chinese has entered not only the local public primary and secondary schools but also the local government of the Arradas District and the local open university. UA-CI has established roots in the local community to become a civil ambassador to bilateral friendship using the medium of Chinese language (Cai, 2015).

Confirmatory Case 1: Confucius Institute at University of Brasilia

In 2019, the number of registered students at UNB-CI reached 664. CI has set up Chinese credit courses targeted at undergraduates and the local language school and semester courses for local citizens. In 2016, one of its students, Ricardo, achieved third place in the first CI Oral Chinese Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean region and applied successfully for a Chinese Government Scholarship to study in the Dalian University of Technology.

Chinese Courses with Characteristics

As the political center of Brazil, Brasilia has a relatively small population, and its demand for Chinese is far less than that of São Paulo and other regions. Therefore, UNB-CI opened Chinese training courses and Chinese culture promotion for high-end social classes in Brazil. For example, co-operating with the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign

Relations, UNB-CI opened four Chinese classes for diplomats and three for military officers from the Brazilian Defense Ministry. These people are the leaders of public opinion in Brazil, and their profound understanding of China and Chinese language can shape a better image for China when they handle issues concerning China. Some diplomats also work in the Brazilian Embassy to China, and their language ability will facilitate bilateral interactions.

Co-operating with the Brazilian Federal District Education Bureau, UNB-CI offered five Chinese language classes for 75 teenagers and adults at the Brasilia Public Language Center (CIL). As a public language training institution, CIL used to only offer three foreign languages: Spanish, English, and French. This is the first time that Chinese was accepted and taught in the public school in the federal district of Brasilia. This debut of the Chinese class for these Brazilian teenagers laid the foundation for the promotion of Chinese language in Brasilia public school.

Localization of Teachers

In 2014, CI held the first training program for 20 local teachers, and since then local Chinese training has been a regular project of CI. In 2019, three local teachers and two backup teachers were formally employed. One local teacher was selected to participate in local teacher training activities organized by the Latin America Center. Another local teacher, Rodrigo, participated in the 2016 Global Foreigners' Chinese Competition and ultimately represented Latin America in the final. As a star teacher of UNB-CI, he is also in charge of the Chinese classes for diplomats. Renzo won third place in the 2015 Chinese Bridge Contest. Since finishing his study in China with a CI Scholarship, he has been a local Chinese teacher in UNB-CI. Renzo said in an interview that he was grateful for his experience in UNB-CI which helped him become a local Chinese teacher.

Digital Teaching Resources

UNB-CI attempts to bring the benefits of digitization into teaching. In 2019, three volunteer teachers participated in a microlecture competition held by Hanban. CI has been developing a database of teaching resources. However, due to limitations of

manpower and financial support, mature digital teaching and management has not been achieved. The foreign director of UNB-CI suggested in the first CI Alliance Conference of DUFL that UA-CI and UNB-CI should develop shared digital resources together because these two CIs not only share the same Chinese host university but are also located in PSCs.

Table 5.3 Teaching-Related Information of UNB-CI

Year	Register Students	HSK Test Candidates	China-Sent Teachers	Local Chinese Teachers	China-Sent Volunteers	Scholarship Winners
2015	248	24	1	6	1	0
2016	405	49	1	5	2	0
2017	434	54	1	5	2	0
2018	605	78	1	4	2	1
2019	664	120	1	5	2	4

Confirmatory Case 2: Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University

According to the location and types of its teaching sites, UEM-CI has formulated a different development orientation and management style. Linkage effect and integrated development have been formed to improve its local influence. In 2016, students of UEM-CI participated in The Chinese Bridge Competition for Global College Students and ranked in the top six among African CIs. In the Chinese Bridge Competition for Global Secondary Students, students of UEM-CI became the African champion and ranked in the top five in the world in 2017 and won the Global Best Style Award in 2018.

Chinese+ Project

In addition to the Headquarters of UEM-CI, there are seven teaching sites, including the Higher Institute of International Relations in Maputo. The Chinese credit course has been extended to Unilúrio, and special courses have been set up for the National Defense Ministry to State Taxation Bureau and Police Department. At least 10 training classes have been offered annually to meet different needs. The teaching territory of UEM-CI has radiated throughout Mozambique. In addition, Taiji, martial arts, paper cutting, calligraphy, and other cultural courses are also offered. In February 2016, the Chinese Major program officially recruited students, and Chinese was officially incorporated into

the national higher education system of Mozambique with its first Chinese major, a milestone in the educational field of Mozambique. UEM-CI combined Chinese teaching with special professional needs and launched Chinese+ courses. In 2018, the project started to co-operate with Nanjing Agricultural University and Wanbao Agricultural Base in Mozambique to hold the Chinese+ Agricultural Technology Training Course to train local farm technicians, so that Chinese teaching can better serve different professions and different groups, a bold attempt to develop Chinese with its special characteristics. In 2019, the Deputy Minister of Culture of Mozambique participated in the Chinese language training course in the Ministry of Culture. By the end of 2019, more than 130 students were majoring in Chinese, and the first batch of graduates graduated in 2020. In the past eight years, the number of Chinese teachers has grown from eight to 27, teaching more than 5,000 Chinese learners.

Combination of Teaching and Research

UEM-CI attaches great importance to the monitoring and evaluation of teaching quality. Chinese teachers with doctorates and senior titles oversee teaching management. Course assessment focuses on teaching-process evaluation, and the results are composed of attendance, homework, mid-term examination, and final examination. Monthly meetings and cultural activities are organized to test the teaching results and commend outstanding students. Each teacher is required to write three teaching cases and cultural activity cases, which stimulates teachers to reflect on the teaching process and accordingly improve teaching quality.

In addition to the regular lecture and evaluation system, UEM-CI regularly holds a Demonstration Week of teaching and research activities and conducts student assessment. In 2017, Serle, a UEM-CI student, received a master's degree in International Chinese Education and signed a job contract to be the first native Chinese teacher in Mozambique. His student won first place in the Chinese Bridge Competition. In May 2018, UEM-CI successfully hosted the Joint Conference of CIs in Africa on the largest scale ever. Participating in the conference were more than 300 Chinese and foreign directors,

Presidents, and representatives of Chinese and African enterprises and institutions from more than 60 CIs and classrooms in 41 African countries. The representatives held group case-sharing and in-depth discussion on CI's innovation development.

All-Around Support for Students

UEM-CI has set up various scholarships aimed at commending students with excellent qualities. Among them, Victor company has provided 6,000 US dollars each year for 10 consecutive years for outstanding students and a bursary for CI students with financial difficulties. UEM-CI organizes the internationally certified standardized Chinese Proficiency Test, Chinese Camp, and various Chinese activity competitions and recommends excellent students to study in or visit China. UEM-CI co-operates with Chinese-fund companies in Mozambique to recommend students for employment and career development. Since 2016, the number of scholarships awarded to students has more than quintupled from three to 23 in 2019, which attests to the interest and commitment of both sides to increase this language exchange (China Daily, 2018).

Table 5.4 Teaching-Related Information of UEM-CI

Year	Register Students	HSK Test Candidates	China-Sent Teachers	Local Chinese Teachers	China-Sent Volunteers	Scholarship Winners
2016	833	115	8	0	11	3
2017	1450	259	8	1	14	16
2018	1900	232	8	1	18	12
2019	2000	441	7	1	15	23

Means of Cultural Promotion

Language and culture are interdependent and inseparable (Mazari & Derraz, 2015). China's practice of cultural diplomacy on the platform of CI is not only a need of diplomacy but also an effort to promote diversity and dialogue among civilizations (Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes). Based on the cultural needs of the host country, CIs in PSCs provide cultural consultation and assistance to carry out professional Chinese teaching on business, tourism, medicine, etc. CI combines the promotion of Chinese teaching with Chinese culture and meanwhile adapts various means to make Chinese culture better accepted by local society. The case study shows

that each of the three chosen CIs has exerted its power to promote two-way cultural exchange.

Main Case: Confucius Institute at University of Aveiro

Since its establishment, UA-CI has always sought to integrate itself into the local area. Through close co-operation with local governments and institutions, it has targeted the promotion of Chinese culture through a series of typical cultural activities with diverse forms and innovative spirit. Through the integration and exchange of Chinese culture and local Portuguese culture, it has improved local people's understanding of Chinese culture, and the participation rate of people in these activities has been rising (CM-Aveiro, 2018).

Need-Oriented Activities

In accordance with different festivals, themes, and target groups, UA-CI has designed rich cultural experiences to meet the needs of local people who have different understandings of Chinese culture. To broaden students' interests, UA-CI held workshops for local students. Activities covered many cultural forms such as Chinese food, martial arts, handicrafts, Chinese Medicine, etc. UA-CI has launched a series of festival activities such as CI Day, the Dragon Boat Festival, the Mid-Autumn Festival, the Chinese Spring Festival Celebration, etc. Further forms include the local Summer Camp, the Art Tour Show, academic lectures, concerts, experience workshops, seminar and knowledge competitions, etc. According to different themes, UA-CI has held many trial classes on Chinese music, modern oriental masks, calligraphy and painting, martial arts, traditional Chinese medicine, Bronze Art, porcelain, clay sculpture, shadow play, and experience workshops. There are book exhibitions for children, such as Chinese Children's Literature World, and suitable music performances for the elderly, and the Spring Festival Temple Fair for the whole family to participate in. While participating in the UA-CI Vocational Technology and Education Expo, the Mayor of Aveiro expressed his gratitude to UA-CI for its contribution to the cultural diversity of the Aveiro region and expected further co-operation between the two sides. These colorful cultural

activities showcase the interweaving of traditional Chinese culture and modern culture, as well as the integration of Chinese culture and Portuguese culture.

Brand Activities with Local Characteristics

UA-CI advocates the integration of Chinese culture and local culture by creating innovative brand activities with local characteristics, so that more local people have greater willingness to know and accept Chinese culture. The International Dragon Boat Festival and the Martial Arts Team are two shining examples that display CI's attempts to blend bilateral cultures. The International Dragon Boat Festival mixes the Chinese dragon boat race with local Moliceiro culture, displaying Chinese culture with Western aesthetics, and attracts a large number of local people and tourists as participants. It has been listed as an annual fixed cultural project by the Municipal Government of Aveiro. The Municipal Councilor of Aveiro commented about CI in an interview:[3]

> UA-CI has become a part of Aveiro and the pride of the city. We are grateful to CI's partnership. The cultural activities held by CI both indoors and outdoors have produced profound educational significance for the local people and children.

UA-CI's Martial Arts Team has not only set up long-term courses and martial arts clubs at teaching sites but also actively co-operated with CI to carry out various cultural activities. It helped CI to hold The First Martial Arts Competition for Portuguese University Students and represented CI in the World Multi-style Competition as well as the Wushu International Tournaments at All Levels, all of which achieved outstanding results and won a good reputation for CI. It was also invited to participate in many local events in Portugal, such as the Carnival Tour, European Singing Competition, Iberian Mask Festival, 16th Obidos International Chocolate Festival, etc., which publicized the Confucius Institute on a broader platform.

Plural Co-operation

UA-CI maintains good co-operative relations with surrounding municipal governments, museums, theaters, and other departments of UA as well as the Chinese Embassy in Portugal. In 2019, for example, CI hosted 195 cultural activities with various

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[3] Interview with the local officer by UA-CI, 18 June 2018.

cultural organizations which were open to the public and had more than 26,000 participants. UA-CI utilizes diversified resources by joining with the Aveiro Municipal government, CI Headquarters, the Cervantes Office, the Beijing Institute of Dunhuang, CI at Madrid University, and the Dunhuang Research Institute. UA-CI hosted the exposition, The Pilgrimage Road: The Sacred Trail from Dunhuang to the Iberian Peninsula, inaugurated in the Aveiro Art Gallery. There are 50 photographic works on display which gather splendid Dunhuang Grotto Art on the Chinese Silk Road and Spanish Romanesque Mural Art, linking the two cultures with a history of thousands of years. This exhibition not only introduces the mysterious beauty from China's Silk Road but also deepens the cultural exchange between China and the West. Such plural co-operation promoted two-way exchange and respect towards international cultures.

