DSpace
 
  Repositório Institucional da Universidade de Aveiro > Instituto Superior de Contabilidade e Administração > ISCA - Artigos >
 Corporate dividend policies in bank-based and market-based systems: survey evidence from UK and Portugal
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item http://hdl.handle.net/10773/6777

title: Corporate dividend policies in bank-based and market-based systems: survey evidence from UK and Portugal
authors: Archbold, Stuart
Vieira, Elisabete F. Simões
keywords: Cash Dividends, Signalling Hypothesis, Clientele Hypothesis
issue date: 2010
publisher: ISEG
abstract: This paper reports the empirical results of a questionnaire survey about corporate dividend policy addressed to finance directors of UK and Portuguese listed firms. Similar to other studies (for example, Brav et al., 2005 in the US and Dhanani, 2005 in the UK), we survey 313 finance directors in the UK and 48 in Portugal to examine their views of and understanding about the dividend decision in order to compare practice with theoretical propositions to be found in the literature and to examine cross-country determinants of dividend policy. Our survey results demonstrate similarities in the responses from the UK and Portugal, but also substantive differences, particularly in respect of the interaction between dividend and investment decisions and views about the signalling consequences of dividends.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10773/6777
ISSN: 1647-225
publisher version/DOI: http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~pjms/
source: Portuguese Journal of Management Studies
appears in collectionsISCA - Artigos

files in this item

file description sizeformat
PJMS-XV-1-art2.pdfDocumento principal103.7 kBAdobe PDFview/open
Restrict Access. You can Request a copy!
statistics

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

Valid XHTML 1.0! RCAAP OpenAIRE DeGóis
ria-repositorio@ua.pt - Copyright ©   Universidade de Aveiro - RIA Statistics - Powered by MIT's DSpace software, Version 1.6.2