On the arrival of the 70th Anniversary of China's National Day, the BRI Photo Exhibition was held in co-operation with the Chinese embassy in Portugal and the São João da Madeira Municipal Government. Together with the Aveiro Museum and Macao Arts Association, UA-CI held the Chinese Porcelain Exhibition. The 16th and 17th century Macao History and Culture Exhibition was held with the relevant cultural institutions of Macao and UA. DUFL also sent experts in martial arts and traditional Chinese medicine to hold lectures and training in UA-CI.

Collaborating with the Department of Language and Culture of UA, the International Mother Tongue Day Online Lecture and The Intersection of Languages: The Chinese Translators and Translations of Portuguese Writers Exhibition were held successfully. The latter exhibition covered a large number of excellent Portuguese works, such as sonnets by Luis de Camões, the Father of Portugal, and works by Nobel Prize winner for literature Jose Saramago. At the same time, Portuguese versions of excellent Chinese works, such as Lao Zi's *Dao Te Ching* and selections of Du Fu's poetry, were also exhibited. Such joint activities effectively use and integrate resources in a new way to construct a broader platform which attracts more local people from different backgrounds to participate in and understand bilateral relations. It is the mission and goal of UA-CI to

enhance the friendship between the Chinese and Portuguese peoples.

Besides holding various activities, UA-CI recommended students for CI scholarships and summer camps. In addition to the programs designed for students, UA-CI organized two Delegations of Directors to visit China. The author accompanied one delegation to China. Most of the involved directors commented that the trip showed them the real China and changed their stereotype of China. When in China, one director who had never been to China told the author that the real China is far more modern and beautiful than the one he had imagined.

Confirmatory Case 1: Confucius Institute at University of Brasilia

UNB-CI has held cultural publicity, promotion, and exchange activities all year round, including activities of the United Nations Chinese Day, Chinese Song Competition, Chinese Writing Competition, Confucius Institute Day, the Dragon Boat Festival Gala, Culture Week, Chinese Corner, and traditional Chinese dance classes. This series of activities has not only promotes the extensive and profound Chinese culture but also makes UNB-CI better known to local people from all walks of life.

Broadening the Influence in the Community

UNB-CI insists on entering Brasilia's local communities and middle schools to carry out cultural promotion activities in different forms. The communities actively provide support while UNB-CI is responsible for designing and organizing the cultural activities. Hundreds of people were invited to participate in events, including university professors, doctors, lawyers, and other elites. Mr. Joe Valle and Ms. Erika Kokay, members of the Brazilian Parliament, participated in the Taiji Festival held by UNB-CI and the local Taiji association. They highly praised UNB-CI. The local community also granted CI's Chinese director an honorary certificate to recognize her efforts in promoting Chinese culture in the area.

Co-construction of Cultural Platforms with Local Cultural Organizations

The Taiji Association is an influential local community organization in Brasilia whose founder is an 87-year-old Taiji master who has been teaching Taiji free of charge

in the city square for more than 40 years. The local government named the square World Harmonious Square in 2007 to commend his promotion of Chinese culture. UNB-CI has been actively supporting the activities of the Taiji Association, and together they have brought more Chinese culture to locals, via the closing ceremony of Confucius Institute Day and the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Taiji Association, which was also supported by the local Chinese Medicine Association, the Brasilia Chinese culture center, and other institutions. Activities included diagnosis through traditional Chinese medicine, acupuncture using traditional Chinese medicine, a tea culture exhibition, and Taiji practice.

In addition, CI actively co-operates with the China-Brazil Cultural Group to hold various cultural activities and lectures. The most influential ones are Poetry Reading Competitions and Poetry Appreciation Seminars. Confucius Institute, together with the China-Brazil cultural center and the Taiji Association, has jointly set up martial arts and Taiji classes.

Co-operation with Embassies and Chinese Enterprises

Located in the capital, UNB-CI maintains close contact with the Brazilian government, Chinese and foreign embassies, and Chinese enterprises. CI actively participates in cultural promotion and exchange activities held by various departments and recommends excellent students to work in Chinese embassies, Chinese enterprises, and other departments. CI co-operates with embassies of various countries to make full use of this international stage to expand its popularity. UNB-CI has recommended students to participate in one-month study tours organized by the Ministry of Commerce of China. UNB-CI co-operates with embassies of France, Spain, Germany, Japan, and other countries to hold forums and lectures on culture, education, scientific and technological innovation, cultural exhibitions, and charity sales activities, all of which are attended by envoys and staff of different countries. Such a platform enables people with different cultural backgrounds to understand both CI and China. In 2016, two students were recommended to work at Huawei, the world's leading provider of

information and communication technology solutions. Meanwhile, with the co-ordination of UNB-CI, Huawei and UNB have discussed research on information and communication technology and reached a preliminary intention to co-operate further. In this way, UNB-CI builds a multilateral platform for more Chinese enterprises, universities, and NGOs to co-operate with UNB.

Co-operation with UNB

UNB-CI has invited experts in various fields to give lectures to its students and citizens in Brasilia on topics such as Chinese culture, martial arts, food, modern China, etc. With the Management Department of the university, it held lectures on China-Brazil Economic Co-operation. As one of the main participants, CI participated in the Second International Forum and Expo held by the International Exchange Office of the university. The Chinese Director was invited to give a lecture on the Confucianism underlying Chinese foreign policy to students of the Department of International Relations and Politics, so that the students could have a close understanding of Chinese cultural diplomacy.

In 2017, the Beautiful China photography exhibition jointly organized by the China Photographers Association, Latin America Center, and UNB-CI was unveiled at UNB. CI has successively co-operated with Anhui University and DUFL to hold the Chinese Literature and Art Tour. Chinese Ambassador to Brazil Li Jinzhang, President of UNB Ivan Marques de Toledo Camargo, teachers and students of CI, relevant leaders of Chinese-funded enterprises, and more than 600 local people attended the performance, which was reviewed positively at UNB and on local media.

Since its establishment, UNB-CI has tried to organize a student Summer Camp. However, due to complicated financial regulations, the 50% fare for international student tickets could not be paid from CI's account. In 2018, the account was placed with Finatec Foundation, so that CI successfully organized the first successful Summer Camp and its influence has been profound among CI students.

Confirmatory Case 2: Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University

Plural Co-operation

On the basis of conventional cultural activities, UEM-CI has gradually focused on shaping its characteristics in the realms of literature and art. Influential cultural activities include the Spring Festival Temple Fair, Chinese Song Competition, Poetry Recitation Competition, Mid-Autumn Festival Gala, Painting Competition, and Photography Competition. Through innovative kinds of activities, CI has actively organized more than 250 large-scale cultural activities and reached more than 40,000 people up to 2019.

UEM-CI actively co-operates with the Chinese Embassy and local Chinese Institutions such as the Chinese medical team and China Road and Bridge Corporation to organize cultural activities for local people. CI's development has been strongly supported by Chinese enterprises in Mozambique. Liu He Engineering Manufacturing Co., Ltd. has sponsored the First Poetry Competition, while China Road and Bridge Corporation has sponsored the Chinese Bridge Competition for College Students. Chinese enterprise Kelley Hotel has supported performances of the UEM-CI Chorus at the teaching sites. The French Culture Festival is a cross-cultural activity hosted jointly with a local language institute to show the charm of language diversity. Participation in the International Education Exhibition held by the Ministry of Higher Education of Mozambique also put UEM-CI on a high platform to gain greater popularity in the country. On weekends, UEM-CI offers Chinese classes for the China-Mozambique Friendship Exchange Association. In line with BRI, UEM-CI holds special lectures on modern China. Additionally, CI offers convenience for Chinese groups visiting Mozambique. In 2019, UEM-CI organized a gathering party with the Chinese Navy convoy team during CI Day. All the above activities have expanded UEM-CI's local influence.

Highlights of Culture Activities

Since its inception, the UEM-Chinese Chorus has successively performed Chinese songs for the Mozambican president, government officers, and local people. The Chorus performed at the Joint Conference of CIs in Africa in 2018, at Maputo's Night of Beijing

and at the China-Mozambique economic and trade reception. The teaching methodology of the Chorus is to learn Chinese through songs. The Chorus has become CI's most beautiful brand and greatly improved the popularity and influence of Chinese language. In disseminating Chinese music in Mozambique, UEM-CI combines Chinese music with Mozambican music to produce sustainable communication effects.

Academic Exchange

Main Case: Confucius Institute at University of Aveiro

UA-CI has gradually grown into a research-oriented CI. In academic exchanges, it focuses on collaborative innovation and bilateral academic exchanges to promote academic development and co-operation in the humanities.

International Symposia

UA-CI has organized two international symposia on Portugal-China Intercultural Dialogue. At the first symposium, more than 100 experts and scholars gathered to share academic thinking on the nature and value of intercultural dialogue. One overseas Chinese student said in an interview, "The symposium is not only the 'handshake' between Chinese and Portuguese but also the 'dialogue' between the two cultures. I have never known that two countries have so much in common." President of the New Silk Road Association, Ms. Fernanda, delivered a speech entitled "The New Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century in Portugal." Rui Lourido delivered a speech entitled "Preserving the Past and Building the Future: The Legend of China in Portuguese." A Taiji teacher from Beijing Sport University commented, "I have seen the display of China's soft power in many corners of the world. After breaking through the language barrier, foreigner can learn Chinese culture with a very inclusive and open mind." In 2019, more than 300 experts and scholars from international universities and scientific research institutions attended the Second Intercultural Dialogue, which produced remarkable academic achievements. The conference covered themes including BRI, literature, translation and teaching, culture and tourism, art, etc. A total of 107 documents were submitted and 21 seminars were held, while 89 guests delivered speeches. The

proceedings were published in 2021. It is certain that UA-CI's international symposia have produced positive effects in showing UA-CI's academic image to participants.

Academic Lectures

CI has invited top-level Chinese scholars to deliver lectures, for example, Chinese Yangtze River Scholar Wang Ning's lecture "Comparative Literature of China: Historical Review and Contemporary Trend," which explored the opportunities and strategies for Chinese humanities research in the contexts of globalization and cosmopolitanism. UA-CI, together with UL-CI, UM-CI, the China-Portugal Lecture Association, and the New Silk Road Association, invited the Chinese economist Li Shi to hold a series of lectures on China's income distribution system and the current situation of China's economic development. All such academic lectures not only enrich Portuguese teachers' and students' understanding of China but also provide good opportunities for Chinese and Portuguese scholars to exchange ideas.

UA-CI, the Municipal Government of Aveiro, and Saint Joanna Museum jointly held a seminar on the history of Chinese and Portuguese Porcelain. The curator of porcelain at the Museum of Portugal, and porcelain expert Alexander served as the keynote speakers. The former introduced the historical development of Kraak porcelain and its various technological characteristics with the lecture "Kraak Porcelain: The Turning Point of China's Porcelain Production." Dr. Alexander's lecture vividly narrated how local people produced porcelain with local characteristics on the basis of Chinese porcelain. The seminar explored the integration of Chinese and Portuguese culture and art in terms of porcelain technology. There were many other outstanding seminars held by UA-CI.

Publication of Academic Works

Main Case: Confucius Institute at University of Aveiro

The compilation *Intercultural Dialogues between Portugal and China*, *Magazine of Alumni* has been completed. The Chinese director finished the program "The Case Study of BRI and Chinese promotion." CI has published *Chinese Grammar Book* (Portuguese version), a best-seller in terms of Chinese learning in Portugal, which fills the gap of a

Chinese grammar book in Portuguese and provides academic support for the promotion of Chinese in PSCs. CI completed the localization development plan of teaching materials by publishing a series of textbooks for primary school students named *Chinese 123*.

Confirmatory Case 1: Confucius Institute at University of Brasilia

With the support of CI Headquarters, the Jingying Group, the first Chinese host institution of UNB-CI, has published a series of Chinese books in Portuguese, including *Children's Chinese*, *Chinese for Travel*, *Chinese Learning Software*, *Oral Chinese*, and others. UNB-CI's Chinese Director has completed a project entitled *An Empirical Research on CI's Collaborative Innovation*.

Confirmatory Case 2: Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University

UEM-CI's Chinese Director co-edited the reading book *Chinese Style* for Chinese-major students at UEM. UEM-CI has completed research on Mozambique's language policy and foreign language teaching situation and prepared guidelines for visitors to Mozambique. This book covers the literature, education, and culture life of Mozambique. The textbooks *Life in Literature* and *Selected Readings of Chinese Historical Classics* have also been published in Mozambique.

Media Publicity

Main Case: Confucius Institute at University of Aveiro

UA-CI has always strategized publicity and spared no efforts in promoting CI's regional influence. First, the Alumni Association Project aims to enhance students' sense of belonging and forms a solid foundation for further promotion of Chinese language and cultural activities. The Alumni Club has 1,250 members who regularly participate in Alumni activities, such as visiting the Oriental Museum in Lisbon, to gain a more multidimensional understanding of Chinese culture. UA-CI publishes an alumni magazine, *Fenix*, to introduce China-related contents. With the support of the local diaspora, Alumni Club members enjoy discount purchases in certain local Chinese shops and restaurants.

UA-CI takes advantage of official social channels such as WeChat, Facebook, and other websites to upload information about Chinese courses and cultural activities, so as to publicize itself widely.Further, it has established close ties with Chinese and foreign media agencies. UA-CI has been reported by local media such as *Aveiro Daily* which enlarges its local influence. Portugal's National Television gave a positive evaluation of the Chinese teaching project of São João da Madeira which laid a foundation for the construction of other teaching sites.[4] Chinese mainstream news agencies such as CCTV, the People's Daily, and Xinhua News Agency have given diversified and comprehensive coverage of UA-CI. However, this study also finds some negative reports about CIs in Portugal, such as a decline in the number of Chinese students. Nonetheless, these partial comments are contrary to the real teaching situation in Portugal we explored.

In Portugal, media agencies of the Chinese diaspora show affinity towards China and present China's national image positively by conveying China's objectively true information to Portuguese people. These media play an important role in promoting China's concept of peaceful development, so their coverage of CIs will be relatively objective and professional to enhance CI's regional influence.

Confirmatory Case 1: Confucius Institute at University of Brasilia

The activities of UNB-CI are normally reported on the official websites of Hanban, the Latin American Center, the Confucius Institute Magazine, among other possible channels.UNB-CI has also built its own publicity platforms, such as its official accounts on WeChat, Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube, on which it vigorously publicizes its Chinese curriculum and cultural activities. UNB-CI was reported by Globo, EBC, and UA to introduce various cultural activities, courses, and HSK examinations. During the BRICS conference in 2019, CCTV reported on UNB-CI comprehensively, which caused widespread influence in and out of China.

Confirmatory Case 2: Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University

UEM-CI has received extensive attention from important Mozambican leaders and

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[4] Available at Crianças de S. João da Madeira (en)cantaram em chinês na inauguração do Instituto Confúcio | Educação | Notícias | Câmara Municipal de São João da Madeira (cm-sjm.pt).

local media. Mozambique National Television, Social Television, frequently reports CI's daily operations and cultural activities. UEM-CI was invited to participate in the program Manhãs Alegres of STV to introduce the status of CI's Chinese major, training classes, and subordinate teaching sites. UEM-CI and Rádio Moçambique have co-produced a radio program called *The Voice of Chinese* to reveal a panoramic China. Each five-minute episode teaches some basic Chinese phrases on weekdays. On Saturdays, the program is a 15-minute live show, and Mozambican students who have visited China more comprehensively introduce Chinese society, economy, education, culture, and visa policy. During the 2018 Confucius Institute Day, UEM-CI performed Taijiquan, Chinese pop music, and traditional music on Mozambique Social Television. Such exposure on local mainstream media brings Chinese arts close to the public and further enhances CI's reputation and influence. Taking the year 2018 as an example, CI published more than 100 news reports in the mainstream media of China and Mozambique. Local well-known Yinguissane Newspapers and Amviro newspapers, for instance, published what Summer Camp students saw and heard in China.

In short, after researching the diplomatic activities implemented by three typical CIs, this study reveals that although CI is restricted to the specific situation of its host country and host university, it always attempts to adopt different cultural diplomacy strategies through education, culture, academics, and media publicity to expand its popularity and influence. More importantly, such activities have contributed significantly to building a better national image of China.

5.5 Questionnaire Investigation

No survey can achieve success without a well-designed questionnaire. In this study, a questionnaire with 10 objective questions has been designed to test the study's specific hypotheses. The questionnaire can be divided into five parts. The first part reveals the personal information of CI students. In the second part, the questions from 1 to 3 are used to test whether CIs in PSCs have fulfilled their core responsibilities in Chinese

teaching, culture promotion, and providing information resources. In the third part, questions 4 to 6 ask to what extent CI's public image exists from the students' perspectives. Then, the author expects to collect information about CI's influence from questions 7 to 9. The fifth part involves CI's role in shaping China's image in PSCs. Administered from October 2019 to January 2020, the questionnaires have been distributed globally to the 15 CIs of PSCs in Latin America, Europe, and Africa. A total of 735 students participated in the survey, from six countries: Brazil, Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and São Tomé e Príncipe. Most of the invalid questionnaires were ones completed by minor students, a demographic lying outside this research.

Basic Information

Table 5.5 Information of the Collected Questionnaires

Continent	Registered Students	Valid Questionnaires	Invalid Questionnaires
Latin America (6 CIs)	4016	244	1
Africa (4 CIs)	3999	232	13
Europe (5 CIs)	4605	238	7
Total (15 CIs)	12620	714	21

Valid respondents are limited to adult students aged 18–75 years old. Accordingly, the survey yielded extensive results from 714 valid questionnaires collected. The number of male and female students is 45% and 55%, respectively. Students' answers provide their perceptions of CIs' performance in PSCs. Using frequent analysis, the attitudes of the respondents regarding each question were explored. Data reveal several findings that are worth studying in detail.

First, the time investment in Chinese learning is demonstrated in a typical pyramid structure. About 66.3% of the students studied Chinese for less than one year, 21.1% for one to three years, and 12.6% for more than three years. The reason lies in the following. On the one hand, the number of students enrolled in Chinese courses is indisputably increasing annually around the world (Cáceres-Lorenzo, 2015). This fact is confirmed by the annual reports of CIs in PSCs. Chinese teaching has developed rapidly in PSCs along with the rise of China. However, on the other hand, Chinese is recognized as one of the

most difficult languages in the world. Chinese as a foreign language naturally differs from Portuguese in words, writing, pronunciation, and grammar. In addition, Latin American culture, European culture, and African culture are far distant from Chinese culture, which makes the spread of Chinese in PSCs more complex. Further, the language ability of students, attitudes towards learning, motivation for learning, and teachers' methodology may also contribute to this situation (Li, 2002). The ideas of a Brazilian Chinese Director shed light on the phenomenon:

> Brazilians have a high enthusiasm for learning Chinese. However, their interest doesn't last long so their mastery of Chinese and understanding of Chinese culture remained at the primary level. Many Brazilian students choose to learn Chinese out of the curiosity for Chinese and Chinese culture, which makes the learning attitude of Brazilian casual. Once they find it difficult to learn Chinese, they will choose to give up.[5]

The same characteristics were found in the field investigation of UA-CI, where each semester two basic Chinese courses has been opened with around 15 registered students in each class, but only 7 or 8 students at most subsequently register for the intermediate Chinese course. The number of registered students in intermediate and senior classes shrinks sharply. According to UA-CI's annual student evaluations, several reasons can be summarized: some students graduated from UA and moved to another city; some were distracted by personal business; some couldn't catch up with the Chinese class, etc. The process of learning Chinese differs substantially from learning to read an alphabetic orthography. This difference has implications for how efficiently or awkwardly the growing number of people around the world who want to learn Chinese can do so (McBride, 2016). Meanwhile, Chinese teachers also keep improving their teaching methodology to adjust to the needs of students. Chinese is rising as a global language, and there are both opportunities and challenges associated with learning it. The survey results imply that China's cultural diplomacy has space to develop in terms of language teaching.

Second, in terms of their educational background, the majority of students are well-educated with good literacy. The percentage of students who have studied in a university

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[5] Confidential telephone conversation with the Brazilian Chinese Director in August 2019.

is up to 70.7%, 79.9%, and 83.2% in Africa, Latin America, and Europe, respectively. The CI network has attracted a lot of attention due to its fast growth and great potential (Lien, 2013). In addition, although Chinese culture is not mainstream in PSCs, the high literacy of the students is conducive to CI's development. The students can become leaders of public opinion on bilateral exchange and information interaction, so their views on CI and China are of great value.

Third, students' age span in the survey varies from 18 to 73, among which 84.2% are young people (18 to 35), 12.3% middle-aged people (36 to 55), and 3.5% old people (above 55). This age structure also presents a pyramid structure, with young people accounting for the absolute majority portion. CI is rooted in the host university and mainly open to university students, along with primary and secondary students in the surrounding cities with compulsory courses and elective courses, and broader communities through public courses. The survey excluded students under 18 who actually constitute a large portion of CI students, such as the 2,500 minors out of 2,750 students in UA-CI and the 1,703 minors out of 2,029 students in UCV-CI. In 2015, the pilot project of Chinese teaching in secondary schools was launched. Then Minister of Education and Science, Nuno Crato, advocated for Chinese language teaching in public secondary schools and said that the Portuguese government would provide policy support to ensure the achievements of bilateral educational co-operation and the overall development of bilateral relations. With such friendly governmental support, Chinese teaching in the universities and public schools is developing smoothly in PSCs. In Brazil, Chinese enjoys popularity among young students. PUC-Rio-CI and Rio State co-operated to open the first Portuguese-Chinese bilingual middle school. Leticia was one of the first students to be accepted: "I signed up Chinese courses because it is a future language and Chinese culture fascinates me." The Director of the school said: "This project provides a valuable opportunity for our students in Rio State, because this opportunity of cultural exchange with other countries will open up a multidisciplinary door for them in the future." In Africa, in 2017, UCV-CI signed a co-operation agreement

with the Ministry of Education on the comprehensive development of Chinese teaching in secondary schools. The trial period of the agreement would be valid for five years, and Chinese courses are offered in 17 secondary schools on Santiago Island and Saint Vincent Island of Cape Verde. Chinese teaching in Cape Verde has entered the national education system. In our field observation, CI students seemed inclined to be more affectionate towards CI after studying in CI. In this way, the younger the students are, the earlier they have the potential to accept CI and love Chinese culture, which in the long term will facilitate China's cultural diplomacy's success.

Fourth, in terms of occupation, 64.4% of respondents are college students. Of the other respondents, 12.89% are company employees, 10.36% are public servants, and 12.32% are from other walks of life. Taking advantage of CI's location in local universities, college students have easier access to CI. CIs actively conduct Chinese teaching and course promotion on campus. University has become CI's major base to develop itself, but this fact also explains the previously mentioned phenomenon that some countries, such as America and Sweden, have been on the alert for the existence of CI on campus. Some Western countries are even on the alert for the spread of Chinese culture generally, regarding it as hegemony (Stambach, 2015). Therefore, when teaching and organizing cultural activities, CI must negotiate the boundary between cultural communication and cultural hegemony (Hong, 2018).

5.6 Survey Results

Having examined the collected questionnaires, the researcher finds that in terms of the 10 propositions the perception of students towards CI has two main characteristics: on the one hand, generally speaking, students studying in CIs of PSCs have a positive perception of CI and its practice. Students' perception of CI aligns with the previous hypothesis, and the values of Agree for the ten propositions vary from 71.9% to 94.8%.[6]

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[6] The value of Agree combines that of Strongly Agree, Totally Agree, and Agree. Similarly, the value of Disagree combines Strongly Disagree, Totally Disagree, and Disagree.

The proposition with the highest recognition rate, 94.8%, is that *the courses of Chinese teaching help students better understand China*. The proposition *CI's experience is conducive to future career* received an Agree rating of 92.3%, with 38.9% of students choosing Totally Agree. Only 71.9% of students from the 15 CIs agree that *the influence of CI in the host country is increasing*. This proportion is the lowest among responses to the ten survey questions. However, this number soars to 88.8% for students from African CIs, much higher than the 63.7% in Latin America and 63.5% in Europe. Further, 91.4% and 90% of students in African CIs agree that the existence of CI has stimulated more students to learn Chinese and know Chinese culture, respectively. This number is much higher than the sum of Agree ratings for CIs in Latin America and Europe. The following section will explore the reasons behind the data and provide answers to the hypotheses using statistical analysis.

Table 5.6 The Evaluation of CI's Functions

Overall Rating	All CIs surveyed (%)		
Agree	85		
Disagree	2.3		
Neither agree nor disagree	12.7		
	15 Cis	**Latin American CIs**	**African CIs**	**European CIs**
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The courses offered by the CI help me better understand China.				
Agree	94.8	96.7	91.5	94.2
Disagree	1.3	0.4	1.7	1.6
Neither agree nor disagree	3.9	2.9	4.7	4.2
The CI provides educational And cultural exchanges between the two countries.				
Agree	82.4	82.1	86.2	72.5
Disagree	2.1	1.6	3	1.6
Neither agree nor disagree	15.5	12.3	10.8	23.6
The various programs of the CI provide good opportunities for me to study and conduct research in China.				
Agree	78	77.5	86.2	70.5
Disagree	3.4	5.3	2.6	2.1
Neither agree nor disagree	18.6	17.2	11.2	27.4

Time invested (% of students choosing Agree)	Less than 1 year	1 to 3 years	Over 3 years
The courses offered by the CI help me better understand China.	94.1	95.7	96.7

Age (% of students choosing Agree)	18–35	36–55	56–75
The various programs of the CI provide good opportunities for me to study and conduct research in China.	79.9	68.2	68

The Evaluation of CI's Functions

At present, CIs and CCs throughout the world take Chinese teaching and other extended projects as their main workload. The domain of CI also includes providing bilateral educational and cultural exchanges and offering various programs scholarships, summer camps, and local teacher training.

As evident from Table 5.6, 94.8% of students agree that CI's courses make them understand China better. The overall recognition value of Latin American students is 96.7%, higher than the 94.1% in Europe and the 93.5% in Africa. Further, 38.1% of Latin American students have chosen Totally Agree. The crossover study reveals that the Agree rating rises along with an increased length of learning. The overall Agree ratings for students who have studied Chinese for 1 year, for 1 to 3 years, and for more than 3 years are, respectively, 94.1%, 95.7%, and 96.7%. This shows that the degree of students' recognition towards CI's courses and teaching gradually rises as the students study longer in CIs.

Such positive data confirm the remarkable achievement of the 15 CIs in PSCs mentioned in the previous literature review. Various courses set up for Chinese students diversify the means of education and cater to different learning needs. Take the UNESP-CI as an example. It has completed 12 years of operation dedicated to the continuous improvement of the quality of Chinese language teaching. The UNESP-CI adopts various measures to enhance quality, such as establishing a teaching reflection system and organizing teaching seminars. In addition, CI puts out teaching reference materials, teaching plans, and curricula. Apart from regular courses, CI develops MOOC courses. Through these measures, teachers reflect constantly on their teaching and thus improve its quality. In Europe, too, the performance of CIs in teaching supports the survey results. At UL-CI, for example, Chinese credit courses are offered to 600 students at its St.

Thomas CC and to students with an Asian Studies Major at UL. For part-time students, there are customized Chinese courses and non-credit courses such as New Practical Chinese Readers, Experiencing Chinese, Tourism Chinese, HSK Fast Track Course, and so on. Among African CIs, UCV-CI has achieved remarkable success in providing local middle schools, several universities, and an SOS village with the courses Basic Chinese, Intermediate Comprehensive Chinese, Intermediate Chinese Listening and Speaking, Intermediate Chinese Reading, Business Chinese, and An Introduction to Chinese Culture. The overall Agree value of the second proposition *The CI provides educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries* reaches 82.4%. The values in Africa and Latin America are 86.1% and 86.2%, respectively, much higher than Europe's 74.8%. Moreover, 36.5% of students in Latin American chose Totally Agree. In the crossover study, the recognition rate of young people is 83.1%, more than that of middle-aged and old people.

Compared with Latin America and Africa, European educational and cultural exchanges with China are more active and diversified in form. Recent exchanges between China and Portugal have blossomed in various fields and provided many opportunities to promote bilateral cultural exchange, so that CI is far from the only channel. For instance, the Macao Science, Technology, and Culture Center under the Ministry of Higher Education of Portugal was established in accordance with the agreement of Macao's return to China. Besides organizing various bilateral co-operation programs, the center displays cultural artifacts representing the Ming and Qing Dynasties in its exhibition hall. Barreto, Director of the Center, said, "the exhibition is to help Portuguese people better understand China and Chinese culture, as well as the history of Portuguese-Chinese exchanges"(The Central People's Government of China, 2009). In addition, there are the Macao Tourism Promotion and Consultation Center, the Macao Economic and Trade Office in Lisbon, as well as various NGOs in Portugal. Lisbon Traditional Chinese Medicine Center has sent people to study at Jiangxi University of Traditional Chinese Medicine in China. Therefore, the relatively low Agree rate in

Portugal makes sense in contrast to that in Latin America and Africa. Such a result suggests to CI organizers that there is space for CIs in PSCs to exert more cultural diplomacy by strengthening co-operation with China-related organizations, so as to enlarge CIs' regional influence.

Let us move on to the third proposition, *The various programs of the CI provide good opportunities for me to study and conduct research in China.* According to the previous literature review, CIs in PSCs are actively engaged in promoting various projects such as summer camps, scholarships, core Chinese teacher plans, visits by the educator delegation to China, and New Sinology Study. However, the Agree rating from students is 78%, which is lower than that for the other nine questions. Notably, in Africa, the Agree percentage soars to 86.2%, obviously higher than the 77.5% in America and 70.6% in Europe. The crossover analysis reveals the Agree rating of young people 18–35 is 79.9%, much higher than that of middle-aged and old people with 68.2% and 68%, respectively. There are three main reasons lying behind these results. First, there are strict standards for the assessment of scholarship applications, summer camps, and training programs. The scholarship application is limited to persons 16–35 years old, and in-service Chinese teachers can be up to 45 years old. Students in summer camps should be 18–30 years old. Applicants also need to register and study for more than 3 months or 40 hours in CI. HSK 3 and HSKK Primary Qualification Certificate are required to apply for a one-year scholarship. However, according to the syllabus of HSK and HSKK, students usually need at least 240 hours or two years of study to pass the exams, so it is not easy to meet the basic qualification. These restrictions sometimes hinder students from applying for programs, especially middle-aged and senior students.

Second, in 2018, there were 492,185 foreign students from 196 countries (regions) studying in 1,004 Chinese universities, including about 75,800 master's and doctoral students (MOE, 2019). Here are the statistics by continent: Asian students account for 59.95%, African students 16.57%, European students 14.96%, American students 7.26%, and Oceania students 1.27%. Even if the numbers show China as Asia's largest

destination for studying, we can see that China isn't on the priority list among European and Latin American students. The 2018 champion of the Chinese Bridge for Secondary School Students in Portugal said in an interview, "Since my childhood, my mother always recommended me to study in the UK until I fell in love with Chinese [and], I decided to study in China" (Francisco, 2019).

Third, CI's scholarships are mainly for Chinese learning, so there are limited majors to choose from. According to the China Scholarship Council, in 2018, Western medicine, engineering, economics, and management are the most popular majors for foreign students to study in China. However, things are quite different in African CIs. The recognition rate of African students toward this third proposition is the highest among the three continents. CIs in African PSCs often co-operate with local Chinese enterprises or the Chinese embassy to provide scholarships and bursaries for students to learn Chinese in CI or study in China. These survey results from the questionnaires conform to the overall statistics of foreign students in China.

Language is the most significant symbol for differentiating an independent country from other countries (Black, 2019). The status of a country's language in the international community can, to a large extent, show the country's international status and influence. Language teaching is CI's main and long-term task, and its success is directly related to the value of its existence. Annual reports of the CIs in PSCs reflect that CIs continually develop their teaching. The registration rate for Chinese courses has been rising steadily, and courses are well-received by students. Although CI's promotion of cultural projects is less successful than its language teaching, based on the survey results, CI still performs the function of cultural diplomacy by stipulating more comprehensive projects to adapt to the students' needs. Survey results confirm the previous literature review that Chinese teaching offered by CIs enables students to know more about China and verify that CI's Chinese teaching is successfully implemented in PSCs.

Table 5.7 CI's Public Image

Overall Rating	All CIs surveyed (%)			
Agree	84.8			
Disagree	2.1			
Neither agree nor disagree	13.1			
	15 CIs	**Latin American CIs**	**African CIs**	**European CIs**
People around me think the CI is a good place to know China and Chinese culture.				
Agree	77.2	75.8	76.7	78.8
Disagree	1.4	1.2	1.7	1.2
Neither agree nor disagree	21.4	23	21.6	19.8
CI provides us with a platform to know about China and Chinese culture.				
Agree	84.9	83.6	86.2	84.9
Disagree	3	3.7	2.4	2.5
Neither agree nor disagree	12.1	12.7	11.2	12.6
The experience in the CI is helpful to my career development.				
Agree	92.3	93.4	93.5	89.9
Disagree	1.9	1.2	1.7	2.5
Neither agree nor disagree	5.8	5.4	4.8	7.6
Age (% of students choosing Agree)	**18–35**	**36–55**		**56–75**
CI provides us with a platform to know about China and Chinese culture.	84.7	84.3		80

The Evaluation of CI's Public Image

Since CI came into being in 2004, it has been regarded as a platform for cultural exchanges between China and foreign countries (Liu, 2017). CI's teaching activities and cultural promotions need to be recognized by the students in order to establish CI's value and reputation. CI's brand building is a classic proposition. CIs in PSCs have created many excellent public products with brand connotation or potential. The curriculum system and various activities provide brand experience for a vast audience. Although CI's original intention was to introduce China in a positive way, people's evaluation of CI's public image may vary. Interestingly, the survey results in this section show approximately consistent feedback from CIs on three different continents.

The proposition that *People around me think the CI is a good place to know China and Chinese culture* has an overall recognition rating of 77.2%. In CIs of Latin America, Africa, and Europe, the recognition rating is approximately 75.8%, 76.7%, and 79%, respectively. In the crossover study, the overall Agree rate of the elderly reaches 88%, significantly higher than that of young and middle-aged people. The survey results indicate that CI has space to exert its full potential in getting students' friends and family involved in CI's various activities and teaching by developing innovative projects, such as the Alumni Association projects launched by UA-CI, which regularly carry out Alumni activities and release Alumni e-magazines.

As to the proposition that *CI provides us with a platform to know about China and Chinese culture*, the overall Agree value for all investigated CIs is 84.9%. The percentages in the three continents are basically the same, and that of the African CIs is slightly higher at 86.2%. The crossover study shows that people under 35 have a more positive attitude towards this proposition, with a rate of 84.7%, in contrast to people aged 55–75 with 80%. Generally, according to students, CI has been well-received as an authoritative platform to know China and Chinese culture. CI's reputation formation relies not only on excellent Chinese teaching but also on efficient and flexible market publicity to create a wide and deep social impact and attract more Chinese learners. Further, teachers are CI's most direct representatives when CI is identified as a platform for people to conceive the Chinese state (Hubbert, 2019). In the process of shaping CI's public image, every Chinese teacher is an influential embodiment of its public image when realizing CI's cultural diplomacy function. Students and activity participants believe that CI's teachers are a good demonstration of China and its culture (Lu, 2015). Every Chinese teacher can act as a Chinese cultural ambassador. As key players in global education, teachers commit to the mission of disseminating Chinese language and culture overseas.

The overall rating of the 15 CIs for the proposition that *CI's experience is helpful to my future career* is 92.3%, the second-highest percentage among all the propositions. The

ratings in Latin America and Africa are close to each other, with numbers of 93.4% and 94.5% respectively, while the rating from students in Europe is lower than 90%. A student of UNB-CI told the author that he started a clothing business with friends. He hoped that his clothing brand would enter the Chinese market, so he decided to study Chinese. He is not an exceptional case, for many students study Chinese as a means to a better job. Learning Chinese, then, is not only a matter of interest but also a skill of practical advancement. In Africa, take UAN-CI as an example. The average age of the population in Angola is 20.6 years old. Improving personal ability is a strong motivation for young people to learn Chinese. CI is established with the participation of Chinese enterprise CITIC (African Region), so the company has brought a stable supply of students, including its customers, foreign employees, and technical support personnel, and provided opportunities for their career development. CITIC has also established a public vocational and technical school. Every year, the host university and CI jointly hold a job fair to provide Chinese-funded enterprises and local enterprises with students who speak Chinese and understand Chinese culture. Using the platform of CI, Chinese enterprises have obtained many local high-end talents to accelerate the process of localization. Chinese learners in Africa have realized the great opportunities that learning Chinese can bring. They spend a lot of time and energy learning Chinese to change their own destiny.

China's achievements in the past few decades have attracted worldwide attention and increased co-operation with the rest of the world. More and more Chinese enterprises enter the huge markets of PSCs and provide many local employment opportunities, which also inspires enthusiasm to learn Chinese. CI can enhance its public image by cultivating more sinologists and helping more students find ideal jobs.

Table 5.8 CI's Influence

Overall Rating	All CIs surveyed (%)			
Agree	81.5			
Disagree	1.2			
Neither agree nor disagree	17.8			
	15 CIs	**Latin American CIs**	**African CIs**	**European CIs**
Because of CI, more and more people are learning Chinese.				
Agree	85.8	85.2	91.4	81.1
Disagree	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.6
Neither agree nor disagree	13.1	13.9	7.7	17.3
Because of CI, more and more people around here know about Chinese culture.				
Agree	87.2	83.7	90.1	87.9
Disagree	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.6
Neither agree nor disagree	11.6	15.1	9	10.5
CI's influence is growing in my country.				
Agree	71.9	63.7	88.8	63.4
Disagree	1.3	0.8	1.3	2.1
Neither agree nor disagree	26.6	35.5	9.9	34.5
Time invested (% of students choosing Agree)	**Less than 1 year**	**1 to 3 years**	**Over 3 years**	
Because of CI, more and more people around here know about Chinese culture.	86.9	86.8	90	
Age (% of students choosing Agree)	**18–35**	**36–55**	**56–75**	
CI's influence is growing in my country.	72.9	68.2	60	

The Evaluation of CI's Influence

Whether on the macro level of politics, economy, culture, and education or on the micro level of countries, regions, groups, and individuals, CI's social role is characterized by different actors. This section aims to unveil CI's influence in the host countries and determine whether it arouses positive impact on local communities and residents. CI's influence is an important component of China's national cultural influence. The simple average of data for the three propositions is 81.5%, the lowest when compared with students' evaluation towards CI's functions and public image.

The overall Agree rating for the proposition that *Because of CI, more and more people are learning Chinese* is 85.8%, with 91.4% in Africa, 85.2 % in Latin America

and 81.1% in Europe. As a symbol of soft power, language strength is positively related to the country's comprehensive strength. The rising boom of learning Chinese in PSCs depends on the strategies of Chinese language promotion organizations. According to the annual reports of CIs in PSCs, the registration rate for Chinese courses has been rising. The status of a country's language in the international community can reflect the country's international status and influence. The survey results show the value of CIs has been more appreciated in African PSCs.

As for the proposition that *Because of CI, more and more people around here know about Chinese culture*, the overall recognition rate is 87.3%, with 90.1% in Africa, 83.7% in Latin America, and 87.8% in Europe. CIs in Africa again achieved more positive feedback. In the crossover study, the rate is 90% for students who studied Chinese for more than three years. This indicates that the recognition rating increases along with more time spent learning, verifying CI's role in disseminating Chinese culture.

The overall Agree rating for the proposition that *CI's influence is growing in my country* is 71.8%, and this percentage is the lowest compared with that for the other nine questions. In contrast to 63.4% and 63.7% Agree ratings in Europe and Latin America, respectively, the percentage reaches 88.8% in Africa. In the crossover study, the recognition rate of young people is 72.9%, higher than that of middle-aged people with 68.2% and old people with 60%. This is a good sign for CI's future development.

Chinese culture and the culture of PSCs do not have any geographical connections, so there is no geographical advantage in their co-operation. For example, among PSCs, Brazil is the largest and the furthest country from China. Only a few cultural activities held by CI cannot root themselves deeply in local people's hearts. To improve its popularity and influence, CI needs the help of public media. After all, people who can be influenced by the oral transmission of Chinese teachers are few.

Nevertheless, the existence of CI is still conducive to enlarging China's influence in the local societies. Chinese education of CIs in PSCs has been integrated into the local education system. CIs have profound co-operation with local governments and social

service departments in teaching and organizing cultural activities. In addition to increasing the number of courses, great importance is attached to the quality of the cultural activities. As has been illustrated, CI organizes cultural activities throughout the year, and many signature projects have been reported positively by local media. From the southern state Rio Grande do Sul to the northern Amazon region, in 2019, 11 CIs and 6 CCs in Brazil had nearly 30,000 registered students. Brazilian students have improved their acquaintance with Chinese people by learning Chinese in CIs. Among the six Brazilian CIs in this survey, UNESP-CI has long been committed to serving universities and their communities by offering various short-term free or low-cost Chinese language courses. It has set up 16 teaching sites in Sao Paulo State and Maranhão State, with an annual enrollment of around 1,500 registered students and a cumulative enrollment of 13,000 students over last 12 years. To expand its scale of teaching, UNESP-CI actively sought partners by contacting different social organizations and enterprises and setting up new teaching sites each year. As one of the Global Pilot Cultural CIs, UNESP-CI held many cultural events of high quality to build up more cultural events with brand effect, such as the Sao Paulo Chinese Lantern Festival and Su Yang Rock Concert, the Sao Paulo Annual Chinese Movie Festival, and so on, attracting more than 80,000 participants in 2019. At the 2019 and 2020 Carnival Festivals, UNESP-CI participated in the China-themed Carnival show, which aroused great enthusiasm from the audience and from the viewers who watched the broadcast (Xinhua Agency, 2020). In UNB-CI, the number of officially registered students is 644, and the number increased by 32% in 2019. In 2018, the Brazilian-Chinese Bilingual High School of PUC-Rio-CI ranked second in Rio state in the evaluation of the Ministry of Education of Brazil, so that enrollment in the school is now quite competitive.

The number of students in Portugal is increasing annually. In April 2019, President Marcelo and President Xi Jinping jointly signed an agreement on bilateral co-operation to launch more Chinese language teaching and cultural activities in local schools and communities, for students in humanities and social sciences courses and for students in

vocational and technical courses. In 2019, UM-CI opened 93 classes with 1,838 students, UL-CI classes with 990 students, UA-CI classes with 2,750 students, UC-CI classes with 234 students, and UP-CI classes with 72 students.

With the rapid development of China's economy and many Chinese-funded institutions entering the African market, more and more Africans have begun to learn Chinese language and culture (Hartig, 2015). CIs have played a quasi-embassy role in some ways, and many African universities have pushed the existing policy "Look East" deeper with the help of CIs, which typically have great scale and influence in Africa (Li, 2021). In 2017, there were 150,000 registered students in Africa, nearly 2,500 cultural and academic activities, and more than 800,000 participants in CIs (Ma, 2018). CI's promotion in African PSCs has resulted in outstanding achievements. Chinese has been included in the national education systems in African PSCs. Both UCV and UEM have set up native Chinese major courses. UCV-CI was unveiled in 2015, and the number of registered students rose to 2,029 in 2018. As of 2019, the number of students in UEM-CI is about 2,000. At the opening ceremony of the Joint Conference of African CIs, the Minister of Science, Technology, Higher Education, and Vocational Education of Mozambique praised UEM-CI as an important institution for Chinese language education and cultural communication in the world. The Joint Conference of CIs in Africa is an important milestone of educational, cultural, and social exchanges between China and African countries, marking an important stage of friendly co-operation between China and Africa.[7] The governments of African PSCs generally support CI's work and actively attend CI's activities. For example, Jorge Bom Jesus, President of São Tomé e Príncipe, unveiled USTP-CI in person, which was widely reported by media. In Africa, many Chinese-funded enterprises actively participate in CIs' construction and offer great help in the development of CIs. With their support, cultural communication and co-operation between CIs and local governments are implemented closely, which greatly helps CIs to enlarge their nationwide influence.

[7] Citation from CICRM of 2018.

Table 5.9 CI's Role in Shaping China's Image

	15 Cis	Latin American CIs	African CIs	European CIs
CI plays a greater role in better shaping China's national image.				
Agree	88.2	88.2	94.9	81.9
Disagree	1.1	0.8	0.8	1.6
Neither agree nor disagree	10.7	11	4.3	16.5
Rating of CIs-PSCs in Africa	**UNA-CI**	**UCV-CI**	**UEM-CI**	**USTP-CI**
Agree	100	96.2	95.3	91.3
Disagree	0	1.3	0	1.4
Neither agree nor disagree	0	2.5	4.7	7.3
Age (% of students choosing Agree)	**18–35**	**36–55**		**56–75**
	88.7	87.5		80

CI's Role in Shaping China's Image

The purpose of the fifth part of the questionnaire is to sort out the factual materials related to the proposal of the thesis and make final speculation about how China's efforts in building its national image through CIs are perceived in PSCs.

As the answer to the first hypothesis, the survey results show that CIs in PSCs have obtained good social feedback and played a positive role in shaping the image of China. On the one hand, among the 714 valid questionnaires, 88.2% of CI students chose to confirm the role of CI in better shaping China's image. On the other hand, according to the different continents where CIs are located, the data present different characteristics. The overall Agree rating is 94.8% in Africa, 88.1% in Latin America, and 81.9% in Europe. CIs in African PSCs have much more Agree value. CIs in Portugal have the lowest value. More specifically, the proportion of African students who chose Totally Agree is as high as 35.8%. In contrast, the corresponding percentage of Totally Agree is 27.9% in Latin America and 19.7% in Europe. When focusing on CIs in African PSCs, we find that the overall Agree rating in Angola is 100%, and the value goes to 96.2%, 95.3%, and 91.3% in Cape Verde, Mozambique, and São Tomé e Príncipe, respectively. Such astonishing data fully demonstrate that CIs in PSCs have given full play to the role of cultural diplomacy in their respective fields and contributed to the promotion of

China's image.

Age also plays a role in how people view China. Through the crossover research, it has been found that younger people are significantly more likely than older people to look favorably upon the role of CI in shaping China's image. Young students show better alignment with CIs than do middle-aged and senior students. The Agree value of young students is 88.7%, while that of middle-aged people is 87.5%, and that of seniors 80%. This trend bodes well for the future development of CI because China's greatest global asset in the future may be its appeal among young adults. Further, our field investigation found that the young students of CI have diversified accesses to information (teachers, teaching materials, Internet, television, radio, newspapers), especially the wide use of social media such as YouTube, TikTok, and Facebook in the international community. This diversification of access to information makes young people's awareness of China's national image more comprehensive and in-depth than for the other age groups. Also, for young students, learning Chinese rewards them with greater potential for scholarships and job opportunities.

The survey proves that CIs in PSCs have a positive perception in building China's national image, and it also conforms to the previous literature review and case study concerning the CIs in PSCs. The questionnaire data can be analyzed from two perspectives. On the one hand, CI's internal construction and development have contributed to China's image building, including the increase of students, the booming cultural and academic activities, and the various highlights of each CI. Since the first CI in a PSC was established in 2005, CI's construction has made positive achievements in training many language talents and enhancing bilateral mutual understanding. On the other hand, the external environments of the CIs in PSCs also help CI effectively complete its cultural diplomacy function.

First, steady bilateral relations between China and PSCs provide a good environment for CI's development. In 2019, global economic and trade growth fell to its lowest level in a decade due to Sino-U.S. trade disputes, geopolitics, Brexit, and other factors (Shang

& Ding, 2020). However, China has continued its steady development trend and maintained active co-operation with PSCs. Macao celebrated the 20th anniversary of its return to China. China and Brazil, China and Portugal, and China and Guinea-Bissau celebrated their 45th, 40th, and 45th anniversary, respectively, of establishing diplomatic relations. China and PSCs speak highly of each other on multilateral political platforms and conduct high-level visits (Ding & Shang, 2020). Meanwhile, the construction of Macao as a platform to link mainland China and PSCs has gradually become a system, so that bilateral co-operations have been continuously strengthened.

Second, since the BRI was put forward in 2013, China has signed co-operation documents to jointly build BRI with 144 countries, including Portugal, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and East Timor. PSCs and China have a solid foundation and broad space for co-operation. Portugal joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as one of its founders. Portugal is also the first Southern European country to sign BRI co-operation documents and the first Eurozone country to issue RMB bonds. Since Portugal increased efforts to promote enterprise privatization, Chinese enterprises have actively participated in Portuguese investment. For example, China Three Gorges Group has acquired 23.3% of the equity of Portuguese Power Company, becoming the largest acquiring shareholder. Total import and export volume between China and Portugal in 2019 was US $6.643 billion, a year-on-year increase of 10.43%. Brazil and China are both important members of the BRICs countries and the largest developing countries in the northern and southern hemispheres, respectively. In March 2015, Brazil became a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China is Brazil's largest trading partner and largest export destination. From 2013 to March 2019, China's cumulative investment in Brazil exceeded US $71.3 billion, becoming Brazil's largest source of investment. Currently, there are more than 200 Chinese enterprises in Brazil, covering energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, finance, and other fields. As for African PSCs, China and Mozambique are the most closely linked. In 2017, China replaced the UAE and South Africa as its largest source of foreign investment. As

Angola's largest exporter and importer, bilateral trade ranks second among all PSCs, second only to Brazil. China and Cape Verde signed BRI Memoranda of Understanding, and Macao has invested a tourism project with US $250 million, equivalent to about 15% of Cape Verde's GDP. São Tomé e Príncipe has become an outbound tourist destination for Chinese groups and welcomes co-operation with China in the context of BRI. China majors in intensive industries of labor, capital, and technology, while the export content of PSCs is highly complementary to China's intensive products (Gu, 2020). The total value of import and export trade between China and PSCs was US $149.639 billion. The value has grown four years in a row and accounts for 3.27% of China's foreign trade. Against the backdrop of a decline in global foreign direct investment, China's direct investment in PSCs has increased moderately (Ding & Shang, 2020).

Third, bilateral co-operation in the humanities has been deepened through diversified cultural activities. Up to 2019, there are about 50 universities setting up Portuguese majors in China, and most of the universities have developed bilateral co-operation with the universities of PSCs, so that frequent interactions have also triggered Chinese language promotion. Portugal has included Chinese in the college entrance exam as an optional foreign language. University of Leiria, University of Lisbon, and University of Minho have all cultivated Chinese major students. Brazil has set up two Brazilian-Chinese bilingual public schools, thus creating a precedent in its educational system. UEM has established a Chinese major, and Chinese was officially incorporated into the national higher education system of Mozambique. In Angola's vocational training school, Chinese is used as the tool to learn skills. Cape Verde launched its Chinese major program at the University of Cape Verde in 2020. China and PSCs have increasingly closer exchanges, and areas of co-operation have been expanding. CI is used as the carrier to promote the training of bilingual talents, scientific research co-operation, and the construction of think tanks. Hence, as expounded in Chapter, the CI project aligns with China's overall development structure, and CI has achieved fruitful results predicated on steady and smooth bilateral relations. Although CI's performance overall

has received satisfactory feedback, the data from different CIs on the three continents have displayed apparent variances. We will next explore the underlying reasons for these variances.

Today, China with its great historical legacy confronts the West with its modernity. As long as China's political system maintains values different from those of its Western counterparts, China will fail to establish its political identity according to the framework of hegemony and ideology constructed by Gramsci. According to Gramsci (1971), the hegemonic side resists any new forces that could challenge its status. When CI snowballed in its early stages, some Western countries misconstrued the mission of CI and then employed their power to disseminate alternate interpretations of CI as the truth (Liu, 2007). Moreover, both the geographical and cultural distances between China and PSCs can expand the gap between first-hand knowledge and third-hand stories. Among all the actors on this cultural diplomacy terrain, the media play a critical role in shaping people's perceptions. Clifford and Marcus (1986) have explained that media reports always involve a relation of power and knowledge. The world's media systems controlled by the West have strong impact on their audiences (Schiller, 1992; Tunstall, 1977). Media play a role in shaping the general public's perception of China, so that the different media environments in Africa, Latin America, and Europe help justify the different survey results for the CIs. When the hegemonic side has determined that China's rise is at their cost (Nye, 2005), it is almost impossible for the cultural pluralism and harmony practiced by CI to be easily accepted. Only when CI shows its attitude to offer cultural interaction as a plus-sum game can CI then trigger an equal dialogue (Liu, 2017). This explains why the questionnaires show a higher Disagree rating from the CIs in Europe. The shutdown of all the CIs in Sweden can also help illustrate that cultural diplomacy has never been apolitical (Belanger, 1999). Goethe Institutes along with Alliance Franchises and Cervantes Institutes are considered harmless, while CI which shares the same political values and mission was interpreted as a threat. However, the case is different in the developing countries on which China's political, economic, and

security support has increasing impact. Africa and Latin America are the continents dominated by developing countries, whose cultures are not usually dominant ones, so they are much friendlier to Chinese culture. They normally think highly of China's modernization process and modern culture because they are facing the same task of opposing cultural imperialism and colonialism that Chinese culture does (Liu, 2017). Therefore, the advantages of the CI project in terms of cultural diplomacy stand out most prominently in developing countries, especially in Asia and Africa.

At the cultural level, cultural dimensions are the shared assumptions that vary from culture to culture. People who grow up in the same place will share similar opinions about what is proper in daily communication (Hofstede, 2009). According to Hofstede's six dimensions of culture, the scores of China and the PSCs surveyed in the study illustrate that the countries belong to a hierarchical society, where less powerful members of organizations and institutions can accept that power is distributed unequally. Notably, due to its score (27), Portugal is the only collectivist culture (except for Spain) among European countries. China (20) is definitely considered a collectivist society, where everyone is integrated into strong and cohesive groups, as are Angola (18), Cape Verde (20), Mozambique (15), São Tomé and Príncipe (37), and Brazil (38). For the rest of Hofstede's four dimensions, China scores either maximum or minimum.

In the dimension of Long-Term Orientation, China scores 87, which remarkably outscores Mozambique (11), Cape Verde (12), Angola (15), Portugal (28), and São Tomé and Príncipe (32). Countries with low scores demonstrate great respect for traditions and normative thought. Brazil (44) scores as intermediate. In contrast, people with long-term orientation adapt traditions easily to changed conditions, having a strong propensity to save, invest, and respect thriftiness. It is not surprising that China has a high score here because this dimension was derived from Chinese values and helps explain why China's economy has achieved such rapid growth (Ogden & Cheng, 2011).

China (66) is the only Masculine society which implies that competition, achievement, and success are the driving forces of society. The need to ensure success

can be exemplified by the fact that many Chinese teachers of CI will sacrifice family and leisure priorities to work abroad. Portugal's low score (31), together with Angola (20), Cape Verde (15), Mozambique (38), and São Tomé and Príncipe (24), characterizes it as a Feminine society, where people believe that excessive competitiveness is not appreciated. Instead, people value equality, solidarity, and quality in their working lives. Brazil (49) has a very intermediate score, and in such a country conflicts are resolved by compromise and negotiation.

As for Uncertainty of Avoidance, China and Portugal almost inhabit opposite poles, scoring (30) and (99), respectively. China's low score indicates Chinese tend to feel comfortable with different things and ambiguity, as the Chinese language is full of ambiguous meanings that can be difficult for Western people to follow. With a score of (99), Portugal can be defined precisely by this dimension, wanting to avoid uncertainty. Brazil scores high (76), so does Angola (60), and São Tomé and Príncipe (70). In high Uncertainty Avoidance societies, unorthodox behavior and ideas are not welcome. Cape Verde (40) and Mozambique (44) have very pragmatic cultures. People prefer new ideas, innovative products, and a willingness to try something new or different.

China (24) scored the lowest in the dimension of indulgence. Portugal (33) and São Tomé and Príncipe (44) also show a preference for a culture of restraint. In contrast to indulgent societies, restrained societies do not much emphasize leisure time and control the gratification of their desires according to social norms. The high scores of Brazil (59), Angola (83), Cape Verde (83), and Mozambique (80) attest to their being indulgent societies where people want to fulfill their impulses and desires for enjoying life. In addition, they place a higher degree of importance on leisure time, act as they please, and spend money as they wish.

Moreover, although developed countries such as Portugal have much closer communication with China, the influence of Chinese culture is less likely to attract the same attention it does in developing countries such as the African PSCs. Further, as an EU country, Portugal is not only restricted by the EU system but also more vulnerable to

influence from other European countries (Ma & Zhang, 2019). According to the Pew Research Center survey on China's image in 2013, the recognition rate of China's image in Europe was far lower than in Africa and Latin America. Cultural exchanges are an important component of the co-operation between China and PSCs. However, there is inequality in the extent of cultural exchanges between China and different PSCs. There are more cultural exchanges with Portugal and Brazil but much fewer with Asian and African PSCs. Therefore, CI's language promotion and cultural activities are the main forms of cultural exchange and have greater influence in African CIs in this survey.

China hopes that the Chinese language teaching and cultural activities conducted by the CIs create a positive narrative for China and thereby increase understanding of and sympathy for its positions and goals in global politics (Huang, 2021). Generally, optimism abounds in the CIs because China continues to spur world economic growth, and people learning about China and its language have been rewarded. As an important global player, China together with the government departments, cultural institutions, and NGOs of the host countries aims to makes full use of CI's resources in creating more cultural brand activities.

As the world changes, China's image and CI's role change accordingly. The moment in time captured in this study was just before the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic. It does not cover any changes brought to China's image occasioned by the epidemic. In the next phase of research, we will further explore how CI can carry out cultural diplomacy in an innovative way in the face of COVID-19.

Conclusion

The fundamental way to face various global challenges lies in the pursuit of peace and development, the two major themes of the times (Zhan & Xiong, 2016). Only when different civilizations coexist harmoniously can mutual cultural communication and exchange become a means to world peace. Therefore, sovereign countries must aim to achieve specific political purposes or strategic intentions via the means of cultural diplomacy. China is no exception and aims to create a positive public opinion of itself and cultivate a positive national image (Ding & Saunders, 2006). Since increasing Chinese national power is the foundation for improvement of its national image, China as an emerging power has heightened the magnitude of its cultural diplomacy in the process of globalization (Liu, 2019). China's goal to build a harmonious world allows China to exercise soft power using diplomatic tools such as the CI project. However, the rocketing growth of CIs leads to people's ignorance and misperception about CIs' real influence. This thesis offers a theoretical discussion of how the CI project is actually implemented as a tool of cultural diplomacy. By means of the literature review, case studies, and questionnaire research, the thesis has concluded that in the context of PSCs the Chinese state has exercised soft power by taking advantage of CIs to improve the perception of CI-related people towards China's national image. To our knowledge, this is the first study to scrutinize CI's role in shaping China's national image in PSCs in such a fine-grained way. Its findings can fill some knowledge gaps and shed light on China's cultural diplomacy's future development. Notably, CI has less radioactive influence in PSCs, but as the saying goes in China, "A single spark can start a prairie fire." Compared with the longer histories of the Goethe Institute and Alliance Française, CI needs more time to ripen and develop as a tool to achieve the success of cultural diplomacy.

i. Conceptions

Interaction between China and the world has never stopped. In particular, BRI has opened a new direction for international exchanges and co-operation (Ferdinand, 2016).

After BRI launched in 2013, CIs have mushroomed along BRI routes (Deng, 2016). Indeed, CI's development abroad is closely related to China's realistic policies. After the phase of rapid growth, CI has focused on efficiency and quality improvement. Based on the survey results, some detailed measures are proposed below for CIs to better practice cultural diplomacy and expand the influence of Chinese culture.

Geographical Distribution

The promotion of Chinese language and culture should be in accordance with the national interests and regional characteristics of the recipient country. As of June 2020, CI is widely distributed in 162 countries and regions, with more CIs in Europe and America and fewer in the Asian-Pacific region. There are more in developed countries and fewer in developing countries. The resource allocation of CIs reflects China's strategy of prioritizing developed countries and investing less in developing countries. According to the survey results, if China instead points its resource allocation to those countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, CI will produce a more significant impact on the spread of Chinese language and culture. Although China claims that its relationships with developing countries are the cornerstone of China's diplomatic pattern (Qi & Dauvergne, 2022; Tull, 2006), CI's global layout does not seem to embody this claim.

Cultural Promotion

What cultural content and products can CI export to the outside world? The answer to this question has always been the core proposition that determines CI's future. World civilization can be roughly divided into eight forms: Western Christian civilization, Confucian civilization, Islamic civilization, Hindu civilization, Orthodox civilization, Japanese civilization, Latin American civilization, and African civilization (Huntington, 1997). In cultural promotion, CI ought to pay attention to the civilization form and cultural sensitivity of the target country. Only by formulating tailored promotion strategies for each county can CI achieve harmonious communication and cultural integration. The surveys show that PSCs have adopted a welcoming attitude towards CI.

However, the development of CI never goes so smoothly globally. Therefore, prior to the establishment of any CI, the local demand for Chinese language and culture needs to be evaluated carefully. CI can neither blindly cater to the needs of learners nor ignore their reasonable needs. For instance, resource support for CIs in developed countries ought to focus on nonfinancial support such as academic exchange, media publicity, and sinology development. Merging Chinese culture with the local culture is the best way to make cultural policy more acceptable to a target country. The promotion of traditional Chinese culture has certain popularity and affinity but often lacks lasting appeal to local people. CI can rather deliver to the world a contemporary image of China. However, cultural activities held by CI mainly center around folk culture. China's contemporary culture, including political, economic, and social life, people's living conditions, values, etc., can be equally emphasized to construct a three-dimensional and comprehensive contemporary national image.

Cultural exchange never misses interaction and dialogue. The Goethe Institute in China once held a three-year Germany and China program called The Urbanization Process of Sustainable Development to enhance mutual understanding and long-term co-operation. The activity fully displayed a positive, innovative, and future-oriented national image of Germany. More importantly, during such a length of time as three years, almost no single project is implemented by one side. For example, the famous German satirical comedy *Lionher and Lena* debuted in China and its troupe and director all came from China. In contrast, CI Headquarters often co-organizes Art Tours with CIs or local institutions, and the latter should be responsible for the venue and publicity, for without this the activities cannot be regarded as real dialogue and interaction. Unilateral promotion of one's culture to the outside world cannot expect and will not yield ideal results, since the basic characteristic of cultural diplomacy is bi-directionality, not one-sided cultural output. The cultural identity of both sides should be given priority in the process of interaction.

Teaching Quality Construction

China-sent teachers of Chinese majors leads to a dilemma: Although Chinese teachers are well qualified, some of them don't understand the local language and cultural differences, which often renders them unable to meet the practical needs of their students. CI's courses are inclined to take an evasive attitude towards ideological issues, or they only involve superficial cultural elements such as ancient cultural knowledge, customs, and festivals, instead of deeper cultural elements such as socialist ideology (Golden, 2011). The presence of overwhelming ideology and politics in language teaching is absurd, but their absence is not desirable, either. Learners need to know what perspective Chinese people have of their own country, the international community, and international affairs (Hughes, 2014). Therefore, teaching staff should be familiar with China's national conditions and political society.

International Chinese teaching can initiate international bilingual schools such as the one in Brazil co-operated by the local education department of PUC-Rio-CI. In 2019, the Ministry of Education piloted the construction of China's overseas international schools in Rio to extend compulsory education for overseas Chinese citizens. This was the first full-time school abroad adopting the Chinese syllabus in primary education. China can make full use of CI with the top-level design of overseas Chinese international schools, especially focusing on the development of Chinese teaching in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

CI's Library Cultural Diplomacy

Books are weapons of thought that strike the minds of readers and are a very durable means of publicity (Osgood, 2011). A library is a carrier of information resources, including all kinds of paper documents and digital information resources (Chen, 2020). The purpose of setting up libraries in CI is to let students understand China's history and contemporary politics, economy, and culture. According to the regulations of CI Headquarters, the book donation amount of newly built CIs shall not exceed 150,000 yuan. For CIs that have operated for up to and including five years, the annual book donation amount is 40,000 yuan. Principally speaking, the CI library has promoted

Chinese teaching and the dissemination of Chinese culture, but in practice there is greater untapped potential for CI libraries through holding more book exhibitions, taking action to facilitate the circulation of books, setting up reading clubs, and translating the books into local languages. The launch of the "CI Digital Library" project in 2013 is another channel for CI to further practice cultural diplomacy, and the library has nearly 200,000 kinds of digital resources such as e-books, newspapers, periodicals, and video materials. Since books can display national culture and ideology (Maack, 2001), CIs' libraries can not only help readers have a comprehensive and deep understanding of China but also help to shape a more objective and accurate image of China.

HSK Promotion

China's national standardized test, HSK, is designed to assess non-native speakers' Chinese language proficiency, and it has developed into an influential international proficiency test to spread Chinese language (Teng, 2017). It has been widely used in and outside China to meet the demands of examinees and their societies. Chinese has become a very important trade language for the Belt and Road countries in particular (Liu, 2017). HSK has greatly improved Chinese culture's international influence, especially in Asia because many Asian economies belong to the "Chinese Cultural Circle" (Xie, 2018). However, as indicated through interviews with CIs' Directors in PSCs, the promotion of HSK has not been fully valued. The British Council enhances England's soft power through the export of British English language examinations and expertise in language testing (Weir & O'Sullivan, 2017). China could refer to the modes of IELTS or TOEFL, focusing on promoting China's own educational products and giving full play to the educational training and qualification examination system. Further enhancing the international influence of HSK would help China to find a new source of export growth. These educational products win not only economic benefits but also cultural influence. CI ought to emphasize HSK as a tool to enhance China's soft power and pursue profitability. Meanwhile, combining testing and teaching, CIs could also establish the framework for HSK Standard Courses.

CI's rapid spread has received attention from both critics and admirers. The former think that it is improper for organizations funded by the Chinese government to operate on campuses. The latter applaud that the CIs have contributed to people-to-people exchanges and cross-cultural understandings all over the world (Hughes, 2014). Despite these ups and downs, CI's construction and development have gained positive results, especially in PSCs. The CI project proves China's educational efforts to be ground-breaking and innovative. John Thornton, President of the Brookings Institution, asserted that if CI persists for another 30 years, the world will change greatly (Bader, 2018). During the past 17 years, through the co-operation between Chinese partner and international host institutions, as well as the devotion of many supporters, CIs have delivered fruitful educational accomplishments by providing high-quality and face-to-face teaching services to Chinese language learners. These accomplishments have helped to overcome the barriers erected by unbalanced media influence.[8] But just like Paradise (2009) once commented, only time will tell whether CIs can help China gain the desired understanding and sympathy and usher in a more friendly public perception. CI acts as a crucial part in China's cultural diplomacy, but it will take China and CI a long time to determine the best operation mode.

To conclude, although China has acknowledged the importance of culture for national soft power and exerted intensified efforts to project soft power, China needs to update its practical model in the international context. If China uses soft power only to pursue its national interests, rather than to provide public goods and shared values, it will encounter further obstacles and not reach its goals.

ii. Road Ahead

Nye (2006) thought that the rise of China's soft power is at the cost of the decline of the United States' soft power. Kurlantzick (2007) agreed that China has indeed benefited from the decline of U.S. soft power but the latter can improve its own soft power rather

[8] Citation from the letter of CI Headquarters to the President of UA.

than weakening China's influence. Brzezinski (2014) argued that China may become a global country economically and militarily but not a comprehensive global country due to its lack of cultural influence. Although China's soft power cannot be underestimated, it has much room to develop. In the 21st century, China's global strategic awareness is awakening, and its overall blueprint is to spur governments and policymakers at all levels to envision how to make cultural diplomacy function well. The internal driving force to achieve the success of cultural diplomacy is to enhance affinity and attraction (Nye, 2013). Hence, China needs to show the world the real China, including its development mode, lifestyle, and cultural values, while strengthening both its hard power and domestic soft power. If China aims to be recognized, innovation in its cultural diplomacy cannot cease.

Innovation of Cultural Connotations

China can derive the essence of its traditional culture and promote a culture with its own characteristics. China possesses rich, regional folk cultures and different nationalities with their own unique cultures, providing support for the development of soft power. China's five-thousand-year civilization is not limited to Confucian culture and other ideological schools. The rich connotations of its cultural system deserve more attention. According to the 2018 National Image Report, traditional Chinese medicine, Chinese food, and martial arts are regarded as the most representative symbols of Chinese culture (CCWRI, 2019). Compared with America, China has few prominent global cultural brands. Besides CI, China can coordinate various forces to diversify the executive agencies of cultural diplomacy. For example, Buddhism Institutes and Lao Zi Institutes could also be set up in due time. Since China possesses the largest number of Intangible Cultural Heritages in the world, China can incorporate the concept of heritage protection into its cultural diplomacy to display the rich diversity of Chinese culture beyond stereotyped cultural forms. Today, China has initiated civilization rejuvenation based on traditional Chinese civilization as well as absorbing the essence of other

civilizations. Instead of being the opposite of Western civilization, such a civilization appears as its complementary force with historical attributes.

In Western democracies with strong participation cultures, it becomes increasingly controversial to host global games (Xin & Kunzmann, 2020). However, China has actively exploited sport mega-events as a vehicle for its foreign policy (Price & Dayan, 2009). The 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games offered an opportunity to demonstrate China's potential to develop into a major economy (Cornelissen, 2010). Despite facing a diplomatic boycott over its human rights violations, Beijing became the only city in Olympic history to host both the Summer and Winter Olympics. Although the latter is sometimes seen as a luxurious event for the rich and powerful, the Chinese Government aims to polish its international reputation as a powerful actor in the global capitalist order (Lee, 2021). Since the 24-second countdown with 24 Chinese solar terms was shown during the innovative opening Ceremony, China has been displaying its cultural identity with breakthrough visual spectacles and projecting its image as an advanced and responsible country. The combination of cultural heritage with advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, machine vision, 5G, and cloud broadcasting, represents China as a technologically and culturally savvy global superpower.

Integration into the Diplomatic System

Cultural diplomacy is guided by a country's overall diplomacy. The country plays the leading and coordinating role in stipulating the national strategy to ensure macroscopic integrity and comprehensiveness. However, under globalization, the formulation of national strategies and policies has been influenced by many international actors such as foreign governments or NGOs. In China, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs all undertake the function of cultural diplomacy. Yet, the development of cultural diplomacy needs a unified national policy with the active involvement of all levels of government, NGOs, individuals, embassies, consulates abroad, CIs, and overseas Chinese cultural centers. Therefore, China's cultural diplomacy requires a competent department to unify its development

plan. Additionally, the means of monitoring and benefiting public opinion must be improved. The closure of a single CI can arouse strong repercussions in the international community, and sometimes positive reports about CIs have not been given adequate attention. A national-level evaluation and monitoring mechanism on public opinion is needed to accelerate the processing of negative public opinions and provide effective remedies.

The publicity of the national image should rely not only on key actors such as national media and diplomatic talents but also on overseas enterprises and citizens abroad. Every Chinese is potentially a credible and influential folk ambassador for people to understand China, such as Li Ziqi who has 10 million fans on YouTube who watch his videos about food-making on the basis of Chinese solar terms, traditional festivals, and customs. The videos are highly praised by viewers and have positively influenced China's image. In contrast, the exposure of uncivilized behavior by some Chinese traveler's hurts China's image. Improving people's awareness and perceptions will require a unified, long-term national strategy. In addition, China can increase the number of scholarships and training programs for political and academic representatives to visit China, and it can fund foreign academic institutions and scholars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to do systematic research on China. Such strategies of cultural diplomacy emphasize two-way behavior instead of simply exporting Chinese culture.

As the second largest economy in the world, China's cultural and creative industry doesn't match its economic status (Zhou, 2019). As the global culture industry changes, China must affirm innovation in this industry, run large-scale cultural enterprises that are internationally competitive, and cultivate qualified personnel who know the rules of world trade. Moreover, following the examples of Hollywood in the United States and Bollywood in India, China could develop its film industry so that overseas audiences can understand a historical and contemporary China. Only in this way can China's cultural diplomacy truly become a real arm of China's diplomacy.

Crucial Actors: NGO

Joshua Kurlantzick has underscored that the best way to deal with cultural diplomatic issues is the employment of NGOs. The inevitable rise of NGOs in the international community is determined by the characteristics of Western culture (Lester, 2004). Western society advocates values of democracy and freedom and instinctively rejects official diplomatic means. Traditional Chinese diplomacy has neither given enough attention to the recognition of ordinary foreign nationals towards China nor participated in international events in environmental, social security, and cultural fields. China is inexperienced in the use of international NGOs to facilitate co-operation between the government and NGOs. The strong political color of China's propaganda cannot arouse the applause of foreign nationals, so more NGOs need to bring real Chinese elements to the world. Attracting more nongovernmental forces can realize China's cultural diplomacy's strategy of combining government leadership and public autonomy. NGOs could be an important force in China's foreign cultural exchanges, such as the formation of The Chinese International Education Foundation, which will provide support for university-to-university partnerships and serve as the developmental vehicle for CI programs.

This thesis has explored how culture is China's cultural diplomacy's key component because China has historical advantages: its five-thousand-year civilization, rich tourist resources, advanced infrastructure industry, world-class ability to host mega-events, intangible cultural heritage, and global network of cultural promotion. However, China's international relations and economic development have been susceptible to political influence (Graham, 2006). During the worldwide outbreak of COVID-19, countries and their people displayed different reactions, resulting in diverse perceptions among foreign publics (Chen et al., 2020). China's perceived image changed from non-negative to negative, and the public's positive evaluation of China's national image reached an all-time low of 24% (Pew Research Center, 2020). While China has rich cultural resources, competitive advantages and innovations must be strengthened during the practice of cultural diplomacy. As Joshua Cooper Ramo commented, "in the past 30 years, China

has changed so fast that China's image cannot adapt to the rapid change of China's reality. China needs to figure out what kind of Chinese core values cultural diplomacy aims to promote or foreigners formulate their own perceptions of China regardless of the CCD's practice." CCD's policymaking should have an objective and clear understanding of its present national image. CCD ought to incorporate "Building a Community of Shared Future for Mankind" into its overall diplomatic framework and establish a long-term mechanism for cultural diplomacy. In confronting, and refuting, the "China Threat Theory," China needs to clarify its institutional roots and cultural genes and, through effective cultural exchanges, convey China's pursuit of peace, development, and co-operation. Cultural diplomacy means obtaining the cultural identity of both sides through interaction, especially at the interpersonal level. At the same time, Western observers should not underestimate the possibility that China may consciously integrate the flexibility and vitality of Western culture within its own stable traditional culture. In this way, China may provide a new cultural starting point for the civilization of mankind (Toynbee, 1987). China has set its sights on boosting its national image as a self-confident, trustworthy, cooperative, and peace-loving country, so the enduring task of China's cultural diplomacy is to help the world understand how after its rise China will use its power in peace, by peace, and for peace.

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Appendix

1. Questionnaire for Confucius Institute Students

Dear students of the Confucius Institute,

Thank you for taking part in this important study of the Confucius Institute. There is no right or wrong answer to the ten survey propositions; we simply would like to hear your thoughts and opinions. This questionnaire should take you only a few minutes to complete. Please be assured that all answers you provide will be kept strictly confidential. Thank you again for your time and support.

I. Personal Information

1. Gender □Male □ Female

2. Age ____

3. Education: □ Secondary Education □Undergraduate □ Bachelor's Degree
   □Postgraduate (master's, PhD)

4. Occupation: □Student □Government Employee □Private Sector Employee
   □Other_____

5. How long have you been studying at the Confucius Institute: □Less than 6 months
   □6-12 months □1-3 years □3-5years □5+ years

II. Questions Please tick the appropriate box after each of the following questions to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement on a scale of 1-7	1. totally disagree	2. strongly disagree	3. disagree	4. neither disagree nor agree	5. agree	6. strongly agree	7. totally agree
1. The courses offered by the Confucius Institute help me better understand China.							
2. The Confucius Institute provides educational and cultural exchanges between the two countries.							
3. The various programs of the Confucius Institute (such as scholarships, summer camps, local teacher training, and so on) provide good opportunities for me to study and conduct research in China.							
4. People around me think the Confucius Institute is a good place to know China and Chinese culture.							
5. The Confucius Institute provides us with a platform to know about China and Chinese culture.							
6. The experience in the Confucius Institute is helpful to my current or future career development.							
7. Because of the Confucius Institute, more and more people are learning Chinese.							
8. Because of the Confucius Institute, more and more people around here know about Chinese culture.							
9. The Confucius Institute's influence is growing in my country.							
10. The Confucius Institute plays a greater role in better shaping China's image in my country.							

Thank you for your cooperation!

2. Questionário para os alunos do Instituto Confúcio

Caros estudantes do Instituto Confúcio,

Bem-vindos ao nosso Questionário. Obrigado por participarem nesta pesquisa importante do Instituto Confúcio. Com este Questionário, que levará apenas uns minutos para a sua conclusão, gostaríamos de conhecer os vossos pensamentos e opiniões. Não há reposta certa ou errada para as dez questões do Questionário.

Garantimos que todas as respostas fornecidas serão mantidas em sigilo absoluto.

Agradecemos novamente o vosso apoio.

I. Informação pessoal

1. Sexo □Masculino □ Feminino

2. Idade ____

3. Educação: □Secundário □Aluno Universitário□ Bacharelado □ Pós-graduação (Mestrado, Doutorado)

4. Ocupação: □ Estudante □ Funcionário do Governo □ Funcionário do Setor Privado □ Outro _____

5. Há quanto tempo você estuda no Instituto Confúcio: □ Menos de 6 meses □ 6-12 meses □ 1-3 anos □ 3-5 anos □ 5 anos ou mais

II. Questões: **Por favor, escolha o caixa aproriada após cada uma das seguintes perguntas para indicar seu nível de concordância ou discordância em uma escala de 1-7.** Instituto Confúcio(abreviação= IC)	*1.* *discordo* *totalmente*	*2.* *discordo* *fortemente*	*3.* *discordo*	*4.* *Nem* *discordo* *nem* *concordo*	*5.* *Concordo*	*6.* *Concordo* *fortemente*	*7.* *concordo* *totalmente*
1. As cursos oferecidos pelo IC ajudaram-me a entender melhor a China.							
2. O IC oferece intercâmbios educacionais e culturais entre os dois países.							
3. Os vários programas do IC (tais como Bolsas de Estudo, Acampamentos de Verão, formação de professores locais) oferecem boas oportunidades para estudar e efectuar pesquisas na China.							
4. As pessoas ao meu redor acham que o IC é um bom lugar para aprender a cultura chinesa e a China.							
5. O IC oferece uma plataforma para conhecer a China e a cultura chinesa.							
6. A experiência no IC é útil para o meu desenvolvimento de carreira atual ou futura.							
7. Por causa do IC, mais e mais pessoas estão aprendendo chinês.							
8. Por causa do IC, as pessoas daqui conhecem cada vez mais a cultura chinesa.							
9. A influência do IC está crescendo no meu país.							
10. O IC desempenha um papel no nosso país na formação de uma imagem melhor da China no meu país.							

Este é o final do questionário. Obrigada pela sua participação!

3. Cultural Dimensions of China and Partial PSCs

Country	Power Distance	Individualism	Masculinity	Uncertainty Avoidance	Long-Term Orientation	Indulgence
China	80	20	66	30	87	24
Angola	83	18	20	60	15	83
Cape Verde	75	20	15	40	12	83
Mozambique	85	15	38	44	11	80
São Tomé and Principe	75	37	24	70	32	41
Brazil	69	38	49	76	44	59
Portugal	63	27	31	99	28	31

4. The list of CIs and CCs in PSCs (Region)

BRAZIL

Confucius Institute and its Hosting Universities	Founding Time	Chinese Partner Institution
Confucius Institute at University Estadual Paulista	2008/07/24	Hubei University
Confucius Institute at University of Brasilia	2010/03/29	Dalian University of Foreign Languages
Confucius Institute at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro	2011/09/01	Hebei University
Confucius Institute at Federal University of Rio Grande Do Sul	2012/04/25	Communication University of China
Business Confucius Institute at FAAP	2012/07/19	University of International Business and Economics
Confucius Institute at the University of Pernambuco	2013/6/15	Central University of Finance and Economics
Confucius Institute at Federal University of Minas Gerais	2013/11/29	Hua Zhong University of Science and Technology
Confucius Institute at the State University of Pará	2014/07/17	Shandong Normal University
Confucius Institute at the Federal University of Ceará	2014/07/17	Nankai University
Confucius Institute at the State University of Campinas	2014/7/17	Northern Jiaotong University
Confucius Institute at the Federal University of Goias	2019/10/25	Hebei University of Chinese Medicine and Tianjin Foreign Studies University
Confucius Classroom at the Chinbra Chinese Language and Culture Center	2011/11/01	No Chinese Partner Institution
Confucius Classroom at the Sao Paulo Asian Cultural Center	2008/02/03	Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of The State Council
Confucius Classroom at Catholic University	2015/06/02	Central University of Finance and

of Pernambuco		Economics
Confucius Classroom at Santa Maria School in Pernambuco	2015/06/03	Central University of Finance and Economics
Confucius Classroom at Federal Fluminense University	2017/12/22	Hebei Normal University

PORTUGAL

Confucius Institute at University of Minho	2005/12/9	Nankai University
Confucius Institute at the University of Lisbon	2007/01/31	Tianjing Foreign Studies University
Confucius Institute at University of Aveiro	2014/09/21	Dalian University of Foreign Languages
Confucius Institute at University of Coimbra	2016/07	Zhejiang Chinese Medical University & Beijing International Studies University
Confucius Institute at University of Porto	2018/12/05	Guangdong University of Foreign Studies
Classroom at Colegio de Santo Tomás	2014/07/21	Tianjing Foreign Studies University
Confucius Classroom at The Oporto International School	2019/11/05	Nankai University

MOZAMBIQUE

Confucius Institute at Eduardo Mondlane University	2012/04/16	Zhejiang Normal University

EQUATORIAL NEW GUINEA

Confucius Institute at National University of Equatorial Guinea	2014/10/24	Zhejiang International Studies University

ANGOLA

Confucius Institute at Agostinho Neto University	2015/02/06	Harbin Normal University

CAPE VERDE

Confucius Institute at University of Cabo Verde	2015/12/18	Guangdong University of Foreign Studies

SÃO TOMÉ E PRÍNCIPE

Confucius Institute at São Tomé e Príncipe University	2018/09/05	Hubei University

East Timor

Confucius Classroom at the Institute of Business of East Timor	2019/12/13	Shanxi University

MACAO (CHINA)

Confucius Institute at the University of Macao	2017/10/27	Macao University